This chapter will analyze the results obtained in the estimated empirical models, comparing them with the results of other studies. The models in question were all estimated in the “R” software. It should also be noted that, in this research, due to the fact that regression models with panel data are used, all the models in the study were estimated in the form of pooled OLS, random effects and fixed effects, in order to understand which one was appropriate. After this estimation, the models were subjected to three tests: F-test, Breush-Pagan test, and Haussman test. Each one of these tests identifies the fixed-effects, random-effects, or pooled OLS model that best fits the case under study. More precisely, the F-test allows us to understand which is the best model between the fixed effects model and the pooled OLS model; the Breush-Pagan test provides evidence to choose between the pooled OLS and the random effects model; and finally, the Haussman test identifies whether it would be more correct to use the fixed effects model or the random effects model. To emphasize that in all models, the additional control variables were the same, that is, size (logarithm of assets), sector, and age. The country was also to be used as a control variable, however, with the insertion of this variable in the models, it was found to be non-significant, so it was not considered in the estimated models.
Finally, it should be noted that in certain models there will be a distinction between the best and worst overall ESG and GC Score, as well as the dimensions of the ESG index. This distinction will be made using an adjusted relative frequency plot. First, a score scale ranging from 0% to 100% is presented, with amplitude classes of 5%. Subsequently, the worst scores are considered to be those below the 1st quartile and the best scores will be those above the 3rd quartile (note that the score is rounded to the nearest class and subject to change in order to improve model results).
4.2. Discussion
Model I contains three econometric regressions that aim to analyze the existence of a direct relationship between the dependent variables (ROA, Tobin’s Q and ROE) and the ESG index. The results are presented in
Table 2.
Regarding model I, it can be seen that when the dependent variable is ROA, the ESG variable (which represents the ESG scores obtained by firms), Log(Size) and Age are statically significant at least at the 0.1% level. This means that, these variables influence the operating performance of European firms. However, at the sector level, it can be seen that the energy, financial and utilities sectors are relevant in this regression, with the financial and energy sectors being statistically significant at least at the 10% level, and the utilities sector at least at the 5% level.
Through the results, it can be seen that the additional control variables exhibit diverse relationships with ROA. That is, while age and the energy, financial and utilities sectors exhibit a positive relationship with operating performance, Log(Size), in turn, presents a contrary relationship with this economic-financial ratio. As far as the ESG variable is concerned, it shows an estimated negative impact on the operating performance of European firms. More precisely, when the ESG variable varies by one percentage point, the operating performance of firms decreases by about 0.53 p.p., ceteris paribus. With this conclusion, there is therefore evidence to reject hypothesis 1 which assumed a positive relationship between SR and ROA.
Contrarily, in the literature review, Kamatra & Kartikaningdyah (2015) and Cheng et al. (2015) identified a positive relationship between SR and operational and financial performance. Rossi et al. (2021), who also focused their study on European firms using the ESG index to measure SR, found a positive relationship between ESG and ROA ratio, thus contrasting the relationship identified in this study. However, these authors used companies from the major European economies (France, Spain, Germany and Italy) with quite large results and excluded companies from the financial sector. On the contrary, the sample of this research included listed firms from smaller countries, such as Portugal or Ireland, as well as firms belonging to other large economies, such as the United Kingdom. These differences may be the cause of the contrast between these two studies. In short, one of the possible justifications for this contrast in results may be associated with the fact that the companies in the sample adopt socially responsible behaviors to have a positive impact on stakeholders, not giving so much importance to the relationship that SR establishes with business performance, something already argued by Wuttichindanon (2017).
However, it should be noted that the results of the first regression equation of model I support several studies that have also resulted in confirming the existence of a negative and significant association between operational performance and SR practices (Buallay, 2019; Hirigoyen & Poulain-Rehm, 2015; Oh & Park, 2015, referenced by Guzman et al., 2016). An interesting fact of Buallay’s (2019) study, is that this author also used a sample of companies from different European economies (considering smaller countries) and identified an inverse relationship between SR and ROA. This inverse relationship could be justified for several reasons. While Buallay (2019) justifies the use of SR for managers’ own benefit as one of the reasons, Oh & Park, 2015, referenced by Guzman et al., 2016, point out that the costs of SR are very high. Despite this negative relationship, Western European companies will most likely continue with a SR policy, due to the high pressure they feel from society (Dobrea & Găman, 2011).
