

# 1 Dutch Delta Resiliency by Societal Learning 2 Introducing the Intertwined Process of Daily Practice and 3 Theory Development

4 Dr. F.C. Sanders MSc. MBA1 Senior-Fellow2 ORCID: 0000-0003-1180-4656

5 <sup>1</sup> Delft University of Technology, Architecture and the Built Environment, Urbanism

6 <sup>2</sup> TSM Twente School of Management, Enschede in the Netherlands.

7 E-Mail: F.C.Sanders@tudelft.nl - Mobile phone: +31 654773140

8

9 **Abstract:** The Wester coastal Delta zone of the Netherlands is the relatively more crowded area of  
10 the country where ten of the seventeen million people live. The governmental prognosis is that  
11 this number of people will increase steadily in the coming decennia, unless the threat of climate-  
12 change seawater level rising. This is the picture in more Delta zones globally what makes the topic  
13 of resiliency for these delta-areas of importance. Approaches of resiliency are often dominated by  
14 governmental rescue planning and believe in technology solutions, while in the process the behav-  
15 iour of people can make the difference in overcoming climate-change impact disasters. In the  
16 struggle against high water storming and flooding, the Dutch people prove this by developing so-  
17 cietal resilient behaviour in a broad spectrum of activities. Post-PhD research on Dutch resilient  
18 behaviour in the in 1016-flooded Zaanstreek-Waterland area near the city of Amsterdam confirms  
19 that. Recently research by questionnaire among citizens in this region shows that people have fa-  
20 vour for shared responsibility with government and related professional organizations. The Dutch  
21 examples of societal resiliency carried by people also show a action-learning perspective inter-  
22 twined with governmental contingency planning. Therewith the Dutch practice shows a positive  
23 cross-fertilization of practice and knowledge development.

24 **Keywords:** water-resilience; climate-change; action-learning; and resident-empowerment  
25

---

## 26 1. Dutch practice of Climate-change 'Water Resilience' <sup>1</sup> (Sanders, 2018)

27 An Old Dutch saying tells 'God created the world, but the Dutch created the Netherlands', un-  
28 less the fact that in the past the Western part of the country counted flooding regularly. History tells  
29 us about the highlights; how the severe storms of 1421 and 1675 for instance braked through dunes  
30 and dikes by which layers of peat poured into the sea disturbing the landscape creating open water  
31 areas in the countryside, with new threats for the people. Unless these water areas were made dry  
32 in later decennia, creating 'polders', in more recent times the floods of 1916 and the last flood of  
33 1953 unexpectedly again set large polder land areas under water (Aten, 2009). The most severe  
34 floods though stimulated the Dutch to start defence planning, as these were:

- 35 • The 'Saint Nicolas' flooding of 1196 in the Northwestern part of the country, near the city of  
36 Alkmaar, by seawater braking through the dunes using an old gully. The villages in the area de-  
37 cided to build a new dike for protection and they divided the work. The effect was the creation  
38 of the first Water-authority in the Netherlands by Count Willem I in 1214.
- 39 • The 'Saint Elisabeth' flooding of 1421 resulted in sea-dikes breaking in the Southwestern and  
40 Northwestern row of dunes resulting in the seawater finding its way to the land. Almost thirty  
41 villages flooded and 2.000 residents did not survive.

---

<sup>1</sup> The former RRAU18 post-PhD congress paper on resilience among residents of the Zaanstreek-Waterland area is used for the content of the chapters 1 to 4 [Sanders 2018].



79 For the Dutch situation every structural seawater-level rise can be far-reaching and will influence  
80 the circumstances of the people and their land, whereby the national and global debate on sea-  
81 water-level raise development (IPCC, 2007) (UN, 2015) (Delta-commission, 2017) (Deltares, 2018)  
82 undoubtedly influences the feelings and worrying of the people.

83 That's why a former post-PhD research focussed on the resiliency of the people behaviour in  
84 such flood disaster situations, research done in the Zaanstreek-Waterland area situated adjacent to  
85 Amsterdam a 100 years after the 1916 flooding (Sanders, 2018). This area, however, concerns a rural  
86 area in the situation of nowadays that most people live in cities increasingly. Which implicitly  
87 makes it important for a total picture to expand this research into the city. For the new added re-  
88 search the research question remains unchanged:

### 89 *How do people act resilient, in a context of governmental disaster management?*

90 The answer on this research question is sought in the combining of both research results by;  
91 presenting the Dutch resiliency developed attitude first [chapter 2] with working-out a definition  
92 for 'water resilience' [chapter 3], with subsequent the presentation of these research results [chap-  
93 ters 5, 6 and 7], for working-out conclusions and thoughts [chapters 8 and 9].

