

1 *Review*

2 **Energy policies and sustainable management of 3 energy sources**

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9 **Abstract:** Sustainability of current energy policies and known mid-term policies are analysed in
10 their multiple facets. First an overview is given about the trend of global energy demand and
11 energy production, analysing the share of energy sources and the geographic distribution of
12 demand, on the basis of statistics and projections published by major agencies. The issue of
13 sustainability of the energy cycle is finally addressed, with specific reference to systems with high
14 share of renewable energy and storage capability, highlighting some promising energy sources and
15 storage approaches.

16 **Keywords:** Sustainability; energy sources; renewable sources; energy efficiency; energy demand

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
18 **1. Introduction**

19 Sustainability involves a web of environmental, economic, and social factors and in the field of
20 energy it clearly shows its complex interdisciplinary nature.

21 A major issue arises from the inescapable depletion of fossil fuels. Formidable challenges and
22 dramatic choices will have to be faced to develop viable substitutes: development of renewable
23 sources is mandatory, but it is not exempt from drawbacks for energy security; nuclear could be
24 revitalized, but its well-known contraindications are to be faced and accepted. In general,
25 development of low-carbon energy sources also rises an issue of affordability.

26 On the other hand, the main source of concern is climate change and the energy-related air
27 pollution. It is well established that widespread exploitation of hydrocarbons is releasing Carbon
28 Dioxide (CO₂) at a rate higher than absorption by forests, oceans, and other natural CO₂ sinks and
29 that this is the main cause of the global temperature increase which is already perceived.

30 The scenarios and the outlooks for the emissions of Green House Gases (GHG) developed by
31 several international organizations clearly show that the goal of stopping the temperature rise before
32 half of the century would require strict energy policies. Even the commitments of the 196 countries
33 who signed the Paris agreement on climate change enforced in November 2016, will be enough to
34 slow and not yet to stop the rise in CO₂ emissions. Stronger efforts would be needed, with heavy
35 constraints about amount and quality of energy consumptions. This could be and has been in some
36 extent accepted in many mature economies: it is possible to improve the energy efficiency of
37 industrial processes, buildings, and vehicles, or even to modify certain lifestyles in a perspective of
38 eco-sustainability. Otherwise in emerging countries a reduced use of hydrocarbons would be an
39 unacceptable burden, as low-cost energy is essential for their industrial growth, which in turn is a
40 prerequisite for enabling access to wellness for populations so far deprived of it.



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42 **Figure 1.** Emissions of Green House Gases for selected energy sources. The histograms refer to
 43 average values, while the error bars correspond to the reported values (Data sources: [1,2,3])

44 Actually, another issue of sustainability is access to energy: today swathes of the global
 45 population have no access to electricity (16% of world's population, and nearly un third of total
 46 African population [4]). Their number is going to reduce, but not to disappear in the next decades
 47 (they have been estimated to be still half a billion in 2040).

48 The perspective of reducing exploitation of fossil fuels could also pose an issue of sustainability
 49 for the prospected regulatory policies should manage in a planned way the reduction of global
 50 production of fossil fuels, avoiding sudden changes in availability of energy sources, as could arise
 51 in case of indefinite prosecution of current energy consumption patterns. They also should manage
 52 economic and social modifications in the countries that currently are more strongly linked to fossil
 53 fuel exploitation. This is also a matter of sustainability, when it is intended in its widest meaning [5].

54 In the next section an overview is given about the trends of global energy needs and production
 55 on the basis of the statistics and projections published by major international organizations [6] - [9].
 56 The share among energy sources, the geographic distribution of consumptions and their
 57 medium-term evolution scenarios are reported and analysed. Sustainability of some promising
 58 technologies is analysed in Sec. 3.

59 **2. Evolution of energy needs and regulation policies**

60 According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), to date the global energy
 61 production is larger than 15,000 Mtoe, and is mainly intended for industry and transportation [7].


