This article summarizes Chinese framework for regulating artificial intelligence and integrates evolutionary game theory with cost-benefit analysis to establish a model and simulation. This framework is employed to analyze the behavioral trends among three distinct entities: governmental bodies, third-party independent institutions, and AI companies within the context of regulatory relationship. The findings indicate that: (1) The cost-benefit dynamics within the regulatory legal nexus significantly influence the behaviors of these entities; (2) Under the condition of normalized government regulation approaching full enforcement, the behavioral choices of third-party independent institutions and AI companies exhibit cyclical fluctuations.The paper draws two principal conclusions: (1) The regulatory framework need to be tailored to the specific risks presented by AI and the relative costs and benefits of legal enforcement in different jurisdictions. (2) From a cost-benefit standpoint, government intervention in AI regulation ought to be circumscribed, with government regulation focusing on critical legal risks. Other aspects of regulatory control should be delegated to cooperative legal framework that allows the participation of the independent third-party institution,which brings a nuanced and specialized approach to the governance of AI.