## 94 **2. Dutch Practice of Action-Learning Resiliency Developments**

95 New circumstances have challenged the Dutch people develop resilient behaviour in recent  
96 years, climate change not only water related mostly. This development makes it important for gov-  
97 ernment and the people themselves to understand their resilient behaviour better. These other cir-  
98 cumstances therewith influence the context the Dutch people are living in nowadays, what makes it  
99 worthwhile searching for patterns in these developments, that are:

- 100 • The Northwest of the Netherlands is suffering by mild earthquakes caused as the result of many  
101 decennia of emptying the gas fields (Van der Voort and Vanclay, 2015). Since the first 1986  
102 earthquake [Richter 3.0] the total of 1269 [until November 2018] seismologic incidents took  
103 place.<sup>2</sup> A 2014 focus-group research proved that 60% of the area residents accepts this calmly,  
104 and for 20% decreased confidence in government (SPG, 2014).
- 105 • In the Northwest of the country milder seismologic turbulences are felt, caused by emptying oil-  
106 bearing layers in the last century; in the villages Anna Paulowna 2015 [Richter 1.5 and Warder  
107 2018 [Richter 2.5]. Unless the villagers experienced little of this, local government because of the  
108 Groningen experience started up a network of measuring points.
- 109 • Heavy clustered rainfall and longer periods of dry weather due to climate change show to be  
110 increasingly of negative influence on the Dutch agricultural sector, and do cause inconveniences  
111 in the cities as flooded tunnels too.<sup>3</sup>
- 112 • The great rivers flowing from Germany into the Netherlands have disturbing periods of very  
113 low and very high water due to melting of the glaciers in the Alps (Bresser et al., 2005) (Vellinga  
114 et al., 2014), causing inconvenience for shipping and nearby housing. This encouraged the de-  
115 velopment of floating housing in the river flood plain areas, and in 2007 an investing program  
116 for giving these river in the Netherlands more space was started by government.
- 117 • Near the coast the hinterland suffers of salinization during periods of prolonged drought by  
118 seepage through the dunes because of the extra water-level differences (Van Bakel et al., 2009),  
119 what effects agricultural production of potatoes and flower bulbs two major export product of  
120 the Netherlands. Branch associations [KAVB and LTO] started discussion with their member in  
121 recent years, to mobilize awareness under the agricultural enterprises and for pressuring gov-  
122 ernment to take reducing measures.

---

<sup>2</sup> <https://www.nam.nl/feiten-en-cijfers/aardbevingen.html>


<sup>3</sup> <https://www.knmi.nl/kennis-en-datacentrum/uitleg/regenintensiteit>

123 These examples show resiliency developments in the Netherlands whereby area residents and  
 124 government cooperate together, in every situation in a different equilibrium, the government often  
 125 takes the initiative, but citizens and citizen organizations also take the initiative, or a combined,  
 126 start-up, start-up. Evidently, this combination delivers positive results, in two indexes scoring resili-  
 127 eness Dutch cities are on the top of these lists; The 'Sustainable Cities Water Index' identifying  
 128 cities harnesses water assets for their long term advantage; 1. Rotterdam, 2. Copenhagen, 3. Am-  
 129 sterdam.<sup>4</sup>

### 130 3. 'Water Resilience' Defined

131 'Climate Resilience', which includes 'Water resilience', has been given a number of expressions  
 132 depending on the focus chosen, by people related to climate-change. Resilience focuses on the abil-  
 133 ity to handle, as a society, mobilizing the capacity to adapt to extreme undesirable changing cir-  
 134 cumstances (Nelson et al., 2007). Concerning the far-reaching circumstances of climate-change,  
 135 which can be severe storms, severe rainfall, seawater rising, loss of bio-diversity, and economic  
 136 recession; many of these climate change examples are water related.

137 Adaptation to such extreme external stimuli and stress to Nelson should be seen as a system  
 138 wide result from which the social component and social actors behaviour could be made particular;  
 139 see the cycle of 'Adaptedness and resilience' figure 2. Nelson sketches the slight differences be-  
 140 tween adaptation and resilience. Resilience concerns the power of people to learn and to develop  
 141 resilience capacity more than adaptation (Berkhout et al., 2006). Resilience therefore is a process of  
 142 development making the system of adaptation stronger by every new experience (Walker et al.,  
 143 2002).



