Rwanda seeks to improve educational performance by training teachers (language, teaching skills), motivating them with decent pay, insofar as national resources will allow, and equipping the schools for the 21st century. All of this is needed, but in this article we have identified health and development issues at school and before school which make things difficult for even the best-equipped school and the best-trained teachers. The efforts of Rwanda's Health Sector over the past wo decades have made commendable reductions in child and maternal mortality, and some of the signs of undernourishment have also been targeted to considerable effect. Rates of stunting have also improved since the Genocide but not in proportion, because it was not a specific target in the MDGs and was not identified as a priority until half-way through the last decade. Stunting is associated with permanently retarded cognitive development. Lack of sensory stimulation in the early years can have a similar effect, retarding children’s language leaning and the development of higher-order abilities. Even able children, however, may come hungry and worm-infested to school, and their physical and mental health does not appear to be monitored systematically, despite the strategic plans. Until recently, young children have been the province of a Health Sector which did not have ‘readiness for school’ among its targets, and once children are of school age they become the Education Sector's concern and appear sometimes to vanish from the health agenda; there are not even separate statistics on them.
In this final section we want to travel beyond i9mmediate policy issues, however, to look at the styles of argument which underlie them – causal; modelling of how to change the material world and more logical and moral/political consideration of the reasons why individuals, collectives and concrete social institutions (e.g. governments, policy secto9rs)decide to support or modify the status quo and the ways in which they decide to do so. This means looking more clearly at the logical status of causal models and the scope and mode of operation of individual and collective agency. The policy history and present endeavours of Rwanda, discussed above, form a case study for this purpose.
5.2. The Importance of Contexts
A further observable fact about the stunting example is a demographic effect: affluence/poverty is related to stunting, not as a material and biological mechanism in itself but as a predictor of material circumstances: poorer people cannot afford expensive food, and/or there is correlation between affluence and access to health information. This elaboration alerts us to the role of the
context in which mechanisms of nutrition and genetics operate.
Figure 4 would become more cluttered if we included the many possible social/societal counter-causes and additional correlations, but it might continue to offer simple deterministic statements about predicting or preventing stunting, backed by the simple and elegant logic of models in the physical sciences.
Effects of community and culture might also function as facilitators/mediators or counter-causes. We have mentioned gross demographic differences, but a fuller understanding might also focus on the immediate social context. Human infants do not forage for food or extract their nourishment directly from the air; a person feeds them –probably their mother. If we added one more box to
Figure 4, it would mention the mother who feeds the child and the diet she chooses, and after that we would add the influences on her choice. The immediate influences would be (1) her knowledge of infant feeding needs and (2) the availability of appropriate foods in the locality (at an affordable price). The concept of affordability would lead us to identify ;competition for family resource;, where feeding the infant to prevent stunting would compete with feeding the rest of the family, paying for and/or maintaining housing, dealing with the expenses which schooling entails even when the tuition is fee-free (T. Williams, 2014), paying for medical insurance or otherwise assuring health care, etc. Less affluent mothers have to make strategic choices routinely.
Figure 5 elaborates the biological mechanism of
Figure 4, adding the actions of the mother and some of the influences on them.
Figure 5 is a grossly oversimplified model of what is going on – the contents of the boxes are not simple things but portmanteau terms for q complicated social and/or economic and/or psychological processes. Even so, it is complicated because it is a representation of a complicated set of influences. Wives’ decisions are influenced by their poverty or affluence – what they can afford – and by their knowledge of what is needed for child development (and the poor tend to have received less education than the more affluent), by the influence of their husbands and the wider community, and by the actions and propaganda of the Government. We have seen already that governments are faced with similar choices: extensive ambitions all make demands on a limited budget, part of which is obtained from the global North in the form of development aid and is subject to what the North is prepared to fund, how many projects they are funding and how much of their budget they are prepared to commit to aid. National systems are part of open, international systems, which means that aid to Rwanda depends on a number of political and economic factors which are outside Rwanda’s control and often also outside the donors’ control.
For a more comprehensive understanding we should also look at the contexts within which such choices are made, whether by mothers of by governments. This would mean considering cultural factors: dominant discourses, religious prohibitions and/or customary ways of understanding how people do and should behave. Historical and customary ways of thinking may prohibit certain kinds of food: countries differ, even within sub-Saharan Africa, on whether pigs, or insects, may be eaten. They differ in whether they prioritise favourable treatment for some people over others by social location. Patriarchy shapes entitlement and obligation, in different ways in different countries but overwhelmingly to the detriment of women and girls.
