

Article

COVID-19 is examining the EU and the Member States: the role of attitudes and sociodemographic factors on citizens' support towards national policies.

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Abstract: During March and April 2020, the European Union (EU) was the center of the COVID-19 pandemic. Many National Governments imposed severe lockdown policies to mitigate the health crisis. The European Parliament commissioned a survey to analyse the citizens' attitudes over a number of issues related to the COVID-19 pandemic. 21804 European citizens in 21 EU countries responded the survey between 23 April and 1 May 2020. The paper analyses empirically the individual satisfaction that European citizens have experienced over the measures taken by the respective National Governments to control the COVID-19 pandemic. The analysis is based on a micro-econometric model (ordered probit) that explains the citizens' satisfaction by a number of attitudes and sociodemographic factors. Our results reveal that Spaniards are the least satisfied citizens in comparison with Danes, Irish, Greeks and Croats who are the most satisfied nationals. The years of education and the social class also play a determinant role. We also find that the most important determinant is the political support to the Government, and that those who are more worried by the economy and the protection of individual rights are usually more critic with the measures than those who are more worried by the health consequences.

Keywords: COVID-19 pandemic; ordered probit; micro-econometric analysis; marginal effects; lockdown measures

1. Introduction

In December 2019, Chinese health authorities faced a group of severe cases of bilateral pneumonia in Wuhan City located in Hubei province, China. The Wuhan local government announced a strict quarantine in the city with the complete closure of the urban and intercity transport network and Wuhan Tianhe airport. The World Health Organization (WHO) calls the new infectious disease "COVID-19" and declares it as a global pandemic on March 11, 2020 (WHO, 2020a, b).

The official reactions to the pandemic has not been uniform and some countries have reacted with different speeds and measures that balanced the health care with the economic damage. Nevertheless, the majority of the EU Member States have decreed lockdowns mainly characterized by a strict and enforced confinement in which citizens were obliged to stay at home with a limited number of essential activities exceptions. Other less restrictive measures include banning large gatherings, school closures, closure of bars, restaurants and discos and selective geographical mobility closures. Italy was the first country to close schools, on Wednesday 4 March (CGTN, 2020). Andersson and Aylott (2020) review the Swedish strategy for being extremely different from the rest of the countries of the EU.

The containment of the pandemic spread has been a key challenge for EU National Governments as not many successful examples existed in the world. The lockdown imposed by the Chinese Government in 16 cities of Hubei Province that affected 50 million people cannot be easily transferred into more democratic regimes. Bull (2020) contends that “managing a public health crisis in a democracy involves striking a balance between measures protecting citizens and the social and economic impact of those decisions – meaning democratic politics cannot be suppressed.” Sohrabi et al. (2020) extracted the following learning points from the current pandemic: (1) lack of transparency; (2) travel restrictions delay; (3) quarantine delay; (4) public misinformation; (5) emergency announcement delay; inadequate research and development. In addition, Fetzer et al. (2020) contend that lockdowns reduce civil liberties, erode social capital and create a lot of stress and uncertainty about the economic situation.

In any case, the successful implementation of any containment measure will require public support. Bavel et al. (2020) make an explicit call for the scientific community to mobilize rapidly to produce research to directly inform policy and individual and collective behaviour in response to the pandemic. The authors select a number of topics within social context as the pandemic control usually requires a significant change in social behaviour. According to the authors, the extent and speed of the social behavioural change is affected by features such as social norms, social inequality, and culture and polarization.

Regarding social norms, this paper aims to contribute to the literature concerning how different traits such as sociodemographic variables and attitudes can affect the degree of citizens’ support towards the different measures taken by National Governments to control the COVID-19 in the EU. Thus, we will analyze how the support measured by the answers given to the question Q2 of the survey: “How satisfied or not are you with the measures your government has taken so far against the coronavirus pandemic?” The main determinants are studied according to a set of covariates that include sociodemographic factors such as country, gender, age, household size, no children presence in the household, marital status, years of education, social class and job status; and citizens’ attitudes such as voting participation in the last EU elections, national government support, personal position on whether health benefits are greater than economic damage, personal position on being in favor of limit individual rights, the use of apps to track people, own health concerns, others’ health concerns, being affected by some economic loss, do need help from others, do help others, do talk more to others and do engage online in COVID debates. Thus, our study will provide interesting insights with respect to the identification of the determinant factors that affect the citizens’ satisfaction experienced by the containment measures taken by the EU National Governments to control the COVID-19.

Our study presents several advantages over other existing studies. First, we directly examine the degree of citizens’ support measured by the satisfaction experienced with the measures taken by the government so far to control the pandemic. Other studies have examined a similar topic with presidential vote intention or institutional trust as dependent variables (Bol et al. (2020); Harell, 2020; Leininger and Shaub, 2020; Merley et al., 2020; Schraff, 2020). In this sense, Devine et al. (2020) contend that the pandemic has presented a unique opportunity to analyze the main theories in the trust literature. Second, our dataset is based on individual answers from a broad survey administered in 21 different EU countries, meanwhile the majority of the previous studies are only based in one country, so multinational comparisons are still scarce. In our case, it will be possible to analyze the existing differences at national level. And third, we consider a very extensive set of potential explanatory variables that include interesting individual attitudes as well as social effects caused by the current pandemic. We also consider sophisticated covariates that measure the degree of acceptance of measures that limit the individual civil rights –movements ban and the use of people tracking apps.

2. Literature review

Amat et al. (2020) contend that the current pandemic poses an unprecedented number of challenges to modern democracies that include a massive global public health problem, an unknown

economic recession and containment measures that subtly border and suppress civil democratic liberties. Empirical evidence shows that governments in charge during natural disasters, financial crisis or economic downturns (Achen and Bartels, 2017; Katz and Levin, 2016; Margalit, 2019; Quiroz-Flores and Smith, 2013) are usually punished in the next election unless they have shown proficiency and efficiency in the crisis management (Ashworth et al., 2018; Besley, 2007) or they have allocated enough donations and humanitarian aid that mitigate substantially the economic loss of the most affected households (Cole et al, 2012; Gallego, 2018). The last mechanism that gives politicians in cabinet an incumbent advantage is known in the literature as clientelism and consists in guaranteeing the votes of those voters who have received the humanitarian aid.

Evidently, it is still too early to find enough literature that analyzes the drivers of the political support of the measures taken by distinct levels of government to control the current pandemic. The methods range from social media and survey experiments to observational data. The majority of the studies analyze only one country with the exception of Bol et al. (2020) who analyzed 15 Western European countries during a period in which seven countries imposed national lockdowns. The authors find that incumbents have been benefited from the implemented measures as the vote intention for the current cabinet has increased by about four points, and trust in government and satisfaction with democracy by about 3 points. The authors conclude with a clear demonstration of “the retrospective evaluation of performance mechanism: it seems that citizens have understood that lockdowns were necessary and rewarded those responsible for them (p.2).”

The results of other studies (Harell, 2020; Leininger and Shaub, 2020; Merley et al., 2020; Schraff) are concordant with those found by Bol et al. (2020) with respect to that the health crisis has benefited the incumbent political parties. In fact, Schraff (2020) finds that collective angst caused by the pandemic leads citizens to convert existing institutions into life vests. On the other hand, the study by Amat et al. (2020) is the exception as the authors claim that the crisis may trigger a paradigmatic political attitudes change. Partisanship has been found to be an important political driver to support strict lockdown measures (Andersen, 2020; Gadarian et al., 2020; Grossman et al., 2020) in the case of the United States.