144

145

**Figure 2.** Showing the cycle of 'Adaptedness to Resilience' (Nelson et al., 2007).

146 According to Nelson, the resilience approach is unfortunately narrowed down to mainly the  
 147 technological and governmental policy approach (Holling, 1973). Resilience though should be seen  
 148 as an ecological reaction that cannot be considered void of peoples' action and behaviour (Nelson et  
 149 al., 2007). Searching for resilience requires exploring and defining variables to create vulnerable  
 150 preconditions and action-prospects for the time an impact takes place (Tompkins and Adger, 2004).

151 The understanding of 'Climate resilience' has developed in the past four decades along with  
 152 the understanding of climate-change (Martin-Breen and Anderies, 2011). Originally in the sixties of  
 153 the past century resilience became ecologically related and initially outlined as 'the capacity for  
 154 ecological systems to persist and absorb changes'. By which ecological systems are described as  
 155 from nature searching for the equilibrium towards some stable prior point under all circumstances  
 156 (Holling, 1973). In the years after these ecological systems were seen less stable and functioning in a  
 157 dynamic surrounding by adaptive management and environmentally limited resources (Holling,  
 158 1973). In the seventies the resilience phenomenon became connected to social science in a more  
 159 evolutionary approach and transformed in the eighties to a reacting system approach through

<sup>4</sup> <https://www.arcadis.com/en/global/our-perspectives/which-cities-are-best-placed-to-harness-water-for-future-success-/>

160 which external stresses could be offended. In the nineties when the issue of global-warming  
161 emerged resilience became related to climate-change (Pelling, 2010). Resilience related to climate-  
162 change water flooding became an important new issue of growing attention from the beginning of  
163 the twenty-first century. The extreme flooding of New Orleans, New York are examples of that  
164 (Sebastian et al., 2017).

#### 165 4. Dutch 'Water Resilience' by People's Behaviour

166 Taking responsibility has always been a part of the mentality only the incentives have changed  
167 and become more urgent due to climate-change developments. (Wiering and Winnubst, 2017).  
168 Dutch experts with knowledge of this new defence systems today advise globally to make flood  
169 defence barriers in the USA, India and South America concerning several cities over the last years.  
170 Remarkably some of these cities managed to recover much faster than the others unless nothing  
171 profound was done yet. The city of New York for example recovered in 2012 from the Sandy hurri-  
172 cane in only a number of weeks while New Orleans is still starting up the recovery of the Katrina  
173 hurricane from 2005. The difference should possibly be the behaviour of the residents, how they  
174 took initiative and started-up cleaning and recovery tasks. This likely proves that the action pro-  
175 spects of the people does make the difference to make cities resilient for water flood disasters not  
176 just technology and governmental ruling alone (Chamlee-Wright and Storr, 2011).

177 Recently in 2017, Delft University of Technology in a 'Hacketon' session of researchers and 80  
178 students discussed the tropical hurricane 'Harvey' that hit Houston Texas USA on August 17<sup>th</sup>  
179 2017. In a four-day period the areas received more than a 1,000 mm of rain as the system slowly  
180 meandered over eastern Texas and adjacent waters, causing catastrophic flooding, with peak accu-  
181 mulations of 1,539 mm with made Harvey the wettest tropical cyclone on record in the United  
182 States. The resulting floods inundated hundreds of thousands of homes, displaced more than 30,000  
183 people, and prompted more than 17,000 rescues'. One of the conclusions generated by 3D mapping  
184 analyses studying the flooded area and the city development of Houston over the last decennia  
185 found that new housing built in recent decennia's replaced former 'swamp' water storage areas that  
186 surrounded the city. Since 2001 over a period of 15 years the Houston had grown 23% without tak-  
187 ing into account new water collection facilities (Sebastian et al., 2017). The residents of Houston  
188 showed the self-reliance of concerned residents. Volunteer firemen, neighbourhood's brigades,  
189 individual residents, and others mobilized themselves by successfully rescuing area residents and  
190 managing the reconstruction afterwards.