Regarding the second regression equation of the first model, highlight that the independent variable ESG is statistically significant at least at the 1% level and the additional control variables age and Log(Size) are statistically significant at least at the 0.1% level. On the other hand, the health and technology sectors are relevant for assessing market performance since both sectors are statistically significant at least at the 1% and 5% level, respectively.
It should be noted that the additional control variables show a positive relationship with Tobin’s Q, with the exception of the Log(Size) variable which shows a negative relationship. Regarding the ESG variable, it is possible to see a positive estimated impact between this variable and market performance. That is, when ESG increases 1 p.p., market performance increases 1.18 p.p., ceteris paribus. Given this observation, it is possible to accept hypothesis 2 raised earlier.
This positive relationship identified in this study is contrary to that identified by some authors in the literature. Specifically, Bannier et al. (2019) identified no relationship between market performance and ESG, while Hirigoyen & Poulain-Rehm (2015) found a negative relationship between SR and market performance.
However, the identification of a positive relationship between SR and market performance is not unprecedented in the literature, with other authors having identified the same relationship (Cho et al., 2019; Giannarakis et al., 2016; Li et al., 2018; Okafor et al., 2021; Tarmuji et al., 2016; Yoo & Managi, 2022). The justification given by most authors for the existence of this positive relationship with the market is essentially related to the responsible image that companies convey to stakeholders, especially to investors, whose investments are influenced by ESG scores. Since SR is increasingly present in investors’ lives, a socially responsible company performs better through reputation and investor trust, which consequently increases its market value, and naturally the Tobin’s Q ratio (Tarmuji et al., 2016). From another perspective, this positive relationship between this ratio and ESG scores can also be justified by the view presented by Yoo & Managi (2022). That is, the companies in this sample that show a high value in this ratio have a higher market value and greater financial capacity, so they adopt a greater number of socially responsible actions, thus increasing their ESG scores.
Contrary to the previous ones, the last regression equation of model I is not very relevant in explaining the relationship between social responsibility and financial performance, since ROE is not significant at the reasonable confidence level. Therefore, it is not possible to accept or reject hypothesis 3. In fact, the only variable in this equation that is statistically significant at the 1% level is Log(Size), which shows a negative relationship with ROE. This finding is in line with findings from several other studies that also found no relationship between SR and ROE (Crisóstomo et al., 2011; Hirigoyen & Poulain-Rehm, 2015; Kamatra & Kartikaningdyah, 2015; Madorran & Garcia, 2016; Nollet et al., 2016). The absence of this relationship between SR and ROE in Western European companies may be associated with the fact that these companies use SR as a strategy to create additional value for the product, without the intention that this will influence financial performance, a view advocated in the study by Nollet et al. (2016).
Model II (whose results are presented in
Table 3) was developed with three regression equations to assess the relationship between GC Score and financial, market, and operational performance. Highlight that this social responsibility index is obtained not only in a distinct way from the ESG but is also composed of other dimensions (anti-corruption, environment, human right, and labor right). In short, highlight that this index is associated with a normative basis, namely the UN Global Compact.
With regard to the results of model II, it can be seen that in the first regression equation, GC Score and Log(Size) are statistically significant at the 0.1% level. The control variable age, on the other hand, is statistically significant at least at the 1% level, while the energy and financial sectors are at the 10% level. It should be noted that the utilities sector is statistically significant at least at the 5% level. Regarding the relationship that these variables establish with operational performance, it can be seen that the control ones have an estimated positive impact on ROA, with the exception of Log(Size) which is negatively related. Although GC Score scores assess other aspects of social responsibility that the ESG index does not assess (such as human rights, labor law, and anti-corruption), it is still possible to see that it causes a decrease in asset efficiency, i.e., a decrease in operating performance. That is, an increase of 1 p.p. in this index implies a decrease of 0.71 p.p. in ROA, ceteris paribus. Given this scenario, this observation further reinforces the rejection of
hypothesis 1.