3. Data and variables

Our empirical analysis is based on a dataset obtained from the administration of a survey that analyses the European citizens' attitudes and opinions over the course of the COVID-19 pandemic. The survey was commissioned by the European Parliament and produced by Kantar (Zanc and Maillard, 2020). The survey was conducted using Kantar's online access panel between 23 April and 1 May 2020, and 21804 respondents in 21 EU Member States were finally gathered. Six Member States, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Cyprus, Malta and Luxembourg, were not finally covered in the analysis. The survey was limited to respondents aged between 16 and 64 for the majority of the countries, except for Bulgaria, Czechia, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia where the respondents' age was between 16 and 54. Representativeness at the national level was ensured by quotas on gender, age, and region. The sample error at national level was guaranteed to be lower than 3.1 at a confidence level of 95 percent due to the sample size of about 1000 interviews (Table A1).

At the time of the survey's fieldwork, some measures taken against the pandemic were softly modulated in some countries such as Denmark, Germany and Austria, while in others like, for example, Italy and Spain, strict lockdown restrictions still persisted. The questionnaire was structured in four parts: (1) How EU citizens are coping with the crisis; (2) Attitudes towards European action; (3) Attitudes towards the national response; and (4) Personal situation and individual freedoms. As said, the construction of the dependent variable for the econometric model is based on the answers given to the question Q2 of the survey: “How satisfied or not are you with the measures your government has taken so far against the coronavirus pandemic?”

Table A2 in the appendix shows the explanatory variables that are going to be used in the econometric model. It can be seen that there are 97 dummy variables, 8 base variables for socio-demographic determinants that correspond to: (1) country (Spain); (2) gender (male); (3) household

size (1 person); (4) children presence in the household (Yes); (5) marital status (married or living with partner); (6) terminal age of education (16 years or younger); (7) social class (semi or unskilled manual worker); and (8) employment status (employed full time -30 or more hours per week. In addition, we also include in the model 12 more variables and the corresponding base scenarios are: (1) the participation in the last 2019 May EU Election (voted); (2) National Government support in general (Totally support); (3) Personal position regarding whether the health benefits are greater or not than the economic damage (the health benefits are greater than the economic damage); (4) Personal position regarding the recent limitations to individual freedom (the fight against the Coronavirus pandemic fully justifies recent limitations to my individual freedoms; (5) Personal position regarding the use of apps to fight the virus expansion (Strongly in favor); (6) Own health concern because of the coronavirus (very concerned); (7) Health concern of family and friends because of the coronavirus (very concerned); (8) Economic loss caused by the pandemic (No); (9) Respondents receive help from people around them (Yes, definitely); (10) Respondents help other people in need (Yes, definitely); (11) Respondents are talking more often to people on phone, social media or apps (Yes, definitely); (12) Respondents engage online in debates on the measures applied against the coronavirus.

The answer format scale for the question Q2 is based on a 5-point semantic ordered scale formatted according to: (1) Not at all satisfied; (2) Not very satisfied; (3) Don't know/ Not applicable; (4) Fairly satisfied; and (5) Very satisfied. A majority of respondents (56%) say they are satisfied with the measures their government has taken so far against the Coronavirus pandemic, including 18% who say they are 'very satisfied'. However, 34% say they are not satisfied, and this includes 12% who say they are 'not at all satisfied'. The degree of satisfaction varies by country (highest in Denmark and Ireland, and lowest in Spain, Poland and France).

The answer format scale for the independent variables can be extracted from Table A2. For example, it can be seen that for the social class variable, the response options are based on an 8-point semantic scales according to: (1) semi or unskilled manual worker; (2) skilled manual worker; (3) Supervisory or clerical/ Junior managerial/ Professional/ administrator; (4) Intermediate managerial/ Professional/ Administrative; (5) Higher managerial/Professional/Administrative; (6) Student; (7) Retired and living on state pension only; (8) Unemployed (for over 6 months) or not working due to long term sickness. For brevity and document extension, we omit the rest of the format answer scales.

4. Econometric model. Results

The dependent variable for the econometric model is based on the answers given by the respondents to Q2 that deals with the satisfaction experienced on the measures taken by the governments against the coronavirus. As the responses are given in an ordinal scale of 5 points, we decide to use a heteroskedastic ordered probit model as the best approach to analyse the main determinants to explain the citizens' support. Homoscedastic ordered probit models assume that error variances are constant across observations, and this is a very strong assumption that can lead to biased parameter estimates in addition to miss-specified standard errors, so the analysis of heteroskedastic ordered probit models is highly recommended (Reardon et al., 2017). Some authors have also speculated that unmeasured variables can affect more the probability of support for some segments such as for example those partisans of the current cabinet than for others who are not partisans, then it will be inappropriate to consider that the model is homoscedastic (William, 2010).

In the current study, the heteroskedastic ordered probit model can be explained as the result of a latent variable model. Let y denote the random variable whose value ranges from 1 to 5, and the order of the values means that citizens are more satisfied with the anti-COVID-19 measures taken by the respective governments. Thus, the nature of the latent variable y^* is determined by:

$$y^* = x\beta + \sigma\varepsilon \quad (1)$$

$$\sigma = \exp(x\delta)$$

where x is a 1×97 vector formed by the dummy variables included in the model as the determinant factors, β and δ are two 97×1 vectors of parameters to be estimated by the model, ε is the error term that distributes as a standard normal distribution, and σ is the scale parameter that allows the

variance of the error term to vary for the heteroskedastic models. The model now determines four threshold parameters $\mu_1 < \mu_2 < \mu_3 < \mu_4$ that permit to link the observed dependent variable with the unobserved latent variable as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} y = 1 & \text{ if } y^* \leq \eta_1 \\ y = 2 & \text{ if } \eta_1 < y^* \leq \eta_2 \\ y = 3 & \text{ if } \eta_2 < y^* \leq \eta_3 \\ y = 4 & \text{ if } \eta_3 < y^* \leq \eta_4 \\ y = 5 & \text{ if } \eta_4 < y^* \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

The parameters are estimated by maximizing as usual the log-likelihood function which are consistent and asymptotically normal.

Table A3 in the appendix reports both the estimation results for the homoscedastic and heteroskedastic models. The homoscedastic model is characterized by a constant σ in equation 1. The signs of the parameters estimated in the homoscedastic model are informative as the sign determines the marginal effects for outcomes at the extreme of the distribution (not at all satisfied and very satisfied), but not for the intermediate outcomes (not very satisfied, don't know/not applicable and fairly satisfied). A brief first analysis of the table A3 shows that: (1) all the nationalities seem to be happier than Spanish; (2) females are happier than males; (3) larger households are less supportive than single households; (4) the children presence in the household does not affect the citizens' support; (5) marital status does not affect citizens' support; (6) education does not affect citizens' support; (7) Retired people are less supportive than unskilled manual worker; (8) Self-employed and unemployed citizens are a little bit less supportive than those who work full time; (9) the citizens who did not vote in the last EU election are less supportive than those who participated; (10) citizen who are less partisans of the national government are less supportive than those who are partisans; (11) the citizens who think that the economic damage is greater than the health benefits are less supportive than those who think the opposite; (12) the citizens who oppose more to any limitation of the individual freedoms are less supportive than those who favor the taken limitations; (13) who are less in favor of the use of trace apps to control the pandemic are less supportive than those who are in favor of the use; (14) the less concern citizens are about the own health, the more supportive are; (15) the concern about family and friends does not affect the support; (16) the citizens who have experienced some economic loss are less supportive than those who have not; (17) the citizens who have needed less help from other are less supportive than those who have needed help; (18) the attitude of helping others does not affect the support; (19) there is not a clear sign for the attitude of talking more to others during the pandemic; (20) and there is not either a trend for having participated in debates online about the measures taken by the government.