Dominant discourses are the ‘currents of thought’ which make it easier to argue for some lines of conduct and some distributions of rights and resources over others. In the global North, for instance, it is easier to accede to than to oppose the rhetorical position that children’s interests should always come first, provided it is women and not men who bear the brunt of consequent partial exclusion from the labour market. Reproducing the dominant discourse is like drifting with the current, while opposing it is like swimming against the tide. An extreme hegemonic discourse would never be debated, because the falsity of its elements would be literally unthinkable. More often, people and factions are able to see that the currents of thought are neither inevitable nor impartial, but policies based on them are endorsed because it is difficult to think of viable alternatives; this has been the strength, for example, of the hegemonic discourse of neoliberal economics in the past four decades.
5.3. Choice, Meaning and Agency
The cultural and discursive contextual factors that ‘govern’ what things
mean to people and interest-groups are not material entities such as appeared in the biological framework of
Figure 4, but they can be used in the same way, as foundations or mediating factors in causal chains. This means downplaying their connection with meaning and treating them as simple predictive terms in the same clean logic of causation/origination/reproduction as informs the physical sciences.
However, the logical simplicity of the causal model is an artefact of its construction, which in turn is a product of the purpose for which it is to be used: as used in the physical and life sciences, it is a mechanism in the real world which when triggered will produce the desired effect if nothing intervenes to stop it doing so. Such mechanisms are useful tools, but as conceptualised in the physical and life sciences they leave out aspects of the world which are real and are associated with the meaning of actions. As used by the Critical Realists, a causal model is more often conceptualised as a mechanism triggered by the actions of an agent: for example, if a mother chooses to spend the household money on the right foods, and feeds them to the appropriate chid(ren), then the biological mechanisms are activated which permit normal cognitive development; if she decides to improve the cleanliness of the households’ sanitation and/or learns to keep children away from bare and potentially infected soil, then they do not pick up parasite eggs, diarrhoea is not triggered by them and the food is properly absorbed. Models based in the physical and biological sciences (and many put forward by economists) employ a narrow angle of vision for the sake of providing a general, ‘one-size-fits-all’ explanation. Taking account of what is going on in any particular case or context requires a wider understanding of meaning. We introduce not just complication but complexity into the description: if agents and agency are included in our conception of what is going on, some of the 'arrows of influence' between terms in the model are not governed only by a cause-and-effect epistemology.
Identifying the reasons for choices and the logic of choice is a very different task, epistemologically, from identifying physical mechanisms. When something is tracked back to the influence of a social location or a cultural formation, one kind of account will cover observed behaviour and the determining causal mechanisms which may have brought it about. Alternative epistemologies may come into play, however. When we ask the reasons for someone’s actions, the natural question is whether a chain of reasoning makes sense, what the intention was, what consequences are foreseen. An action is something done deliberately and with intent, or carelessly without thought of consequences. Once forethought and intention are invoked, we bring in a moral dimension on which the person, group or institution is judged, with the at least implicit suggestion that they could and should do better. Scientific description of causal mechanisms can avoid politics and morality because they are not designed for the question of whether something should be done but consider only how it may be done and whether it will be effective. Wider social explanation implicitly or explicitly assigns responsibility and therefore blame or praise to actors.
In the examples above, mothers are the easiest to blame for how their children are fed and teachers are the easiest to blame for how their pupils are taught. In further elaboration of the model, however, caregivers are set in contexts which are not of their own making or choice (Marx, 2007), nested within families, within communities, within the broader society shaped by its current formal and informal institutions, themselves reflecting a historically evolving culture. The space for mothers' agency is limited by their knowledge, by the price of food and other necessities and the extent of their resources, by their power to act without constraint from husbands, family, community and the law and by their own understanding of what is possible and proper for them as women and mothers. Government in turn is limited in its freedom to act by the stance of institutions - the churches etc, the Parliament, civil society organisations (where effective), the police/army (where engaged in politics and/or the markets), by the attitudes expressed by international 'moral agents' (for example, conditions of aid or trade), by an assessment of what the populace will tolerate and by their cultural sense of what is appropriate and legitimate. Where resources are tight, choices have to be made, just as is the case for the mother.