62 The amount and quality of energy needs in the near future are the subject of great attention, as
 63 most anthropogenic CO₂ is produced in the energy sector. Thus, several organizations like EIA and
 64 IEA (the International Energy Agency), provide long term outlooks, referred to different sets of
 65 assumptions about international policies, economic growth and investments in the energy sector.

66 A crucial role will be played by the technological improvements achieved both in energy
 67 production and in user installations. In turn, they will be both affected by non-technological issues
 68 like the price of energy, which in turn is dependent on factors like the amount of oil produced by
 69 OPEC and the political stability in oil-producing countries.

70 Some effects of different assumptions on energy consumptions are addressed by taking into
 71 account, both a Reference Scenario with a reference 3%/year increase of the World Gross Domestic
 72 Product, and High/Low-Economic-Growth scenarios as well as High/Low-Oil-Price scenarios. The
 73 price of oil is indeed doubly linked to the rate of economic growth: in case of stagnation, the low
 74 energy demand could lead to an oversupply that would limit the oil price (the price of North Sea

75 Brent crude could remain in the range 40-60 \$/barrel (in 2016 dollars) until 2040). In this scenario,
 76 interest in the development of renewable energies and of the technologies for sustainability of
 77 energy consumption would be rather feeble. In contrast, in case of robust economic growth, the
 78 strong energy demand would push the price of oil, which could exceed \$ 220/barrel in 2040. Despite
 79 the economic prosperity, in this scenario the attention to energy policies could be much higher.
 80 Therefore, EIA developed separate outlooks for the different scenarios.

81 IEA also developed outlooks referred to different sets of environmental policies. The reference
 82 scenario (IEA New Policies Scenario) is based on already-announced policy commitments and plains
 83 for reduction of greenhouse-gas emissions and improvements of energy efficiency. With respect to
 84 the prosecution of current trends, it predicts some mitigation of environment modification rates,
 85 which are indeed not sufficient to stop the global temperature increase, which would be around
 86 +4°C by 2035 instead of +6°C, as a result of unstopped increase of carbon emissions (the
 87 energy-related emissions would rise by 34% in 2040). According to this scenario, the global energy
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
89 *Source of data: IEA Key World Energy Statistics 2017*

90 **Figure 2.** Total final consumption by sector and scenario in 2040 and share among the fields of use.
 91 (Data from IEA, Key World Energy Statistics 2017 [6]

92 demand will rise to 16,000 Mtoe in 2020 and then will continue rising with an average growth rate of
 93 about 1.4 % / year, driven by increase of population and economic activities. It will exceed 20,000
 94 Mtoe in 2040, with the industry sector still accounting for more than 31% of the overall energy
 95 consumption (Fig. 2).

96 Otherwise the goal of stopping temperature increases, albeit in the second half of the century, is
 97 achieved by the IEA 450 scenario. It is a set of challenging energetic policies, intended to limit the
 98 concentration of net CO₂ in the atmosphere to 450 ppm in 2035, in order to have a 50% chance to
 99 limit the temperature increase to + 2°C.

100 On the other hand, this goal would require very strong efforts for decarbonisation and
 101 larger investments (nearly double than in the reference scenario) in low-carbon energy sources,
 102 as well as in efficiency and in Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) systems [10]. As shown in fig.
 103 3, in addition to an overall reduction of energy demand it entails a wider use of renewable and
 104 nuclear energy sources.



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Figure 3. Outlook for world Total Primary Energy Supply to 2040 by source and scenario [6].

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The target temperature increase (+ 2°C in 2035) set in the 450 Scenario is the same agreed by the 196 countries participating at the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference, COP 21, held in Paris [11]. They also pledged to make efforts to further lower the temperature increase to 1.5 °C, anticipating achievement of the zero net CO₂ emissions and stopping of temperature increase to the period 2040 – 2060.