In the heteroskedastic model (Table A4), the absolute magnitude of the estimated parameters is uninformative, and for that reason, the marginal effects of the determinants on the probability of the outcome of being very satisfied will be commented. In this case, the marginal effects depend on the sign of the relevant coefficients, the relative value of the mean of the latent variable and the respective threshold parameters.

It can be seen that many coefficients for the countries are significant in both the latent model and the observed heterogeneity. For the rest of the determinants included in the analysis, there is at least one coefficient in the set of the dummy variables of each determinant for which the coefficient for the latent model or the variance is significant. In this respect, we also comment here that age was finally eliminated from the models as it was insignificant. All the threshold parameters are also significant. Finally, we test whether the heteroskedastic model is statistically different from the homoscedastic model using a likelihood ratio test concluding, unsurprisingly, that the heteroskedastic model is different and improves significantly the model fit (Df=97, Chisq=1071.3, Pr>2.2 10⁻¹⁶**). The marginal effects are also included in the table, but in order to summarize as much as possible the results, we only highlight the marginal effects of the outcome 5 which is associated to be very satisfied with the measures.

Figure 1 presents schematically the summary of the results.




Figure 1. Marginal effects for the experienced satisfaction with the measures taken by the government. (Very Satisfied).

It can be seen that the following determinants do not present significant effects: (1) Gender; (2) Household size; (3) Marital status; (4) Voting behavior in the last EU election; (5) Own health concerns; (6) having experienced some economic loss. In summary, from the 20 variables included in the analysis, we conclude that six variables do not have any significant effect on the probability of being very satisfied with the measures against COVID-19 taken by the government. Analyzing now the positive drivers respective the base scenarios, we find that: (1) respect to Spain, the rest of the nationalities have

a higher probability of being very satisfied, especially Danes (44%), Irish and Greeks (41%) and Croatians (40%); (2) Respondents who are still at school have a higher probability of four points of being very satisfied than full time employees. Finally, we present the negative results that is those cases who have less probability of being very satisfied with respect to the base scenario: (1) The households with no children have one percent less probability of being very satisfied than the households with children; (2) Those who have more years of education have two points less probability of being very satisfied than those who ended the education with 16 years or younger; (3) Respect to unskilled manual workers, there are at least five classes which have less probability of being very satisfied, especially the retired people have five points less.; (4) Respect to total governmental support, the lower partisanship citizens show the lower support for the measures is seen (-24% and -17%) but the relationship is not linear; (5) The citizens who focus more on the economic damage than on the health benefits have a lower probability (3 and 5 percent) of being very satisfied in comparison with those who contrarily focus more on the health benefits than on the economic damage; (6) The opposition to limit any individual right decreases the probability of being very satisfied in a range of 4 and 7 points in comparison with those who are in favor of the limitation; (7) A very similar pattern is observed for those who oppose to the use of apps to trace people (-3% and -6%) in comparison with those who are in favor of the use; (8) those who are fairly concerned about the health of others (family and friends) have one percent less probability of being very satisfied than those who are very concerned; (9) The citizens who definitely do not need help have less probability of being very satisfied (-3% and -5%) than those who are in such a need; (10) Those who are not really helping others have one percent less probability of being very satisfied than those who definitely are helping others; (11) Those who are taking somewhat more to others during the pandemic have 2 percent less probability of being very satisfied than those who definitely are talking more to others; and (12) those citizens who are less proactive in engaging in online debates about the pandemic measures have less probability (-3% and -4%) of being very satisfied than those who are very participative.

5. Discussion

Grossman et al. (2020) contend that governments play a central role in controlling pandemics by adopting different measures that impose costs and sacrifices to citizens. The coordination of the response measures of multiple layers of governmental agencies and entities is also crucial. This study analyzes the main determinants that explain the satisfaction experienced by citizens in 21 EU countries of the anti COVID-19 measures taken by the governments. Figure 1 shows that there are 14 determinants (sociodemographic, attitudes and effects) that affect significantly the probability of being very satisfied with the anti COVID-19 measures taken by the respective 21 countries in the EU included in the analysis. By magnitude order, the main determinants observed are country differences, general support to governments (partisanship) and position of being in favor or not of civil rights limitations.

Amat et al. (2020) contend that the response to the pandemic has been mostly handled at national level, and that the leadership of the EU has not existed, and even competition among member states to buy in the stressed medical supplies market has existed. Similarly, the pandemic has brought to light an important feature of the divisive union regarding the capacity to respond to the health crisis (Celi et al., 2020). Unfortunately, we cannot compare our results regarding the country differences obtained, as to our knowledge, this is the first study analyzing multi-national responses. We can only speculate that the causes to observe such differences between Spain and the rest of the countries could be rooted in three distinct categories: (1) the weak support that the government coalition (PSOE-Podemos) has in the National Parliament (155 out of 350); (2) the strong support that separatist parties have in some regions of Spain especially Catalonia and the Basque Country; and (3) the lack of resources that the Health Alert and Emergency Coordination Centre has to coordinate a total decentralized health national system of 17 very different regional health systems. Legido-Quigley et al. (2020) find five important lessons that can be drawn to combat the pandemic: (1) health regional systems need more financial resources; (2) the long term underinvestment in health services has

stressed has impaired the system in the moment of necessity; (3) Spanish residents have responded very professionally so far but their demands need to be attended to guarantee this conduct in the near future; (4) Different government layers need to be better coordinated and politicians should not extract situational rents; (5) Spain will need to rearm its previously strong health sector.

In line with previous studies, we find that the degree of partisanship influences the support level (Gadarian et al., 2020; Grossman et al., 2020). Partisanship can be measured in different ways such as with political party affiliation or sympathy, intended vote choice for the next election, ideological position, mass media readership and viewership or general government support. Theodoridis (2017) contends that party identification (PID) is profusely handled in the political behavior literature, but its conceptualization and proper measurement is still in progress.

Andersen (2020) measures partisanship by the counties' vote for Donald Trump or Hillary Clinton in 2016 US President Election and also by Fox News viewership. The author finds that individuals in counties that supported Hillary Clinton in 2016 reduced their visits outside by an additional 0.13 percent per day, compared to counties that supported Donald Trump. Similarly, the author demonstrates that a one percentage point increase in Fox News viewership was associated with 0.06 percent more visits per day. Gadarian et al. (2020) measure partisanship with the sympathy degree to Democrats, Republicans and others measured with the PID scale, and find that partisanship is the single most consistent factor that explains the political support of the measures, and suggest that the public health message needs to take this into account for being decisive. The authors find strong evidence that relative to Republicans, Democrats are more significantly likely to report having adopted a number of health behaviors that include among others wash hands more, use sanitizers, avoid contact with others and gatherings and search information on COVID-19. Similarly, Democrats relative to Republicans exhibit more worrying attitudes about the pandemic. More interestingly, regarding the public health measures, the authors find that Democrats are much more likely to support all the measures related to physical distance such as cancelling public events, closing schools and facilitating paying sick leaves. Regarding bans and travel limitations, Democrats are less supportive than Republicans with respect to air travel restrictions, ban entry from China/UK/Italy, close Mexican border, put in quarantine people travelling from China and Italy. Grossman et al. (2020) measure partisanship with past electoral returns at county level (using Trump vote in the 2016 presidential election) and analyze how partisanship mediates the relationship between governors' COVID-19 communications and residents' engagement in physical distancing. The authors find that governors' tweet messages that suggest voluntary 'stay home' measures have a significant effect on residents' mobility, and the effects are more intense in Democratic counties. Interestingly, they also observe that Democratic counties were more responsive to Republican governors than Republican counties. The authors show that, on average, Democratic governors have been encouraging 'staying at home' messages earlier than Republican governors.

