Edalat, A.; Ghorban, S.H.; Ghoroghi, A. Ex Post Nash Equilibrium in Linear Bayesian Games for Decision Making in Multi-Environments. Games2018, 9, 85.
Edalat, A.; Ghorban, S.H.; Ghoroghi, A. Ex Post Nash Equilibrium in Linear Bayesian Games for Decision Making in Multi-Environments. Games 2018, 9, 85.
Edalat, A.; Ghorban, S.H.; Ghoroghi, A. Ex Post Nash Equilibrium in Linear Bayesian Games for Decision Making in Multi-Environments. Games2018, 9, 85.
Edalat, A.; Ghorban, S.H.; Ghoroghi, A. Ex Post Nash Equilibrium in Linear Bayesian Games for Decision Making in Multi-Environments. Games 2018, 9, 85.
Abstract
We employ the solution concept of ex post Nash equilibrium to predict the interaction of a finite number of agents competing in a finite number of basic games simultaneously. The competition is called a multi-game. For each agent, a specific weight, considered as private information, is allocated to each basic game representing its investment in that game and the utility of each agent for any strategy profile is the weighted sum, i.e., convex combination, of its utilities in the basic games. Multi-games can model decision making in multi-environments in a variety of circumstances, including decision making in multi-markets and decision making when there are both material and social utilities for agents as, we propose, in the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Trust Game. Given a set of pure Nash equilibria, one for each basic game in a multi-game, we construct a pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium for the multi-game. We then focus on the class of so-called uniform multi-games in which each agent is constrained to play in all games the same strategy from an action set consisting of a best response per game. Uniform multi-games are equivalent to multi-dimensional Bayesian games where the type of each agent is a finite dimensional vector with non-negative components. A notion of pure type-regularity for uniform multi-games is developed and it is shown that a multi-game that is pure type-regular on the boundary of its type space has a pure ex post Nash equilibrium which is computed in constant time with respect to the number of the types and is independent of prior probability distributions. We then develop an algorithm, linear in the number of types of the agents, which tests if a multi-game is pure type-regular on the boundary of its type space in which case it returns a pure ex post Nash equilibrium for the multi-game.
Keywords
Bayesian game, Ex post Nash equilibrium, Prisoner's Dilemma, Trust Game
Subject
Computer Science and Mathematics, Computer Science
Copyright:
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