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However, even in the most challenging scenarios, the prospected global reduction of fossil fuels would take place only in the long term. Thus, for the sake of energy security, in the short term a large share of investments will be still devoted to oil, gas and coal extraction, in order to maintain a fair set of operating oil fields.

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
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Some countries (UE, Japan) are well underway to meet their climate pledges. The US, during the Obama Administration, enforced the Clean Power Plan (CPP), capable to give a 2.5% contribution to global carbon reduction. Unfortunately, it has been questioned by the Trump administration and the future environmental contribution from of the US is somewhat uncertain. Otherwise, developing countries, especially India and other non-OECD countries (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD), will be responsible of more than 80% of the increase in energy demand and fossil fuel consumptions (see Fig. 4).



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Source: EIA, International Energy Outlook 2017

Figure 4. Projected growth in energy demand inside the OECD and outside it (quadrillion BTU)[7].

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The outlooks also predict the trend of fossil fuels production.


According to EIA [7] natural gas is going to undergo the fastest growth among fossil fuels: in 2040 its production will be increased by 50% (nearly 1.5%/yr), supported by the production of non-conventional gas [8], and will provide 28-29% of global consumption, with a share nearly equivalent to coal and renewable energy sources. The growth of natural gas will be only limited by economical competition with other sources: despite the low carbon emissions, low capital costs and

131 high operational flexibility of gas-fired plants, the gap with costs of coal supplies will be still limiting
 132 their economical appeal.

133 An interesting market development will arise from the quick increase of Liquified Natural Gas
 134 (LNG). It allows gas trading among countries not connected to specific infrastructures, and will
 135 promote the expansion of exporters like US and Australia, allowing new actors to step into this
 136 market.


137 Consumption of oil and other liquid fuels (see Fig. 5) will be almost stable in the long term the,
 138 as the increase in the developing countries will be offset by decrease in the OCSE countries, where
 139 oil demand will be limited to petrochemicals, aviation, freight. Oil production will take place
 140 mainly in middle-east, with a minor contribution from US arising by the tight oil, extracted by
 141 hydraulic fragmentation from geologic formations of low permeability.

142 In general, the oil demand will also depend on economic trends, especially in the emerging
 143 countries, which in turn will be linked to a series of geopolitical factors that hardly can be traced
 144 back to a mathematical model. Indeed after the OPEC decided to reduce oil prices (from over \$100



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146 Figure 5. Production of liquid fuels by type (millions of barrels per day) (1 barrel = 0.14 toe). Source of
 147 data EIA, *International Energy Outlook 2017* [7].




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149 Figure 6. Price of crude oil in the last 5 years (US \$). (Source of data: Nasdaq [12]).

150 per barrel in mid-2014 to below \$40 in early-2016, see Fig. 6), a certain uncertainty arose about the
 151 payback times of the upstream investments to search and develop new oil fields. Thus after 2015
 152 investments sharply dropped. This situation is harmful for energy security, as the existing fields

153 have a limited operating time and in the first 2020's they could be not sufficient to match demand,
 154 with a likely new boom of prices and backlashes on the global energy market. In that situation the
 155 tight oil produced in the US would be a valuable resource, even if with limited geographical spread.

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158 **Figure 7.** Projected coal consumption in the largest coal consumers (quadrillion Btu). The expected
 159 effect of the Clean Power Plan is also highlighted. (Source: EIA, *Analysis of the Impacts of the Clean*
 160 *Power Plan, 2015*[13]).

161 Coal production will remain nearly stationary on a global scale, at least in the Reference
 162 scenario (Fig. 7): it is going to reach a plateau in China [7] and to decrease in higher-income
 163 economies (-60% in the EU, -40% in the USA). On the other hand, this reduction is going to be offset
 164 by the increase expected in India and, in a lesser extent, in other emerging economies, which cannot
 165 afford to neglect such a low-cost source. In fact, coal prices, despite the rebound observed in 2016,
 166 (Fig. 8) currently are going to level off at values making coal still economically competitive with
 167 natural gas.