The measures taken that limit civil rights can be analyzed from multiple lenses. For example, Amat et al. (2020) contend that the pandemic is seen as an opportunity for governments to centralize, to accumulate power and to increase surveillance and citizens' control beyond democratic borders as citizens are normally willing to exchange civil rights for more protection and pandemic control. The authors find that Spanish citizens are willing to support drastic measures even if they curtail basic civil liberties, and the anti COVID-19 measures are more drastically supported than those measures taken against climate change or terrorism. Tepe et al. (2020) analyze the policy tradeoff preferences of Germans of the response to COVID-19 to minimize the number of deaths with two interesting treatments giving information to the respondents about the associated costs in terms of: (1) economy frame -loss of economic wealth caused by insolvencies, unemployment and public debt; and (2) freedom frame -long term restrictions of civil liberties (assembly and movement freedoms). The authors find that both treatments reduce the support of the saving lives measure and the economy frame reduction is greater than the freedom frame. Our results are a little bit different as we have found that, in Tepe's frames, the marginal effects reduction of being very satisfied with the measures

are greater in the case of 'freedom' than in the case of 'economy'. Our results are not directly comparable as we are only analyzing the tail of the distribution and Tepe's results are made taking into account the whole sample considering no-effects and two treatments.

6. Conclusions

Based on a broad dataset from a survey of citizens of 21 EU member states, this paper empirically tests the individual support of the anti COVID-19 measures taking by the national governments, which have been characterized by lockdowns that impose strict and enforced confinements in which citizens were obliged to stay home with a limited number of essential activities exceptions such as going to work, buying groceries or exercising individually in a surrounding area of the home location. The support varies very much by country because the pandemic effects have also varied in different countries of the EU, affecting more intensely to Italy and Spain. The lockdowns have been highly contested by some groups that include also refuted epidemiologists that especially emphasized the economic damage and the limitation of civil rights. Given this context, the study econometrically examines whether twenty determinants that include sociodemographic factors, attitudes and COVID-19 individual effects affect the citizens' support.

Our micro-econometric analysis, based on a heteroskedastic ordered probit model, shows that there are 14 determinants that affect the highest citizens' support (those who manifest to be very satisfied) to anti COVID-19 measures taken by governments in 21 EU countries. On the other hand, six determinants name list gender, household size, marital status, voting behavior in the last EU election, own health concerns and having experienced some economic loss, do not significantly affect the highest citizens' support. The results provide valuable insights on how the measures have been: (1) more supported in some countries such as Denmark, Ireland, Greece and Croatia in comparison with Spain; (2) less supported for those citizens who are not partisans of the respective government in each country; (3) less supported for citizens who have a personal position of neither limiting civil rights nor using trace apps; and (4) less supported for those who think that the economic damage is greater than the health benefits regarding the consequences of the anti COVID-19 measures. Important lessons can be taken to respond to future pandemics. In this respect, as the partisanship seems to play a relevant role in supporting the government measures, it will be crucial for future pandemics to explore the role that 'rally around the flag' (Hetherington and Nelson, 2003) can play with more unanimous support in the National Parliaments, or even in the European Parliament giving a more prominent role to the European Institutions.

In line with other studies (Reardon et al., 2017), our econometric analysis methodologically clearly supports the empirical evidence regarding that the use of more simple homoscedastic ordered probit specifications to analyze the main determinants that explain the acceptance of policy measures can mislead the results and distort the conclusions. For example, the gender plays a very different role when the heteroscedastic model is used instead of the homoscedastic model.

This study presents a number of possible extensions for future research. For example, the possible negative effects of lockdowns on mental, physical health and subjective well-being of citizens is an interesting research area (Sibley et al., 2020). Winter et al. (2020) assess and validate in English the Fear of COVID-19 scale. The authors find that the scale is negatively correlated with well-being and with the citizens who report themselves as more conservative.

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1 Appendix A

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Table A1. Sample features

Country	Frequency	Percentage (%)
France	1054	4,8
Germany	1054	4,8
Spain	1054	4,8
Italy	1054	4,8
Netherlands	1046	4,8
Belgium	1046	4,8
Austria	1041	4,8
Poland	1051	4,8
Sweden	1041	4,8
Finland	1049	4,8
Denmark	1025	4,7
Bulgaria	1020	4,7
Croatia	1029	4,7
Czech	1011	4,6
Greece	1050	4,8
Hungary	1043	4,8
Ireland	1019	4,7
Portugal	1026	4,7
Romania	1017	4,7
Slovakia	1035	4,7
Slovenia	1039	4,8
Total	21804	100,0

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Table A2. Definitions of the independent variables

Variable	Categories	Definition
21 country dummy variables	Country1	France
	Country2	Germany
	Country3 (Base)	Spain
	Country4	Italy
	Country5	Netherlands
	Country6	Belgium
	Country7	Austria
	Country8	Poland
	Country9	Sweden
	Country10	Finland
	Country11	Denmark
	Country12	Bulgaria
	Country13	Croatia
	Country14	Czech
	Country15	Greece
	Country16	Hungary
	Country17	Ireland
	Country18	Portugal
	Country19	Romania
	Country20	Slovakia
	Country21	Slovenia
4 gender dummy variables	Gender1 (Base)	Male
	Gender2	Female
	Gender 3	I don't identify as either
	Gender4	Prefer not to answer
4 household size dummy variables	HHsize1 (Base)	1
	HHsize 2	2
	HHsize 3	3
	HHsize 4	4 or more

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Variable	Categories	Definition
1 no children presence in the household dummy variable	Ch_Presence(N)	There are no children in the household
6 marital status dummy variables	MarSta1 (Base)	Married/living with partner
	MarSta2	Never married (single)
	MarSta3	Divorced/widowed
	MarSta4	Living with parents
	MarSta5	Domestic partner/living with other adults
	MarSta6	NA
4 terminal age of education dummy variables	Edu1 (Base)	16 years or younger
	Edu2	17-19 years
	Edu3	20 years or older
	Edu4	Still studying
8 social class dummy variables	SClass1 (Base)	Semi or unskilled manual worker
	SClass2	Skilled manual worker
	SClass3	Supervisory or clerical/ Junior managerial/ Professional/ administrator
	SClass4	Intermediate managerial/ Professional/ Administrative
	SClass5	Higher managerial/Professional/Administrative
	SClass6	Student
	SClass7	Retired and living on state pension only
	SClass8	Unemployed (for over 6 months) or not working due to long term sickness
9 employment status dummy variables	Employ1 (Base)	Employed full time (30+ hours per week)
	Employ2	Employed part time (less than 30 hours per week)
	Employ3	Self-employed
	Employ4	Retired/Unable to work/Disabled

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Variable	Categories	Definition
	Employ5	Still at school
	Employ6	In full time higher education
	Employ7	Unemployed and seeking work
	Employ8	Not working and not seeking work
	Employ9	Prefer not to say
3 dummy variables regarding the participation in 2019 May EU elections	VoteEU1 (Base)	Voted
	VoteEU2	Did not vote
	VoteEU3	Don't know/Not applicable
5 dummy variables regarding National Government support in general	Gov_Sup1 (Base)	Totally support
	Gov_Sup2	Tend to support
	Gov_Sup3	Tend to oppose
	Gov_Sup4	Totally oppose
	Gov_Sup5	Don't know/Not applicable
7 Dummy variables regarding the personal position between the health benefits and economic damage	HBvsED1 (Base)	1 - The health benefits are greater than the economic damage
	HBvsED2	2
	HBvsED3	3
	HBvsED4	4
	HBvsED5	5
	HBvsED6	6 - The economic damage is greater than the health benefits
	HBvsED7	Don't know/Not applicable
7 Dummy variables regarding the personal position on the recent limitations to my individual freedoms	LimIndFree1 (Base)	1 The fight against the Coronavirus pandemic fully justifies recent limitations to my individual freedoms
	LimIndFree2	2
	LimIndFree3	3
	LimIndFree4	4
	LimIndFree5	5