Unlike model I, the regression equation of model II, which evaluates the impact of the GC Score on market performance, does not present results with great relevance, and thus it is not possible to accept or reject hypothesis 2. It was only verified that the additional control variables Log(Size), age and health, technology and utilities sectors are shown to have sufficient significance to influence Tobin’s Q. Thus, it can be concluded that market performance is not influenced by GC Score, contrary to the view of Cetindamar & Husoy (2007) who argue for a strong and positive influence on market performance by the UN Global Compact. The lack of monitoring and auditing in this SR measure may be factors that justify the lack of a relationship between GC Score and market performance.
Finally, the last regression equation in model II assesses the impact of GC Score on financial performance. Unlike what was found in model I, in this case this independent variable is statistically significant at least at the 0.1% level. Log(Size) on the other hand is statistically significant at least at the 1% level. Both the Log(Size) variable and GC Score show a negative relationship with ROE. More precisely, for an increase of 1 p.p. in the
GC Score corresponds to a decrease of 0.83 p.p. in ROE, ceteris paribus. Given these results, it is possible to reject hypothesis 3, which assumed a positive relationship between SR and financial performance. This identified relationship between this index and market performance, contradicts the view of Alareeni & Hamdan (2020) and Li et al. (2018) who found a positive relationship between ROE and SR. Moreover, it also contradicts the view of authors who advocate a neutral relationship between these variables (Crisóstomo et al., 2011; Madorran & Garcia, 2016).
In fact, it is possible to conclude that GC Score negatively influences both operational and financial performance and shows no influence on market performance. This is an important contribution, since in the literature consulted it was only mentioned that the participation of companies in the UNGC has a positive influence on profit, sales volume, reputation, employee satisfaction and customer satisfaction (Erro & Sánchez, 2012; Orzes et al., 2018; Orzes et al., 2020). To further highlight that the fact that companies’ participation in the UNGC entails lower costs compared to other SR standards (Orzes et al., 2020), this benefit is ultimately not enough to change the relationship that GC Score has with business performance.
In short, when relating the results of the estimates of Models I and II, there seems to be evidence that companies implement SR strategies through the GC Score dimensions (estimates are significant and higher in ROA and ROE), although investors (market) place greater value on social responsibility (SR) activities developed in the ESG dimensions. This can be a sign of how management should converge to stakeholder expectations.
Model III was developed to ascertain what impact high and low ESG index scores have on firms’ financial, market, and operational performance.
More precisely, two dummy variables were defined for the overall ESG scores. The Best ESG dummy variable takes value 1 when the firms in the sample score above 65% in the ESG scores (3rd quartile) and otherwise take value zero. As for the dummy variable Worst ESG, it takes value 1 when the firm obtains values below 50% in the overall ESG scores (1st quartile) and value zero otherwise.
Regarding the results of model III, they are presented in
Table 4.
As can be seen from the results obtained in the first equation of model III, the variable Best ESG and age are statistically significant at least at the 1% level. On the other hand, the variable Log(Size) and the utilities sector are statistically significant at least at the 0.1% and 5% level, respectively. The energy and financial sectors are statistically significant at least at the 10% level. This means that all these variables mentioned have an influence on ROA. It should be noted that the dummy variable Worst ESG has no statistical relevance in this regression equation. In terms of interpreting the results of the variables, it can be seen that all the additionally significant control variables relate positively to ROA, with the exception of Log(Size) whose relationship is negative. As for the Better ESG variable, it can be seen that operating performance worsens when firms score higher than 65% on the ESG index. That is, when the Better ESG dummy variable assumes value 1, ROA decreases by 5.74 p.p., ceteris paribus. Therefore, it can be concluded that European firms that want to achieve high levels of operational performance should pay attention to high ESG index scores, as there are indications that these may impair operational performance. In the direct relationship between ESG scores and ROA this inverse relationship had already been found, but it was more pronounced for high scores.