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169 **Figure 8.** Price of coal in the last 5 years (US\$/t) (Source: [14]).

170 Nearly 25% of the global increase in energy production is currently destined to electricity
 171 production. In future this share is going to rise to 40% in the main scenario and up to 85% in the 450
 172 scenario. Only 15% of this increase will occur in OECD countries. The increase will mostly take place
 173 in non-OECD Asia, notably in India and China. Thus, the environmental impact of energy
 174 production will be mostly determined by the energy policies taken in these countries.

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Source: EIA, International Energy Outlook 2017

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Figure 9. Projected growth of electricity production from different energy sources (PWh). (Source of data: EIA, *International Energy Outlook 2017* [7]).

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Production of electrical energy is currently supported for about 75% from fossil fuels, for 10% from nuclear, for 10% from hydroelectricity and only for 5% from renewable sources. It is expected that global production of electricity will rise from the current 25 billion kWh to 37 billion kWh in 2040 (see Fig. 9). The use of fossil fuels for electricity generation will continue to rise, mostly for increase of natural gas [8].

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
Coal plants for electricity production are the largest source of energy-related CO₂ emissions and will remain so in the next decades, even if their share of pollution will be reduced due to a larger exploitation of natural gas.

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In the market of energy production, CO₂ emissions are continuing to rise in the non-OECD area, despite specific emissions are expected to decrease from today's 515 gCO₂/kWh to 335 gCO₂/kWh in the Main Scenario or down to 80 gCO₂/ kWh in the 450 scenario (Fig. 10). Otherwise in OECD countries the trend of emissions will be sharply decreasing, as a result of increased deployment of alternative energy sources, like renewables and nuclear, and of enhanced efforts to increase energy efficiency.

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Actually the share of renewable sources is expected to undergo a strong increase (300%), mainly driven by wind farms (see Fig. 11), while hydroelectric production will grow at a smaller rate (40-50%).




Source: EIA, International Energy Outlook 2017

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Figure 10. Energy-related CO₂ emissions (billion metric tons). (Source of data: EIA, *International Energy Outlook 2017* [7]).



202
203 **Figure 11.** Projected growth of electricity production from renewable sources (PWh). Other sources
204 include: Biomass, waste, tide/wave/ocean.(Source of data: EIA, *International Energy Outlook 2017* [7]).

205 Similarly, an increased share of nuclear power is considered in most scenarios. In particular, the
206 planned stop to the increase of coal consumption in China will be enabled by a massive deployment
207 of nuclear installations. On the other hand, despite nuclear power is undoubtedly a low-carbon
208 technology and cannot be neglected in a world where the main concerns arise from global warming
209 and depletion of fossil fuels [2], its sustainability is largely questioned for the release of radioactive
210 waste. Reprocessing techniques are available, but a small amount of radioactive end product still is
211 produced and has to be stored over a very-long term. Concrete structures have been built with an
212 expected life of 10,000 years (twice the Egyptian pyramids), but after this enormous amount of time
213 the radioactivity and the lethal potential of nuclear waste will be only partially mitigated. Even the
214 idea of storing nuclear waste in deep geological cavities is not free from drawbacks [15], [16].

215 In order to understand the relevance of nuclear technology, in 2011 IEA also developed a
216 low-nuclear 450 scenario [17] with a share of nuclear energy halved with respect to the Reference
217 Scenario. In order to achieve the 450ppm target large costs would be required for a wider
218 deployment of CCS and other means to absorb the residual CO₂ emissions. Limitations to the
219 growth of energy consumption would also need to be applied, with relevant effects especially in the
220 economy of developing countries. Most of all, a larger contribution from variable renewable sources
221 would be required, with implications on the energy security.