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Variable	Categories	Definition
	LimIndFree6	6 I am strongly opposed to any limitations of my individual freedoms, regardless of the Coronavirus pandemic
	LimIndFree7	Don't know/Not applicable
5 dummy variables regarding the personal position on the use of apps to fight the virus' expansion	AppsUse1 (Base)	Strongly in favour
	AppsUse2	Somewhat in favour
	AppsUse3	Somewhat opposed
	AppsUse4	Strongly opposed
	AppsUse5	Don't know/Not applicable
5 dummy variables regarding the own health concern because of the coronavirus	Health1 (Base)	Very concerned
	Health2	Fairly concerned
	Health3	Not very concerned
	Health4	Not at all concerned
	Health5	Don't know/Not applicable
5 dummy variables regarding the health concern of family and friends because of the coronavirus	Health_Fam1 (Base)	Very concerned
	Health_Fam2	Fairly concerned
	Health_Fam3	Not very concerned
	Health_Fam4	Not at all concerned
	Health_Fam5	Don't know/Not applicable
1 dummy variable that reflects whether the respondent is suffering some economic loss	Eco_loss	Loss of income, difficulties in paying bills/rents, partial unemployment or bankruptcy, difficulties in having decent meals
5 dummy variables regarding if respondents receive help from people around them	Helped1 (Base)	Yes, definitely
	Helped2	Yes, somewhat
	Helped3	No, not really
	Helped4	No, not at all
	Helped5	Don't know/Not applicable
5 dummy variables regarding if	Helping1 (Base)	Yes, definitely
	Helping2	Yes, somewhat

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Variable	Categories	Definition
respondents help other people in need	Helping3	No, not really
	Helping4	No, not at all
	Helping5	Don't know/Not applicable
5 dummy variables regarding if respondents talk more often to people on phone, social media or apps	Talk1 (Base)	Yes, definitely
	Talk2	Yes, somewhat
	Talk3	No, not really
	Talk4	No, not at all
	Talk5	Don't know/Not applicable
5 dummy variables regarding if respondents engage online in debates on the measures applied against the coronavirus	Debates1 (Base)	Yes, definitely
	Debates2	Yes, somewhat
	Debates3	No, not really
	Debates4	No, not at all
	Debates5	Don't know/Not applicable

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Table A1. Homoscedastic model

Variable	Definition	Model	Marginal effects				
		Coefficient	Freq=1	Freq=2	Freq=3	Freq=4	Freq=5
Country1	France	0.1944***	-0.0131***	-0.0507***	-0.0045***	0.0398***	0.0284***
Country2	Germany	0.6924***	-0.0465***	-0.1804***	-0.0160***	0.1419***	0.1010***
Country4	Italy	0.4348***	-0.0292***	-0.1133***	-0.0100***	0.0891***	0.0634***
Country5	Netherlands	1.0710***	-0.0720***	-0.2790***	-0.0247***	0.2195***	0.1562***
Country6	Belgium	0.6585***	-0.0443***	-0.1715***	-0.0152***	0.1349***	0.0960***
Country7	Austria	1.2256***	-0.0824***	-0.3193***	-0.0283***	0.2511***	0.1788***
Country8	Poland	0.8204***	-0.0551***	-0.2137***	-0.0189***	0.1681***	0.1197***
Country9	Sweden	0.8714***	-0.0586***	-0.2270***	-0.0201***	0.1786***	0.1271***
Country10	Finland	0.9733***	-0.0654***	-0.2536***	-0.0224***	0.1995***	0.1420***
Country11	Denmark	1.4701***	-0.0988***	-0.3829***	-0.0339***	0.3012***	0.2144***
Country12	Bulgaria	0.8171***	-0.0549***	-0.2128***	-0.0188***	0.1674***	0.1192***
Country13	Croatia	1.3922***	-0.0936***	-0.3627***	-0.0321***	0.2853***	0.2031***
Country14	Czech	0.9449***	-0.0635***	-0.2461***	-0.0218***	0.1936***	0.1378***
Country15	Greece	1.3751***	-0.0924***	-0.3582***	-0.0317***	0.2818***	0.2006***
Country16	Hungary	0.6345***	-0.0426***	-0.1653***	-0.0146***	0.1300***	0.0925***
Country17	Ireland	1.3954***	-0.0938***	-0.3635***	-0.0322***	0.2859***	0.2035***
Country18	Portugal	1.1157***	-0.0750***	-0.2906***	-0.0257***	0.2286***	0.1627***
Country19	Romania	0.4425***	-0.0297***	-0.1153***	-0.0102***	0.0907***	0.0645***
Country20	Slovakia	1.0446***	-0.0702***	-0.2721***	-0.0241***	0.2140***	0.1523***
Country21	Slovenia	1.0792***	-0.0725***	-0.2811***	-0.0249***	0.2211***	0.1574***
Gender2	Female	0.0598***	-0.0040***	-0.0156***	-0.0014***	0.0123***	0.0087***
Gender 3	I don't identify as either	0.2088	-0.0140	-0.0544	-0.0048	0.0428	0.0305
Gender4	Prefer not to answer	0.2439	-0.0164	-0.0635	-0.0056	0.0500	0.0356
HHsize 2	2	-0.0510.	0.0034.	0.0133.	0.0012.	-0.0105.	-0.0074.
HHsize 3	3	-0.0668*	0.0045*	0.0174*	0.0015*	-0.0137*	-0.0097*
HHsize 4	4 or more	-0.0525.	0.0035.	0.0137.	0.0012.	-0.0108.	-0.0077.
Ch_Presence(N)	There are no children in the household	-0.0131	0.0009	0.0034	0.0003	-0.0027	-0.0019

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Variable	Definition	Model	Marginal effects				
		Coefficient	Freq=1	Freq=2	Freq=3	Freq=4	Freq=5
MarSta2	Never married (single)	-0.0153	0.0010	0.0040	0.0004	-0.0031	-0.0022
MarSta3	Divorced/widowed	-0.0465	0.0031	0.0121	0.0011	-0.0095	-0.0068
MarSta4	Living with parents	0.0218	-0.0015	-0.0057	-0.0005	0.0045	0.0032
MarSta5	Domestic partner/living with other adults	-0.0187	0.0013	0.0049	0.0004	-0.0038	-0.0027
MarSta6	NA	-0.1327*	0.0089*	0.0346*	0.0031*	-0.0272*	-0.0194*
Educ2	17-19 years	0.0019	-0.0001	-0.0005	0.0000	0.0004	0.0003
Edu3	20 years or older	0.0179	-0.0012	-0.0047	-0.0004	0.0037	0.0026
Edu4	Still studying	-0.0126	0.0008	0.0033	0.0003	-0.0026	-0.0018
SClass2	Skilled manual worker	-0.0384	0.0026	0.0100	0.0009	-0.0079	-0.0056
SClass3	Supervisory or clerical/ Junior managerial/ Professional/ administrator	-0.0361	0.0024	0.0094	0.0008	-0.0074	-0.0053
SClass4	Intermediate managerial/ Professional/ Administrative	-0.0294	0.0020	0.0077	0.0007	-0.0060	-0.0043
SClass5	Higher managerial/Professional/Administrative	-0.0237	0.0016	0.0062	0.0005	-0.0048	-0.0035
SClass6	Student	-0.0072	0.0005	0.0019	0.0002	-0.0015	-0.0011
SClass7	Retired and living on state pension only	-0.1244**	0.0084*	0.0324**	0.0029*	-0.0255*	-0.0181**
SClass8	Unemployed (for over 6 months) or not working due to long term sickness	-0.0258	0.0017	0.0067	0.0006	-0.0053	-0.0038
Employ2	Employed part time (less than 30 hours per week)	-0.0358	0.0024	0.0093	0.0008	-0.0073	-0.0052
Employ3	Self-employed	-0.0621.	0.0042.	0.0162.	0.0014.	-0.0127.	-0.0091.
Employ4	Retired/Unable to work/Disabled	-0.0079	0.0005	0.0021	0.0002	-0.0016	-0.0012
Employ5	Still at school	0.0079	-0.0005	-0.0021	-0.0002	0.0016	0.0012
Employ6	In full time higher education	0.0182	-0.0012	-0.0047	-0.0004	0.0037	0.0027
Employ7	Unemployed and seeking work	-0.0555.	0.0037.	0.0145.	0.0013.	-0.0114.	-0.0081.
Employ8	Not working and not seeking work	-0.0404	0.0027	0.0105	0.0009	-0.0083	-0.0059