The results of the second regression equation show that the variables Best ESG, Log(Size) and age are statistically significant at least at the 0.1% level, while the healthcare and technology sectors are statistically significant at least at the 5% level. The utilities sector is only statistically significant at the 10% level. In this case, contrary to the results of the first equation, the Improved ESG variable exhibits a positive relationship with market performance. More precisely, when firms score above 65% in ESG, the Tobin’s Q ratio increases by 22.66 p.p. Given this conjuncture, firms in the sample that want to increase their market performance should target their efforts towards achieving better ESG scores, because in addition to the direct positive relationship between these scores and market performance, it was also found that high scores promote considerably higher performance.
Finally, with the results of the last equation of model III, we find that only the control variable Log(Size) is statistically significant at the 1% level. This means that neither scores above 65% on the ESG index nor scores below 50% are able to influence the financial performance of the sample firms. This is a natural conclusion since it has been previously observed that there is no direct relationship between ROE and ESG scores.
Model IV follows the same logic as the previous one, except that in this case, instead of defining the scale of better and worse scores with the ESG index, the GC Score was used.
In the case of GC Score, two dummy variables were also created to distinguish the best and worst scores. The Best GC Score takes value 1 when the scores of the companies are above 65% (class closest to the 3rd quartile), and 0 otherwise. On the other hand, the Worst GC Score variable takes value 1 when the scores obtained by the companies in the sample are below 55% (class closest to the 1st quartile), and 0 otherwise.
For this SR index, as already mentioned, three regression equations were estimated, each with a different business performance variable - ROA, Tobin’s Q and ROE - whose results are presented in
Table 5. The goal will be to understand how corporate reputation in terms of SR affects business performance.
As can be seen, the results of model IV are not very interesting, even though they have been subjected to several adjustments. In fact, we find that the variables Best GC Score and Worst GC Score do not influence the market and financial performance of the sample companies, since at no time do these variables assume statistical significance. In the case of Tobin’s Q, this was an expected result given that a direct relationship between market performance and GC Score was not previously identified. The same cannot be said for ROE since this variable was previously negatively related to GC Score at a reasonable significance level.
In both the equation containing Tobin’s Q as dependent variable and that for ROE, only the additional control variables show some statistical significance. More precisely, in the second equation the variables Log(Size) and age are statistically significant at least at the 0.1% level, the health, technology and utilities sectors are statistically significant at least at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. With the exception of Log(Size), all other variables establish a positive relationship with Tobin’s Q. In the third regression equation, only the Log(Size) variable is statistically significant at the 1% level and establishes a negative relationship with ROE.
In the case of the first equation that contains ROA as the dependent variable, the scenario is already different. In this case, the independent variable Worst GC Score is statistically significant at the 0.1% level, which means that there is evidence that this variable affects operating performance. A curious fact is that low or reasonable scores lead to better operational performance. That is, when the dummy variable Worst GC Score takes value 1, operational performance increases by 7.29 p.p., ceteris paribus. Again, there is here a reinforcement of the theory that focusing on the UN Global Compact standards does not appear to be the best means for companies to improve their operational performance. This is because, in addition to previously being able to see an inverse relationship between ROA and GC Score, from model IV it was also found that scores below 55% can be beneficial for operational performance. It should also be noted that in the results of the first regression equation of model IV, the additional control variables Log(Size) and age are statistically significant at the 0.1% level, while the energy and real estate sectors are statistically significant at least at the 10% level. The utilities sector is statistically significant at least at the 5% level. Regarding the relationship that these variables establish with ROA, it can be seen that, with the exception of Log(Size), all the remaining statistically significant additional control variables show a positive relationship with operating performance.
Model V was estimated to assess the impact of obtaining better and worse scores in the dimensions of the ESG index on the financial, market and operational performance of the sample companies.
In this case, the division between high and low scores was done as follows:
In the Environment dimension, a score less than 60% (1st quartile) is considered worse and a score greater than 70% (3rd quartile) is considered better.
In the Social dimension, a score lower than 55% (1st quartile) is considered worse and a score higher than 65% (3rd quartile) is considered better.
In the Government dimension, a score lower than 35% (1st quartile) is considered worse and a score higher than 70% is considered better (in this variable the third quartile value was 60%, however, considering the 70% score the model results improved).