191 Comparing the disastrous flood hurricane effects of 'Katrina' New Orleans August 29<sup>th</sup> 2005,  
192 'Sandy' New York October 30<sup>th</sup> 2012 and 'Harvey' Houston August 17<sup>th</sup>, these severe USA hurri-  
193 canes of the 21-century show remarkable differences in reconstruction speediness', see figure 3.  
194 Unless 'Sandy' hit New York enormously by which 650.000 houses became uninhabitable and  
195 downtown Manhattan became flooded, the city recovered very fast after the hurricane. After only a  
196 number of days Manhattan was again in business. In the surrounding areas people left their houses  
197 to other places making place for new housing developments. The New York city council asked  
198 Henk Ovink from the Netherlands to be their special advisory to take the damage as a change for  
199 building a better city back, for transforming New York to a resilient region (Ovink, 2014). Houston  
200 the young the damage to the city is, already making recovering progress as well. New Orleans piti-  
201 ful for the residents is still starting-up the recovery from the 'Katrina' hurricane of 2005 years longer  
202 ago. As Henk Ovink wrote in his report to the New York council, what the city needs is 'Working  
203 together to build a more resilient region'. Like the Houston residents after 'Harvey' showed, the  
204 mobilization of the people makes the difference.



205  
206


Figure 3. USA hurricanes left to right: Sandy, Sandy, Katrina, Harvey [source: Wikipedia].

207 Europe has laid in the shadow zone of these hurricanes in the past decennia. It was in autumn  
208 2017 that the first Atlantic hurricane in 100 years reached the coast of Ireland. It was on the 17<sup>th</sup>  
209 October 2017 that 'Ophelia' hit the mainland. It became the first time that Ireland needed a national  
210 storm alert. 120.000 houses lost electric power and three people were killed by the storm. According  
211 to 'The New York Times' the latest comparable storms were in 1893 and 1961. According to Ovink,  
212 Europe will become more vulnerable to hurricanes as a result of climate-change in the coming  
213 years. However, it will not be the storms but, the water nuisance from heavy rainfall and seawater  
214 rice that will cause the damage and threat (Ovink, 2014).

215 Surprisingly in the reports of these hurricane disasters little information is given about the role  
216 of residents in the recovering of the cities concerned. Their contribution is mentioned as important  
217 and indispensable in many of the witness reports and related research. It becomes unclear what the  
218 role of residents is in overcoming climate-change disasters, how these are mobilized, and what their  
219 motivation factors are. Because climate-change disasters are predicted to increase in intensity and  
220 frequency, the importance of fulfilling these knowledge gaps is obligatory. Therefore a comparative  
221 case in the Netherlands was used because the Netherlands has a history of struggling with water  
222 disasters since its existence. Additionally, there is conformity of the lack of knowledge with the  
223 Dutch research on the theme of resident-initiative and resident responsibility. Research done re-  
224 cently concerning sustainable city refurbishing and reintroducing neighbourhood responsibility  
225 group programs could be used as the 'body of knowledge' for this new research on 'Water resili-  
226 ence' (Sanders, 2014) (Sanders and Van Timmeren, 2017a) (Sanders and Van Timmeren, 2017b).

## 227 5. Exploring the 'Zaanstreek-Waterland' Societal Resiliency

228 In 2016, research was done that focused on the water-consciousness and self-reliance of the  
229 Dutch people in the Northwestern part of the Dutch Delta area where relatively the majority of the  
230 countrywide flooding took place in the past. The most recent flooding, the one of 1916 [see figure 4  
231 for an impression], is interesting because this area is since 1916 a safety area in which all cities and  
232 civilian organizations worked together, including a large number of volunteers.



233



234 **Figure 4.** Impressions of 1916 'Zaanstreek-Waterland' flooding (Aten and Wieringa, 2015).

235 The 1916 Zaanstreek-Waterland' area flooding, what happened and why, and its effect on pre-  
 236 sent safety in the region is badly documented according to Aten and Wieringa (Aten and Wieringa,  
 237 2015). Looking back at the symbiotic cooperation of the people in the region and the local munici-  
 238 palities have remarkable importance in minimizing the number of casualties, the reoccupation of  
 239 the people, and the help during this disaster. The 'Zaanstreek-Waterland' safety region still has  
 240 large numbers of volunteers in the fire brigade, health care and other civilian supported organiza-  
 241 tions like welfare and animal-ambulance work sectors.