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Variable	Definition	Model	Marginal effects				
		Coefficient	Freq=1	Freq=2	Freq=3	Freq=4	Freq=5
Employ9	Prefer not to say	-0.0617	0.0041	0.0161	0.0014	-0.0126	-0.0090
VoteEU2	Did not vote	-0.0675***	0.0045***	0.0176***	0.0016***	-0.0138***	-0.0098***
VoteEU3	Don't know/Not applicable	-0.0586.	0.0039.	0.0153.	0.0014.	-0.0120.	-0.0085.
Gov_Sup2	Tend to support	-1.2181***	0.0819***	0.3173***	0.0281***	-0.2496***	-0.1777***
Gov_Sup3	Tend to oppose	-2.2106***	0.1486***	0.5759***	0.0510***	-0.4530***	-0.3224***
Gov_Sup4	Totally oppose	-3.1360***	0.2108***	0.8169***	0.0723***	-0.6426***	-0.4574***
Gov_Sup5	Don't know/Not applicable	-1.7409***	0.1170***	0.4535***	0.0401***	-0.3567***	-0.2539***
HBvsED2	2	0.0379	-0.0025	-0.0099	-0.0009	0.0078	0.0055
HBvsED3	3	-0.0519	0.0035	0.0135	0.0012	-0.0106	-0.0076
HBvsED4	4	-0.0889**	0.0060**	0.0231**	0.0020**	-0.0182**	-0.0130**
HBvsED5	5	-0.2542***	0.0171***	0.0662***	0.0059***	-0.0521***	-0.0371***
HBvsED6	6 - The economic damage is greater than the health benefits	-0.5678***	0.0382***	0.1479***	0.0131***	-0.1163***	-0.0828***
HBvsED7	Don't know/Not applicable	-0.0894*	0.0060*	0.0233*	0.0021*	-0.0183*	-0.0130*
LimIndFree2	2	-0.1320***	0.0089***	0.0344***	0.0030***	-0.0271***	-0.0193***
LimIndFree3	3	-0.2857***	0.0192***	0.0744***	0.0066***	-0.0585***	-0.0417***
LimIndFree4	4	-0.3933***	0.0264***	0.1025***	0.0091***	-0.0806***	-0.0574***
LimIndFree5	5	-0.4292***	0.0288***	0.1118***	0.0099***	-0.0880***	-0.0626***
LimIndFree6	6 I am strongly opposed to any limitations of my individual freedoms, regardless of the Coronavirus pandemic	-0.7536***	0.0506***	0.1963***	0.0174***	-0.1544***	-0.1099***
LimIndFree7	Don't know/Not applicable	-0.3498***	0.0235***	0.0911***	0.0081***	-0.0717***	-0.0510***
AppsUse2	Somewhat in favour	-0.1449***	0.0097***	0.0377***	0.0033***	-0.0297***	-0.0211***
AppsUse3	Somewhat opposed	-0.2794***	0.0188***	0.0728***	0.0064***	-0.0573***	-0.0408***
AppsUse4	Strongly opposed	-0.4534***	0.0305***	0.1181***	0.0105***	-0.0929***	-0.0661***
AppsUse5	Don't know/Not applicable	-0.2645***	0.0178***	0.0689***	0.0061***	-0.0542***	-0.0386***
Health2	Fairly concerned	0.0795**	-0.0053**	-0.0207**	-0.0018**	0.0163**	0.0116**
Health3	Not very concerned	0.1654***	-0.0111***	-0.0431***	-0.0038***	0.0339***	0.0241***

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Variable	Definition	Model	Marginal effects				
		Coefficient	Freq=1	Freq=2	Freq=3	Freq=4	Freq=5
Health4	Not at all concerned	0.1248***	-0.0084**	-0.0325***	-0.0029**	0.0256**	0.0182**
Health5	Don't know/Not applicable	0.0555	-0.0037	-0.0145	-0.0013	0.0114	0.0081
Health_Fam2	Fairly concerned	0.0329	-0.0022	-0.0086	-0.0008	0.0067	0.0048
Health_Fam3	Not very concerned	0.0101	-0.0007	-0.0026	-0.0002	0.0021	0.0015
Health_Fam4	Not at all concerned	-0.0141	0.0009	0.0037	0.0003	-0.0029	-0.0021
Health_Fam5	Don't know/Not applicable	0.1089	-0.0073	-0.0284	-0.0025	0.0223	0.0159
Eco_loss	Loss of income, difficulties in paying bills/rents, partial unemployment or bankruptcy, difficulties in having decent meals	-0.1122***	0.0075***	0.0292***	0.0026***	-0.0230***	-0.0164***
Helped2	Yes, somewhat	-0.1414***	0.0095***	0.0368***	0.0033***	-0.0290***	-0.0206***
Helped3	No, not really	-0.1840***	0.0124***	0.0479***	0.0042***	-0.0377***	-0.0268***
Helped4	No, not at all	-0.2136***	0.0144***	0.0556***	0.0049***	-0.0438***	-0.0312***
Helped5	Don't know/Not applicable	-0.1533**	0.0103**	0.0399**	0.0035**	-0.0314**	-0.0224**
Helping2	Yes, somewhat	0.0169	-0.0011	-0.0044	-0.0004	0.0035	0.0025
Helping3	No, not really	-0.0042	0.0003	0.0011	0.0001	-0.0009	-0.0006
Helping4	No, not at all	0.0157	-0.0011	-0.0041	-0.0004	0.0032	0.0023
Helping5	Don't know/Not applicable	-0.0950*	0.0064*	0.0247*	0.0022*	-0.0195*	-0.0139*
Talk2	Yes, somewhat	-0.0401*	0.0027*	0.0104*	0.0009.	-0.0082*	-0.0058*
Talk3	No, not really	-0.0164	0.0011	0.0043	0.0004	-0.0034	-0.0024
Talk4	No, not at all	-0.0070	0.0005	0.0018	0.0002	-0.0014	-0.0010
Talk5	Don't know/Not applicable	-0.0516	0.0035	0.0135	0.0012	-0.0106	-0.0075
Debates2	Yes, somewhat	-0.0835.	0.0056.	0.0218.	0.0019.	-0.0171.	-0.0122.
Debates3	No, not really	-0.0926*	0.0062*	0.0241*	0.0021*	-0.0190*	-0.0135*
Debates4	No, not at all	0.0016	-0.0001	-0.0004	0.0000	0.0003	0.0002
Debates5	Don't know/Not applicable	-0.0316	0.0021	0.0082	0.0007	-0.0065	-0.0046
Threshold parameters							
	μ_1	-3.4185***					

