This paper sets out to reconsider the Hohfeldian framework of rights in celebration of the centenary anniversary of Hohfeld's death. It begins by conceptualising each of the Hohfeldian incidents or rights before outlining the molecular or complex structure of rights to ‘things’. I adopt a broad use of the term of ‘right’ and apply it to Legal, Moral, Equitable and Human conceptions and constructions. It sets out an argument in favour of a further definitional model - in addition to Hohfeld’s scheme of opposites and correlatives – which focuses on the function of these conceptual rights. Finally, it will consider the broader implications of how rights are held and the relationships which these rights govern. Ultimately, this paper seeks to demonstrate the benefit, and indeed necessity, of the Hohfeldian model in any discussion of rights. Without it ‘rights talk’ is debased and impoverished.