222 Energy efficiency has been also acknowledged as a basic energy source [18]. Its potential
223 highlighted by comparing the data on the global energy production (15000 Mtoe) with the final
224 energy consumption (< 9000 Mtoe)[19]. For example: the average efficiency of the coal-fired and
225 gas-fired thermal power plants around the world is around 33%, whereas the best plants currently in
226 operation can provide efficiencies larger than 50%.

227 In different application fields the potential energy savings are bounded to specific technological
228 issues: for example, in the industrial field relevant energy savings can be provided by improvements
229 in the process efficiencies; in the field of transportation, advantages would arise by shifting a share
230 of road freight traffic to rail or to ship; in private transport, savings would arise by increasing the
231 share of electric vehicles; in the residential field, improvements could arise by introduction of
232 sustainability criteria in building construction and by more efficient air conditioning techniques.

233 Electricity consumption could be also halved in a range of end-use applications (e.g. fans,
234 pumps, compressors, refrigerators) simply by upgrading electric motors power supplies with
235 inverter drives.

236 Further relevant savings could arise from reduction of the losses along electricity distribution
237 grids: they are nearly 2% in Europe, are larger than 5% in many countries, including India where,
238 despite recent improvements, they are still close to 20%.

239 **3. Renewable sources and sustainable management of the cycle of energy**

240 Renewable energy sources are important not only for being never-extinguishing, but also for
241 their reduced environmental footprint or, more generally, for their sustainability.

242 In general, the requirement of sustainability involves closed-cycle energy sources, where
243 negligible amounts of resources are absorbed and released, and/or the produced end results can be
244 used as base resources for other cycles. [20].

245 In the field of thermal generation, thermal solar and biomasses are maybe the most interesting
246 technologies. Moreover, biomasses are characterized by a close approximation to a closed life-cycle:
247 in fact, energy is produced releasing as a waste product CO₂, which can be fixed in new vegetal
248 species by photosynthesis and solar radiation, so that the process can be supplied indefinitely. The
249 consumption of other resources is linked to construction of the conversion plants and of the energy
250 distribution infrastructures, transport of the biomasses to the facilities themselves and energy
251 transport to the user. Among other advantages, biomass installations can easily operate at variable
252 power, with short response times, following the trend of energy demand.

253 Actually, environmental sustainability of biomasses is the subject of a quite lively debate.
254 Cultivation of the biomasses intended for energy production takes territory, and for this reason it is
255 in competition with the crops intended for food production. Consequently, the relevance of their
256 contribution for global energy production is still debated. Other doubts on their use derive from the
257 concern that the profitability of crops intended for energy production can boost deforestation and
258 anthropization of wild lands, that otherwise should be protected as a shelter for biodiversity.

259 Among biomasses, an interesting development occurred for wood pellets, which are
260 establishing as an energy source for heat generation in homes and small industries. Moreover, in
261 countries like United Kingdom, The Netherlands and Belgium, they are also in use for utility-scale
262 electricity generation.

263 In the field of energy production, a large growth is expected for renewable sources (2.6%/yr in
264 the NPS scenario, i.e. nearly 60% of new energy installations by 2040). Technological advances and
265 economies of scale are expected to make them competitive even in the presence of reduced or null
266 subsidies: e.g. prices of solar PV are expected to drop by 40-70%, prices of onshore wind by 10-15%.
267 Environmental footprint of solar photovoltaic is quite large, mainly for the amount of energy
268 required for solar cells manufacturing of solar cells, which is just a few orders of magnitude smaller
269 than their expected energy production over the lifetime. From this point of view, wind energy is
270 preferred.