242 The security region of 'Zaanstreek-Waterland' ([www.veiligheidsregiozaanstreekwaterland.nl](http://www.veiligheidsregiozaanstreekwaterland.nl))  
 243 is an independent organization in which seven municipalities in this region have supervision. This  
 244 security region finds its historic existence in the flooding of January 14<sup>th</sup> 1916, when almost the en-  
 245 tire region. This incident created a feeling of mutual responsibility between the municipalities, re-  
 246 lated organizations, and civilians to manage safety and a diversity of tasks together. The mission  
 247 statement of this security region still addressed these responsibilities in 2017: managing integral  
 248 security, ready for disasters and crises, working together with police, and working together with  
 249 civilians in self-reliance. The security region is active in case of fire, disasters, and crisis, has an  
 250 emergency and coordination room and facilitates medical help in the region included ambulance  
 251 help.

252 The present situation makes the civilian history of interest in relation to resilience capacity of  
 253 regions to research the dynamics of this cooperation, what is remarkably distinctive. That's why for  
 254 this area Dutch Officials, volunteers and residents were interviewed on location in a focus group  
 255 Living-Lab setting to clearly distinguish what the important factors of resiliency for the area are.  
 256 The invited interviewees were: one or two mayors, representatives of the volunteer fire brigade, the  
 257 regional police, ambulance, water authority with two civilians and other dedicated residents. Based  
 258 on this focus group session the following general conclusions are generated by this research:

- 259 • The role of volunteering to manage disasters was diminished in the last century due to city de-  
 260 velopment, where people know each other less than compared to the agricultural areas and the  
 261 little villages where most people lived before. This resulted in governmental authorities gaining  
 262 responsibility and taking over the mayor role of managing safety for the people, residents, and  
 263 people living in the surrounding areas.
- 264 • Since the flood of 1953 the Netherlands manages severe disasters by dividing roles by which  
 265 people and professionals work on the different scales of the village or the neighbourhood and  
 266 the city or a region respectively. The speculation is that in the case of severe disasters people can  
 267 act faster to save others personally, and to help older and less able people. The official authori-  
 268 ties on the other hand can focus on hospitals and other vulnerable places and begin recovery  
 269 plans that include refugees.
- 270 • Wealth and long periods of safety can decrease the basic attitude of people taking responsibility  
 271 when disasters take place because they are acclimated to a situation where the government has  
 272 the responsibility. To be ready for severe disasters, based on the predictions of climate change,  
 273 its important to activate people structurally in better times. Officials should not argue this be-  
 274 haviour as it diminishes the role of common people in case of severe disasters because these are  
 275 needed to overcome disasters.
- 276 • Common people, residents, and people in the agricultural areas can be taught to learn and pre-  
 277 pare themselves for volunteering in case of severe disasters by involving them in minor disturb-  
 278 ances and giving them feedback on the results. Official authorities can learn additional infor-  
 279 mation from previous severe disaster recoveries in other countries, the hurricane disasters in the  
 280 USA for example.
- 281 • From the 1916 'Zaanstreek-Waterland' and other flooding recapitulations [Chapters 3 and 5] it  
 282 becomes clear that the cooperation and tuning of civilian initiatives and government ruling in  
 283 case of emergencies depends more on the values and choices of individual people, residents,  
 284 and civil servants, than crisis planning and hierarchies. Crisis planning becomes stronger and

285 more effective when the situation becomes clear to official authorities at helicopter level and  
286 when police and/or military forces arrive at the area of damage.

## 287 6. Resilience of Citizens, by 'Zaanstad Research Questionnaire

288 In spring 2018 a compact questionnaire is launched to the citizens of Zaanstad, the larger of the  
289 two cities in the Zaanstreek-Waterland region. Reason for this questionnaire was to research the  
290 resilience among the citizens for danger of flooding.

291 Awareness of the questionnaire for stimulating participation was taken care of by the local ra-  
292 dio station and the local newspaper. By QR code participation was made easy to stimulate a large  
293 sample for the research, see figure 5. Chosen was for simple questions only to be answered by YES,  
294 NO or DON'T KNOW to facilitate the accuracy of the results. Nevertheless, the result was a low  
295 turnout, only 40 participants filled in the questionnaire, which is very little given the number of  
296 80.000 households in the Zaanstad city. A second limitation of the research is that the composition  
297 of the participants is not representative in comparison with the local population, most of the partic-  
298 ipants were older then 60 years of age [70% instead of 22,5%] and none were young and lesser of  
299 middle age [zero instead of 22,5% and 30% instead of 50%] [According to CBS 2017 national statis-  
300 tics], see table 5. Therewith this research can only be seen as one of exploratory nature.