It is therefore necessary to take account of epistemological differences between perspectives that have nonetheless to be applied concurrently and treated as complementary rather than in opposition. On the one hand, people may be considered as rational actors, and in that case the epistemological questions concern the consistency of arguments and the nature of the values they embody. From this viewpoint it is impossible to confine our account to observables because what is going on expresses what things (and people, and experiences) mean and the ways in which people give them value. On the other hand, we freely adopt causal models based on predictive generalisation as descriptions of the world; they give us mechanisms we can use to influence it, and the use of such mechanisms is validated and justified by its effects, treating what people say and what they value as a ‘caused product’ of physical and psychological constitution, of material resources and their distribution and of a set of social contexts and discursive formations. The discursive formations are not driven by freely and logically formed intentions but created over time in and by the ‘social world’ - the ‘currents of thought’ and the problems which are identified. It is not a question of choosing one perspective over others, and no perspective has inbuilt ontological hegemony. Both social scientists and social engineers, including governments, seek to build a representation of the real world which is enough like it to help us make changes in what people do and think and to change both the material and the symbolic circumstances of their lives.
In other words, to understand a situation we need to see it through the lens of what is sometimes called complexity theory (Byrne & Callaghan, 2013; M. Williams, 2021) and critical realism (Sayer, 1999, 2001) , taking a whole-systems perspective or at least widening the angle of view beyond the immediate problem. We need to consider the effects of contexts and to acknowledge that they are made up of meanings as well as mechanisms and have reasons as well as causes. In both academic explanation and practical policy-making we need to ask why things are the way they are here and now, how they work, on whom they have their effects and in what social, political and economic context (see also Tikley, 2015). Further, the world is not bounded by our descriptions of it. In any given new context there can be not just more factors to discover but different styles of argument to deploy. Among the factors included in many explanations are the consequences of and for human agency: some phenomena can be understood only by first elucidating what they mean to people, or what they might mean if they were brought into consciousness. At the same time, we need to understand what restricts or empowers agency in context. We need to understand how, why and in whose interests the underlying culture has evolved which makes some courses of action more 'obvious' than others. In a world of global markets, we also need to understand whose culture has hegemony – the cultural and economic discourses of the global North affect the willingness and ability of donors to offer aid and the terms on which they are prepared to do so.
When working within artificially closed systems such as the biological explanation of stunting or the effects on development of lack of early stimulation, if the mechanism is correctly described and nothing else intervenes then the effects of action are predictable – they can be deduced from the system description. Where the effect is only probable, we seek counter-causes to say why intervention does not always work. In any particular case, however, it may be a mistake to draw tight boundaries around a system. Stunting is brought about by malnourishment, but the malnourishment is brought about by mothers’ choices, which are influenced by social and cultural factors but also by the need to make a choice of what is to be achieved when resource is limited – making the best of a bad situation. If additional resource is made available by or through a governance system, this in turn is shaped by its policy choices in a situation of limited resource. Why in Rwanda the resources of mothers or governments are limited is partly shaped by a worldwide economic system and a colonial past over which Rwanda has had no control. Once we hit the complexity of open systems, we may have to combine formally incompatible styles of explanation and to use both causal logic and the logic of reasons. When it comes to explanations which include intentions and interpretations, to privilege causal explanations is to ignore the observable effects of new arguments, pressures or forms of organised opposition on the dominant discourse. On the other hand, staying with explanations in terms of reasons, values and deliberate actions ignores the observable influence of patterns, habits and contexts. It can often be more helpful to explain particular sequences in their particular contexts and take a more cautious approach to universal generalisation; retroduction (Mukumbang, 2021; Ritz, 2020) of theories which explain what is going on in the particular situation can sometimes be more illuminating than deduction from generalised and uncontextualized models.
In this article we have looked at Rwanda's Health and Education sectors and their contribution to the survival, development, education/training and wellbeing of those who go through the schools and become Rwanda's human capital. The Government is an active agent in Rwanda's reconstruction, but its scope for action is limited by the context of its history and its cultural, political and economic circumstances. We have tried to 'open up the system' and look at a range of causal issues in health and child development outside the conventional boundaries of an Education Sector which are important for children's capacity to learn. There are technical fixes for all of the problems we have identified, though some need to be dealt with in early infancy, and strategic plans have been devised. Whether they will be put into practice depends to some extent on outside funding, which is beyond Rwanda’s control, or on the Government’s political will to put other important targets aside in order to concentrate on schooling and readiness for school.
Declarations: The authors played an equal part in the preparation of this article. This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors. There is no conflict of interest of which the authors are aware.