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Variable	Definition	Model	Marginal effects				
		Coefficient	Freq=1	Freq=2	Freq=3	Freq=4	Freq=5
	μ_2	-2.1584***					
	μ_3	-2.0386***					
	μ_4	-0.1126					
Model adjustment							
	Log-Likelihood	-21401.82					
	McFadden's R2	0.2738					
	AIC	43005.65					

Significant codes: '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1

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Table A2. Heteroskedastic model

Variable	Definition	Model		Marginal effects				
		Coefficient	SD	Freq=1	Freq=2	Freq=3	Freq=4	Freq=5
Country1	France	0.1015***	0.0382	-0.0088	-0.0535***	-0.0060***	0.0191	0.0493***
Country2	Germany	0.3154***	0.0608	-0.0237***	-0.1478***	-0.0179***	0.0155	0.1740***
Country4	Italy	0.1969***	0.0174	-0.0193***	-0.1047***	-0.0112***	0.0431*	0.0921***
Country5	Netherlands	0.5062***	0.1711***	-0.0264***	-0.1898***	-0.0260***	-0.0825***	0.3247***
Country6	Belgium	0.3065***	0.1347**	-0.0183***	-0.1319***	-0.0173***	-0.0164	0.1838***
Country7	Austria	0.5464***	0.0703	-0.0311***	-0.2152***	-0.0290***	-0.0701***	0.3454***
Country8	Poland	0.3700***	-0.0306	-0.0296***	-0.1836***	-0.0219***	0.0421*	0.1930***
Country9	Sweden	0.4130***	0.2552***	-0.0160***	-0.1496***	-0.0217***	-0.0855***	0.2727***
Country10	Finland	0.4443***	0.0842.	-0.0280**	-0.1869***	-0.0243***	-0.0295	0.2686***
Country11	Denmark	0.6662***	0.1335**	-0.0320***	-0.2300***	-0.0323***	-0.1473***	0.4416***
Country12	Bulgaria	0.3628***	0.0916*	-0.0243***	-0.1595***	-0.0202***	-0.0081	0.2121***
Country13	Croatia	0.6151***	0.1561***	-0.0303***	-0.2173***	-0.0303***	-0.1255***	0.4034***
Country14	Czech	0.4294***	0.1183**	-0.0258***	-0.1764***	-0.0232***	-0.0378*	0.2633***
Country15	Greece	0.6259***	0.1305**	-0.0313***	-0.2233***	-0.0311***	-0.1248***	0.4105***
Country16	Hungary	0.2873***	0.0459	-0.0231***	-0.1394***	-0.0165***	0.0263	0.1526***
Country17	Ireland	0.6267***	0.1247**	-0.0314***	-0.2238***	-0.0312***	-0.1250***	0.4114***
Country18	Portugal	0.5070***	0.0266	-0.0313***	-0.2125***	-0.0280***	-0.0378*	0.3096***
Country19	Romania	0.2020***	0.1389**	-0.0090.	-0.0887***	-0.0123***	-0.0137	0.1238***
Country20	Slovakia	0.4637***	0.0479	-0.0298***	-0.1982***	-0.0257***	-0.0244	0.2781***
Country21	Slovenia	0.4795***	-0.0494	-0.0324***	-0.2174***	-0.0281***	0.0009	0.2770***
Gender2	Female	0.0256***	-0.0268.	-0.0072***	-0.0172***	-0.0004	0.0217***	0.0032
Gender 3	I don't identify as either	0.0550	0.0245	-0.0047	-0.0296	-0.0033	0.0113	0.0263
Gender4	Prefer not to answer	0.0791	-0.0582	-0.0152	-0.0541	-0.0032	0.0551	0.0174
HHsize 2	2	-0.0233.	0.0219	0.0065.	0.0153*	0.0004	-0.0189.	-0.0033
HHsize 3	3	-0.0267*	0.0297	0.0082*	0.0176*	0.0003	-0.0233*	-0.0028
HHsize 4	4 or more	-0.0255.	0.0145	0.0058	0.0162*	0.0008	-0.0171	-0.0056
Ch_Presence(N)	There are no children in the household	-0.0037	-0.0400*	-0.0046.	-0.0005	0.0013.	0.0137.	-0.0099.

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Variable	Definition	Model		Marginal effects				
		Coefficient	SD	Freq=1	Freq=2	Freq=3	Freq=4	Freq=5
MarSta2	Never married (single)	-0.0045	0.0202	0.0033	0.0040	-0.0004	-0.0097	0.0027
MarSta3	Divorced/widowed	-0.0130	-0.0010	0.0019	0.0078	0.0006	-0.0056	-0.0046
MarSta4	Living with parents	-0.0001	0.0089	0.0012	0.0007	-0.0003	-0.0034	0.0019
MarSta5	Domestic partner/living with other adults	-0.0035	0.0579.	0.0084	0.0054	-0.0015	-0.0236.	0.0113
MarSta6	NA	-0.0508*	-0.0020	0.0082	0.0307*	0.0023	-0.0244	-0.0167
Educ2	17-19 years	0.0021	-0.0953*	-0.0118*	-0.0088	0.0026.	0.0373*	-0.0192.
Edu3	20 years or older	0.0081	-0.1002**	-0.0141*	-0.0116	0.0025.	0.0418*	-0.0186.
Edu4	Still studying	-0.0029	-0.0805.	-0.0090	-0.0049	0.0025	0.0290	-0.0176
SClass2	Skilled manual worker	-0.0188	-0.0576*	-0.0044	0.0073	0.0026*	0.0127	-0.0183**
SClass3	Supervisory or clerical/ Junior managerial/ Professional/ administrator	-0.0137	-0.1045***	-0.0106**	0.0002	0.0037***	0.0327**	-0.0261***
SClass4	Intermediate managerial/ Professional/ Administrative	-0.0151	-0.1177***	-0.0117***	-0.0002	0.0042***	0.0366**	-0.0289***
SClass5	Higher managerial/Professional/Administrative	-0.0080	-0.0419	-0.0040	0.0017	0.0016	0.0121	-0.0114
SClass6	Student	0.0001	-0.0049	-0.0006	-0.0004	0.0001	0.0019	-0.0010
SClass7	Retired and living on state pension only	-0.0590**	-0.1861***	-0.0126**	0.0250	0.0093***	0.0291	-0.0507***
SClass8	Unemployed (for over 6 months) or not working due to long term sickness	-0.0195	-0.1116**	-0.0101*	0.0031	0.0044*	0.0310.	-0.0284**
Employ2	Employed part time (less than 30 hours per week)	-0.0059	0.0497*	0.0076.	0.0064	-0.0012	-0.0215*	0.0087
Employ3	Self-employed	-0.0242	0.0669*	0.0135**	0.0171*	-0.0010	-0.0357**	0.0061
Employ4	Retired/Unable to work/Disabled	-0.0062	0.0388	0.0062	0.0059	-0.0009	-0.0175	0.0062
Employ5	Still at school	0.0228	0.1223**	0.0135.	-0.0059	-0.0043**	-0.0392*	0.0359**
Employ6	In full time higher education	0.0087	0.0270	0.0022	-0.0033	-0.0012	-0.0067	0.0089
Employ7	Unemployed and seeking work	-0.0120	-0.0292	-0.0019	0.0052	0.0014	0.0054	-0.0101
Employ8	Not working and not seeking work	-0.0119	0.0742*	0.0124.	0.0105	-0.0017	-0.0332*	0.0120