301 **Table 5.** The questionnaire participation presented in age categories.

Questionnaire participation	<20	20-60	>60
* Divided in age categories [%]	0,0	30,77	69,23

302 With the results of the questionnaire can though be concluded that all the questions show a  
303 remarkable clear result, all questions resulted in a preference of more then 60% for one out of the  
304 three possible answers, what somewhat compensates for the low turnout, see table 6.

305 **Table 6.** The questionnaire questions presented with results.

Question topics	YES	NO	DONT KNOW
1. Awareness of the risk that dikes can break	72,5	25,0	2,5
2. Confidence is the construction of dikes	67,5	22,5	10,0
3. Following governmental instructions by flooding	60,0	12,5	27,5
4. Rescuing neighbours instead of fleeing, by flooding	62,5	15	22,5
5. Taken precautionary measures for flood emergencies	30,0	70,0	0,0

306 Analysing the questionnaire outcome there could be concluded:

- 307 • Most of the citizens of Zaanstad are aware of the risk that dikes protecting their living area could  
308 break [72,55 out of 100%] although most of them have confidence in the construction of these  
309 dikes and their safety [67,5% out of 100%].
- 310 • Most of the Zaanstad citizens will follow the instructions given by governmental organizations  
311 in case of flooding [60% out of 100%] although they will rescue neighbours instead of running  
312 for the flooding if asked for, what seems to expose a dilemma for these citizens. Taking the order  
313 of the questions asked into account, in that case, it is reasonable to conclude based of these out-  
314 comes; that citizens will first rescue neighbours before they follow the instructions government.
- 315 • An interesting part of the citizen populations reacted positively that they have taken precautions  
316 for flood emergencies, having food supplies and a flashlight in stock [30% out of 100%].

317 In general from this questionnaire can be concluded, under the emphasis of the limiting factors  
318 mentioned, that most of the citizens of the Dutch city Zaanstad are aware of the danger and local  
319 risks of flooding, that an interesting part of the populations have taken precautions, and that they  
320 follow instruction of government loyally, after they have take care of neighbours that need that.

## 321 **7. Dutch Resilient Behaviour of Citizens, Conclusions and Lessons Learned**

322 By comparing the resilience research results of Zaanstad with the of the former wider  
323 Zaanstreek-Waterland area research (Sanders, 2018), then it stands out that there is less difference  
324 between the people living in the countryside or the citizens living in the city nearby; 1.they are  
325 aware of the risks of flooding, 2. They rely on governmental instructions, and 3. They are willing to  
326 take responsibility for neighbours and other people nearby that need help in case of such emergen-  
327 cies.

328 The 2018 focus group session with representatives of the 'Zaanstreek-Waterland' safety area  
329 confirmed though that the contribution of official authority, people, and civilians in case of emer-  
330 gencies differs based on the scale of focus and the quickness of taking action. The extent, to which  
331 this also applies to the city and the citizens their behaviour, has not been investigated with the  
332 Zaanstad questionnaire research. There could be suggested that where population density in cities  
333 is greater the communication among and the support to people there will be able to develop more  
334 quickly then in the countryside. On the other hand the density of cities can cause people to be over-  
335 looked and auxiliaries to run into obstructions in streets. For substantive conclusions on this point  
336 its is necessary and advised to cities that the local control room teams become involved and inter-  
337 viewed.

338 The Zaanstreek-Waterland research resulted with the conclusion that residents and people liv-  
339 ing in the farmland areas to overcome severe disasters yet to come, can learn from less severe dis-  
340 turbances on two levels: 1. Learning to take action and volunteer on small scale in their living area  
341 by socially warning others and becoming prepared themselves, and 2. That taking civilian initia-  
342 tives in case of emergencies is important in the first hours and days after a disaster takes place be-  
343 cause the official authorities can not handle that fast giving support to all the people in their area.  
344 The governmental first focus is taking away the threat, the evacuation of less mobile people, such as  
345 hospitals and houses for elderly, and organizing refugees. This too is not researched for the urban  
346 situation of Zaanstad. Nevertheless, I can be accepted in a safe manner that in cities this will not be  
347 different.

