Although many of the processes underlying motor programming and execution are not accessible to consciousness, we are aware that we are moving (motor awareness) and of our desire to act (motor intention). Blakemore et al. [
1] proposed that, for intentional movements, motor commands are selected and sent to the muscles to perform the action, while at the same time a prediction is made about the sensory consequences of the movement. This prediction (indicated as forward model) is based on an efference copy of the planned motor act and is compared, by a comparator system, with the actual feedback of the executed movement. According to this proposal the forward model to be compared with the sensory feedbacks is the neural signal upon which motor awareness is constructed [
2,
3]. Therefore, motor awareness seems to precede, rather than follow, the actual execution of an intentional action being, within certain limits, dissociated from it. In a seminal experiment, Libet demonstrated that subjects become aware of a hand movement before the actual onset of muscle contraction [
4], whereas Haggard and Magno [
5] found that interfering, through single-pulse TMS, with the activity of the left primary motor cortex (M1) resulted in significant delays of right-hand movements but had little effect on the time the subjects experienced the movement, (assessed by asking participants to indicate the position of a rotating clock hand). Conversely, single-pulse TMS of the anterior frontal areas (with the coil placed at the standard FCz site) resulted in smaller delays in actual RTs but larger delays in the assessment of the timing of manual response, an ability related to motor awareness. This shows that motor awareness does not co-vary with the experimentally induced delay in motor response. In other words, once the intention to perform an action has been formed, the motor response may be delayed but the motor awareness, already triggered by the intentional stance, is not affected. Motor awareness can be reported even in absence of any willed movement. Indeed, brain damaged patients with anosognosia for hemiplegia (that is patients who deny their paralysis) subjectively report the feeling of having performed an action with the paralysed limb [
6,
7]. This phenomenal experience has its measurable counterpart in the fact that the pretended action with the paralysed hand actually affects the spatiotemporal parameters of the healthy hand movements [
8,
9]. Interestingly, on the bases of lesional data in anosognosic patients, Berti and colleagues [
6,
10] have proposed that the right premotor cortex (PM, especially area 6) is part of a neural circuit for motor monitoring, therefore contributing to the operation of one of the comparator systems described by Blakemore et al.’s [
1] (see also Haggard, 2005 [
11]). In particular, previous studies suggested the involvement of premotor [
6,
12,
13] and insular cortices [
6,
12,
14] for the process of conscious motor monitoring, basal ganglia, insulo-frontal, temporal and parietal structures for explicit and implicit motor awareness [
15], and mesial-frontal [
5,
16,
17] and posterior-parietal areas [
18] for the intentional component of the motor act. More recently, non-invasive brain stimulation evidence [
19] have shown that cathodal transcranial Direct Current Stimulation (tDCS) of the PM, but not of the PPC, affects subjects' self-confidence about their contralateral (left) hand motor performance, consistent with the idea of a role of right PM in the conscious monitoring of voluntary motor acts. On the contrary, tDCS over PM does not interfere with monitoring of involuntary muscle contractions induced by TMS over the hand motor area [
20].
Taken together previous findings suggest a role of right PM in the conscious control of voluntary action, but they do not provide direct evidence of its causal involvement. With the present study, we aimed at exploring the role of the right PM in motor monitoring by means of repetitive Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (rTMS), which allows to draw causal links between the stimulated brain regions and the observed behaviours [
21,
22]. In particular, subjects were requested to draw straight line either with the left hand (i.e. the hand contralateral to the stimulated side) or with the right (ipsilateral) hand. During the execution of the requested movements, visual feedback of subjects’ actual motor performance was, in most of the trials, experimentally deviated from the real trajectory to create a mismatch between the movement they performed and the movements they viewed on a computer screen. This mismatch would lead the subjects to correct their trajectory in the opposite direction in order to draw a straight line. Previous studies (e.g. [
23,
24,
25,
26]) had shown that, within certain limits of deviation, subjects did not become aware of the modified trajectory they performed. In other words, in the manipulated trial, until certain degrees of deviation, subjects still believed to trace a straight line, as requested by the task. Therefore, in this experimental setting, subjects made (erroneous) movements they were not aware of. In Fourneret and Jeannerod’s interpretation (1998), this finding demonstrated that subjects became aware of the movement they intended to perform (a straight movement) and not of the movement they actually performed (a deviated movement). This is again consistent with the idea that motor awareness is mainly constructed on a predictive code and not exclusively on the actual sensory feedback. In our experiment, in order to interfere with motor awareness we applied, before the execution of the task, 1 Hz rTMS over the right PMd cortex [
27]. The task was also performed after sham rTMS stimulation of the same area.
Our first prediction was that if the PM has a pivotal role in motor awareness, then interfering with its activity by means of rTMS, when the subjects perform their ‘deviated’ trajectories, would further affect their action monitoring. However, it is worth noting that while an inhibitory TMS usually worsens subjects’ responses, by decreasing the activity of the targeted areas, [
28,
29,
30,
31,
32], a few studies have unexpectedly shown that inhibitory rTMS of the right PMd could enhance subjects’ performance [
33,
34,
35]. Consequently, if rTMS has an inhibitory effect on motor monitoring, we should expect an increase in the angle at which subjects become aware of the deviated trajectory (i.e. a decrease in motor awareness), whereas if rTMS has an enhancing effect on motor monitoring, we should expect a decrease in the angle at which subjects become aware of the deviated trajectory (i.e. an increase in motor awareness). As for the side of the body where right rTMS may have an effect, if the right PMd has a control only over the contralateral hand we would expect a modulation of motor monitoring only for the left hand action. However, if the right PM controls awareness of both hand movements then we should expect to find a modulation of motor monitoring for both hands. Finally, we expect to observe modulation of motor awareness in the active but not in the sham rTMS condition.
Crucially, and independently from the outcome of the stimulation, a modulation of rTMS on subjects’ capability of detecting action deviation would be another fundamental step for demonstrating the key role of the PMd in the construction of motor awareness.