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Variable	Definition	Model		Marginal effects				
		Coefficient	SD	Freq=1	Freq=2	Freq=3	Freq=4	Freq=5
Employ9	Prefer not to say	-0.0135	0.0797	0.0136	0.0115	-0.0018	-0.0359.	0.0126
VoteEU2	Did not vote	-0.0259**	0.0262.	0.0074**	0.0171***	0.0004	-0.0217**	-0.0033
VoteEU3	Don't know/Not applicable	-0.0200	0.0232	0.0063	0.0132.	0.0002	-0.0178	-0.0019
Gov_Sup2	Tend to support	-0.6094***	-0.3391***	0.0738***	0.3639***	0.0282***	-0.2265***	-0.2395***
Gov_Sup3	Tend to oppose	-1.0407***	-0.2594***	0.4469***	0.3366***	-0.0096***	-0.5637***	-0.2102***
Gov_Sup4	Totally oppose	-1.5004***	-0.0318	0.8510***	-0.0204.	-0.0277***	-0.6370***	-0.1660***
Gov_Sup5	Don't know/Not applicable	-0.8368***	-0.3363***	0.3637***	0.3403***	-0.0157***	-0.5609***	-0.1273***
HBvsED2	2	0.0028	-0.0593*	-0.0076*	-0.0064	0.0016	0.0239*	-0.0115
HBvsED3	3	-0.0398**	-0.1082***	-0.0073*	0.0171.	0.0053***	0.0194	-0.0345***
HBvsED4	4	-0.0591***	-0.0725*	-0.0001	0.0323**	0.0051***	-0.0038	-0.0334***
HBvsED5	5	-0.1369***	-0.0242	0.0213***	0.0835***	0.0064***	-0.0660***	-0.0451***
HBvsED6	6 - The economic damage is greater than the health benefits	-0.3028***	0.0864*	0.0962***	0.1573***	0.0034*	-0.1978***	-0.0590***
HBvsED7	Don't know/Not applicable	-0.0523**	-0.1370***	-0.0086.	0.0241.	0.0071***	0.0192	-0.0418***
LimIndFree2	2	-0.0635***	-0.1098***	-0.0041	0.0325***	0.0065***	0.0075	-0.0423***
LimIndFree3	3	-0.1324***	-0.1188***	0.0062	0.0806***	0.0100***	-0.0368***	-0.0600***
LimIndFree4	4	-0.1793***	-0.0857**	0.0210***	0.1131***	0.0101***	-0.0802***	-0.0640***
LimIndFree5	5	-0.1911***	-0.0510.	0.0306***	0.1199***	0.0087***	-0.0999***	-0.0593***
LimIndFree6	6 I am strongly opposed to any limitations of my individual freedoms, regardless of the Coronavirus pandemic	-0.3821***	0.0262	0.1192***	0.2024***	0.0044*	-0.2508***	-0.0752***
LimIndFree7	Don't know/Not applicable	-0.1706***	-0.1135**	0.0158*	0.1120***	0.0109***	-0.0771***	-0.0617***
AppsUse2	Somewhat in favour	-0.0630***	-0.0595**	0.0021	0.0346***	0.0048***	-0.0083	-0.0331***
AppsUse3	Somewhat opposed	-0.1223***	-0.0769**	0.0101*	0.0736***	0.0079***	-0.0402***	-0.0515***
AppsUse4	Strongly opposed	-0.1914***	-0.0161	0.0335***	0.1160***	0.0079***	-0.0983***	-0.0592***
AppsUse5	Don't know/Not applicable	-0.1130***	-0.1307***	0.0014	0.0684***	0.0098***	-0.0241.	-0.0555***
Health2	Fairly concerned	0.0392**	-0.0687**	-0.0139***	-0.0292***	0.0000	0.0441***	-0.0009
Health3	Not very concerned	0.0723***	-0.0969***	-0.0214***	-0.0521***	-0.0011	0.0697***	0.0049

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Variable	Definition	Model		Marginal effects				
		Coefficient	SD	Freq=1	Freq=2	Freq=3	Freq=4	Freq=5
Health4	Not at all concerned	0.0619***	-0.0399	-0.0128***	-0.0408***	-0.0022.	0.0419**	0.0139
Health5	Don't know/Not applicable	0.0384	0.0280	-0.0021	-0.0200	-0.0026	0.0043	0.0203
Health_Fam2	Fairly concerned	0.0076	-0.0605**	-0.0087**	-0.0090	0.0014.	0.0266**	-0.0102.
Health_Fam3	Not very concerned	0.0018	-0.0550*	-0.0070*	-0.0054	0.0015	0.0218.	-0.0109
Health_Fam4	Not at all concerned	-0.0064	0.0345	0.0056	0.0059	-0.0007	-0.0159	0.0052
Health_Fam5	Don't know/Not applicable	0.0102	-0.0942	-0.0117.	-0.0154	0.0021	0.0410	-0.0159
Eco_loss	Loss of income, difficulties in paying bills/rents, partial unemployment or bankruptcy, difficulties in having decent meals	-0.0469***	0.0478**	0.0127***	0.0318***	0.0010	-0.0393***	-0.0062
Helped2	Yes, somewhat	-0.0553**	-0.0650.	0.0002	0.0301**	0.0046**	-0.0039	-0.0311***
Helped3	No, not really	-0.0746***	-0.0781*	0.0015	0.0410***	0.0059***	-0.0082	-0.0402***
Helped4	No, not at all	-0.0903***	-0.0743*	0.0044	0.0507***	0.0065***	-0.0167	-0.0448***
Helped5	Don't know/Not applicable	-0.0575*	-0.1011*	-0.0038	0.0304.	0.0061**	0.0044	-0.0371***
Helping2	Yes, somewhat	-0.0012	-0.0537*	-0.0065.	-0.0033	0.0016	0.0199.	-0.0117
Helping3	No, not really	-0.0084	-0.0569*	-0.0058.	0.0009	0.0020*	0.0177	-0.0148*
Helping4	No, not at all	0.0029	-0.0023	-0.0007	-0.0019	-0.0001	0.0022	0.0005
Helping5	Don't know/Not applicable	-0.0324	-0.0489	-0.0012	0.0169	0.0031.	0.0017	-0.0204.
Talk2	Yes, somewhat	-0.0221*	-0.0393*	-0.0017	0.0105.	0.0022**	0.0048	-0.0159**
Talk3	No, not really	-0.0137	-0.0185	-0.0003	0.0070	0.0012	0.0006	-0.0085
Talk4	No, not at all	-0.0108	0.0780**	0.0126*	0.0103	-0.0018.	-0.0342**	0.0132
Talk5	Don't know/Not applicable	-0.0283	0.0294	0.0087	0.0182	0.0003	-0.0240	-0.0033
Debates2	Yes, somewhat	-0.0342	-0.1173**	-0.0090	0.0127	0.0053*	0.0252	-0.0342**
Debates3	No, not really	-0.0383	-0.1494***	-0.0125*	0.0125	0.0064**	0.0365.	-0.0429***
Debates4	No, not at all	0.0047	-0.1347**	-0.0177**	-0.0125	0.0036*	0.0535**	-0.0269*
Debates5	Don't know/Not applicable	-0.0208	-0.1049*	-0.0092	0.0046	0.0042.	0.0279	-0.0275*
	Threshold parameters							
	μ_1	-1.5923***						

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Variable	Definition	Model		Marginal effects				
		Coefficient	SD	Freq=1	Freq=2	Freq=3	Freq=4	Freq=5
	μ_2	-1.0112***						
	μ_3	-0.9594***						
	μ_4	-0.1308**						
	Model Adjustment: Log-Likelihood: -20866.18 No. Iterations: 26 McFadden's R2: 0.2920604 AIC: 42128.36							

Significant codes: '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1

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