348 Based on both research concerning the resilience by flooding in the situation of the Zaanstad  
349 city and the Zaanstreek-Waterland region, the message to conclude is; civilians and professionals  
350 from government and other authorities can work together successfully in case of severe disasters as  
351 long they know and accept their own role, and work on different scales and time schedules. Be-  
352 cause besides government the people living are aware of the danger and an interesting percentage  
353 of them take precautions. Sharing experiences from overcoming less severe disturbances will help  
354 to bring these skills and motivations into practice to both civilians and professionals. This will make  
355 the Netherlands resilient for the coming future, in cities and in the countryside.


## 356 **9. Dutch Resiliency Prospects Coupled to New Research Initiatives**

357 In The Netherlands the four Universities of Technology in 2018 started a combined research  
358 program on resilience coupled to climate-change called DeSIRE [Designing Systems for informed  
359 Resilience Research] under management of the new 4TU-RE Research Center.<sup>5</sup> These Dutch four  
360 Universities of Technology [in Delft, Eindhoven, Twente and Wageningen] had not worked togeth-  
361 er in such an important program before, what shows the urgency in the Netherlands to work on

---

<sup>5</sup> [www.4tu.nl/resilience](http://www.4tu.nl/resilience)

362 combining practice, innovation and theory forming. Smaller programs have started too, like 'SOS  
 363 Waterfront' for exchanging knowledge and vision on water related resilience between professionals  
 364 of Universities in Europe. This program more then DeSIRE program focuses on the behaviour of  
 365 area residents and citizens similar to the research done in the Zaanstreek-Waterland region.



366  
 367

Figure 7. The resilient interaction of; government, technical professionals and residents.

368 These research programs differ in their focus, some take the interaction of government and  
 369 technical professionals central, while for others the behaviour of residents is the starting point.  
 370 From the research done in the Zaanstreek-Waterland area is concluded that the one approach can-  
 371 not be seen separately from the other. As given a picture left in figure 7; these relations form a tri-  
 372 angle, by which the collaboration between government and technical professionals has to seek  
 373 alignment with the residents living in the areas for which resilient results should be developed.  
 374 PhD research has proved that residents think short term attached to a small territory, while profes-  
 375 sionals think long term for large territories, what makes that a productive interaction asked for mu-  
 376 tual respect and empathy for creating results, as pictures right in figure 7 (Sanders, 2014). Both in-  
 377 sights confirm each other, that resilience for an area asks cooperation of all parties involved, each  
 378 from their own strength without giving priority to the one or the other. Research proves to that this  
 379 cooperation does not happen automatically, there are stimulating and frustrating conditions to be  
 380 recognized. Therefore further research area, culture and situational coupled is recommended, that  
 381 theory and practice come together for developing resiliency where needed.

## 382 References

- 383 ATEN, D. 2009. *Stormenderland, canon waterstaatsgeschiedenis boven het IJ 700-2008.*, Edam, HHNK.  
 384 ATEN, D. & WIERINGA, F. 2015. *The 'Water-wolf in Waterland, the flooding of 1916 in the Waterland*  
 385 *and Zaanarea [Dutch: De Waterwolf in Waterland, de overstroming van 1916 in Waterland en de*  
 386 *Zaanstreek]*, Schoorl, Pirola.  
 387 BERKHOUT, F., HERTIN, J. & GANN, D. M. 2006. Learning to adapt: organisational adaptation to  
 388 climate change impacts. *Climatic change*, 78, 135-156.  
 389 BRESSER, A., BERK, M., VAN DEN BORN, G., VAN BREE, L., VAN GAALLEN, F., LIGTVOET, W.,  
 390 VAN MINNEN, J., WITMER, M., AMELUNG, S. & BOLWIDT, L. 2005. *Effecten van klimaat-*  
 391 *verandering in Nederland*, Milieu-en Natuurplanbureau.  
 392 CHAMLEE-WRIGHT, E. & STORR, V. 2011. Social capital as collective narratives and post-disaster  
 393 community recovery. *The sociological review*, 59, 266-282.  
 394 DELTA-COMMISSION 2017. Deltaprogramma 2018. Delta-commission.  
 395 DELTARES 2018. Possible consequences of speeding-up sealvel rise for the Dutch Delta defence  
 396 system [Dutch: Mogelijke gevolgen van versnelde zeespiegelstijging voor het Deltapro-  
 397 gramma] Deltares Delft.  
 398 HOLLING, C. S. 1973. Resilience and stability of ecological systems. *Annual review of ecology and*  
 399 *systematics*, 4, 1-23.