271 On the other hand, the variable renewable sources like solar PV, wind and waves show
272 prominent periodic variations, both hourly and seasonal, superimposed to large random
273 fluctuations. As long as they will be providing a minor share in the energy systems, it will be
274 possible to stabilize the balance between demand and production against their variations by
275 strengthening the grid, or arranging other power plants ready to dispatch at short notice. Otherwise,
276 in the systems where they will provide relevant share (say, higher than 25%) this approach will not
277 be feasible. First, in order to guarantee energy security against their fluctuations, an extra capacity
278 has to be provided (it has been estimated that at least 40% extra capacity would be needed for the EU
279 grid). This, in turn, will make available surplus energy for long periods (estimated 1/3 of time in EU
280 and 1/5 of time in the US and India). Therefore, spreading of renewable energy sources will be
281 accompanied by deployment of a consistent storage capacity.

282 The available energy storage technologies use different forms of energy (Table 1): gravitational
283 in hydroelectric reservoirs, electrochemical in batteries, electrostatic in supercapacitors, kinetic in
284 flywheels, magnetic in SMES, mechanic in compressed-air tanks.

285 At present no technology has been established as the most promising, both for different
286 performance in terms of storage duration or response time and for different issues of sustainability.
287 Among technologies suitable for seasonal storage, the batteries have problems with raw materials,
288 which could be toxic (e.g. Lead, of Cd) or not abundant on the Earth's crust (Li [21]). Hydro-electrical
289 basins have a relevant impact on landscapes, could modify local microclimate and could affect
290 economy of the downstream populations. Therefore, the available sites are nearly saturated.

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Table 1. Storage technologies

Storage technology	Specific Energy	Energy density
	(MJ/kg)	(MJ/liter)
Liquid hydrogen	141.86	8.491
Hydrogen (compressed at 700 bar)	141.86	1.3-1.6
Li-Ion batteries	0.4-0.9	0.9-2.7
Alkaline batteries	0.5	1.3
Lead batteries	0.17	0.56
Supercapacitors	0.01-0.04	0.06-0.05
Air (compressed at 200 bar)	0.5	0.14
Water (100m height)	0.001	0.001


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293 Compressed air requires enormous geological cavities, like depleted oil fields, and are not
 294 easily found.

295 A very attractive approach is energy storage in the chemical bonds of hydrogen molecules
 296 [18],[19]. Hydrogen is easy to be transported, in tanks or via pipelines. It also allows long term
 297 storage, similarly to hydroelectricity and compressed air. Moreover, its specific energy (142MJ / kg)
 298 is by far the largest among the considered energy carriers.

299 On the other hand, energy density of H₂ is considerably lower than that of fossil fuels (e.g. it is
 300 nearly 20% of that of natural gas, at the same pressure), albeit comparable with other storage
 301 technologies, (V. Table 1) [22].

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304 **Figure 12.** Energy balance in the different hydrogen integration schemes.(FC: Fuel Cell, GT: Gas
 305 Turbine). (Source of data: IEA 2015 [23]).

306 The environmental impact of the life-cycle of hydrogen depends on the specific production
 307 process: the most efficient process is Steam Reforming, but it is using some form of hydrocarbons.
 308 On the other end, hydrogen could be produced by electrolysis, consuming mainly water and
 309 electricity, which could be entirely supplied from renewable sources. Unfortunately, the overall
 310 efficiency varies between 20% and 30%, depending on the specific process (see fig. 12), so that
 311 potential appeal of Hydrogen for widespread use is to some extend limited.

312 4. Conclusions

313 Sustainability of energy cycles has been analysed in terms of some economic, social and
 314 environmental facets. The projections on energy consumption show that in the next two
 315 decades major changes will take place in energy consumption, in its geographical

316 distribution and in the composition of the energy portfolio. Relevant climate and economic
317 changes are forthcoming and immediate promotion of policies for sustainability, as agreed
318 among the countries participating at the Conference of Paris, appears the only option to
319 avoid, or at least to minimize, the shocks connected to unmodified prosecution of current
320 energetic and environmental policies.

321 **Acknowledgements**

322 The authors thank Prof. Vittorio Cecconi for the stimulating discussions on the topics of this
323 article.

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