- 400 IPCC 2007. Climate change 2007, impacts, adaptation and vulnerability. WMO.
- 401 MARTIN-BREEN, P. & ANDERIES, J. M. 2011. Resilience: A literature review.
- 402 NELSON, D. R., ADGER, W. N. & BROWN, K. 2007. Adaptation to environmental change: contri-  
403 butions of a resilience framework. *Annual review of Environment and Resources*, 32.
- 404 OVINK, H. 2014. Rebuild by Design: Recovering New York after Sandy.
- 405 PELLING, M. 2010. *Adaptation to climate change: from resilience to transformation*, Routledge.
- 406 SANDERS, F. 2018. Dutch Resiliency of under sea-level cities due to brave people. *RRAU18*. Gro-  
407 ningen, the Netherlands: Ierek.
- 408 SANDERS, F. C. 2014. *Sustainable Development through Resident's Collective Initiatives (Dutch: Duur-  
409 zame ontwikkeling door collectief bewonersinitiatief, leidraad voor professionals om bewonersgroepen  
410 aan de duurzaamheidsopgave te verbinden) (Peer-reviewed Dissertation)*, Delft, Delft University  
411 of Technology.
- 412 SANDERS, F. C. & VAN TIMMEREN, A. 2017a. Pride the Civilians Motivator for Resilient Sustain-  
413 able Cities, results of the 2016 questionnaire research under Dutch Amsterdam council  
414 members (Peer-reviewed). *WSBE17 5-7 June (peer-reviewed)*. Hong Kong China.
- 415 SANDERS, F. C. & VAN TIMMEREN, A. 2017b. 'Success factors for Greenish Initiatives of the  
416 Commons', results of the best practices 2016 research under Dutch Rotterdam project initia-  
417 tives (Peer-reviewed). *IASC17*. Utrecht University of Applied Science: IASC.
- 418 SEBASTIAN, A. G., LENDERING, K. T., KOTHUIS, B. L. M., BRAND, A. D. & JONKMAN, S. N.  
419 2017. Hurricane Harvey Report, A fact-finding effort in the direct aftermath of Hurrican  
420 Harvey in the Greater Houston Region. Delft: Delft Un. of Technology.
- 421 SPG 2014. Earthquakes in Groningen; the feelings of civilians [Dutch: Aardbevingen in Groningen;  
422 wat zijn de ervaringen van burgers]. SPG [Social Planbureau Groningen].
- 423 TOMPKINS, E. & ADGER, W. N. 2004. Does adaptive management of natural resources enhance  
424 resilience to climate change? *Ecology and society*, 9.
- 425 UN 2015. Paris Agreements framework convention on climate change. *Paris, France*.
- 426 VAN BAKEL, P., KSELIK, R., ROEST, C. & SMIT, A. 2009. Review of crop salt tolerance in the  
427 Netherlands. Alterra, Wageningen University and research.
- 428 VAN DER VOORT, N. & VANCLAY, F. 2015. Social impacts of earthquakes caused by gas extrac-  
429 tion in the Province of Groningen, The Netherlands. *Environmental Impact Assessment Re-  
430 view*, 50, 1-15.
- 431 VELLINGA, N., HOITINK, A., VAN DER VEGT, M., ZHANG, W. & HOEKSTRA, P. 2014. Human  
432 impacts on tides overwhelm the effect of sea level rise on extreme water levels in the  
433 Rhine–Meuse delta. *Coastal Engineering*, 90, 40-50.
- 434 VERGOUWE, R. 2016. The water safety of the Netherlands mapped (Dutch: De veiligheid van Ne-  
435 derland in kaart). Rijkswaterstaat Ministry M&I, the Netherlands.
- 436 WALKER, B., CARPENTER, S., ANDERIES, J., ABEL, N., CUMMING, G., JANSSEN, M., LEBEL, L.,  
437 NORBERG, J., PETERSON, G. & PRITCHARD, R. 2002. Resilience management in social-  
438 ecological systems: a working hypothesis for a participatory approach. *Conservation ecology*,  
439 6.
- 440 WIERING, M. & WINNUBST, M. 2017. The conception of public interest in Dutch flood risk man-  
441 agement: Untouchable or transforming? *Environmental Science & Policy*, 73, 12-19.