The results for model V are shown in
Table 6.
From the results of the first regression equation of model V, it is possible to observe that the best scores in the Environment, Social and Government dimensions, as well as the worst score in the Social dimension, influence the operational performance of Western European companies. This is because the variables Better_Gov, Better_Environment and Better_Social are statistically significant at least at the 0.1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The variable Worst_Social is statistically significant at least at the 1% level. Regarding the additional control variables, it can be seen that Log(Size), age and the utilities sector are statistically significant at least at the 0.1%, 1% and 5% level, respectively. The energy and financial sectors are also statistically significant, but this time at the 10% level.
In terms of the interpretation of the variables, high scores in the Environment dimension impair the operational performance of the companies in the sample, thus confirming hypothesis 7 raised earlier. More precisely, scores above 70% in this dimension decrease the ROA ratio by about 3.61 p.p., ceteris paribus.
Regarding the Social dimension, the relationship between the variable Better_Social and the operational performance is identical since scores higher than 65% imply a 2.66 p.p. decrease in ROA. This finding thus confirms hypothesis 4, which argues for a negative relationship between social practices and operational performance. Interestingly, scores below 55% positively influence operational performance, i.e., if the Worst_Social variable assumes value 1, the ROA ratio increases about 6.15 p.p., ceteris paribus.
As far as the Government dimension is concerned, scores above 70% significantly harm the operational performance of European companies. That is, when the Better_Gov variable takes value 1, the ROA ratio decreases by 17.44 p.p., ceteris paribus. Finally, it should be noted that the additional control variables are positively related to ROA, with the exception of the Log(Size) variable, which shows an inverse relationship.
Through the results of the second regression equation it is possible to conclude that of the independent variables, only the Best_Social and the Best_Gov have an influence on the market performance of the sample companies, since both variables are statistically significant at least at the 10% and 5% level, respectively. The additional control variables Log(Size) and age show statistical significance at least at the 0.1% level, while the healthcare and technology sectors are statistically significant at the 5% level. Finally, the utilities sector is statistically significant at least at the 10% level. It should be noted that in this equation the variables associated with the environmental dimension do not present any significance, so that a relationship between environmental practices and Tobin’s Q was not identified, thus it is not possible to validate hypothesis 8.
Interestingly, the relationship that the Better_Gov and Better_Social variables establish with market performance is contrary to the relationship established by these variables with operational performance. That is, in the results of the second equation it is possible to see that if scores higher than 65% in the Social dimension, the Tobins’Q ratio increases 9.20 p.p., ceteris paribus. Scores above 70% in the Government dimension imply an increase of about 20.73 p.p. in the Tobin’s Q ratio, ceteris paribus. Given these results, hypothesis 5 is rejected since it advocated an inverse relationship between social practices and market performance. As for the additional control variables, all are positively related to the dependent variable, with the exception of Log(Size), which shows an opposite relationship.
Regarding the last regression equation of model V, which contains ROE as the dependent variable, it presents two statistically significant variables at least at the 10% level (Better_Environment and Better_Social), one statistically significant variable at least at 5% (Worse_Social) and another variable at 0.1% (Better_Gov). Note that of the additional control variables used, only Log(Size) is statistically significant at the reasonable level (1%), and as has been usual in previous models, this variable is negatively related to ROE.
From the results of the last regression equation of the model presented above, several conclusions can be drawn. First, an inverse relationship was observed between the independent variables Better_Environment, Better_Social and Better_Gov and the dependent variable ROE. More precisely, scores higher than 70% in the environment dimension result in a decrease of about 4.28 p.p. in financial performance, ceteris paribus. In the case of the Social dimension, a score higher than 55% implies a decrease of 3.97 p.p. in the ROE variable, ceteris paribus. The Government dimension is the one where the inverse relation is more accentuated, that is, when scores in this dimension are higher than 70%, ROE decreases 18.90 p.p., ceteris paribus. It should also be noted that the Worst_Social variable is positively related to ROE. This means that scores below 55% in the Social dimension imply a 7.08 p.p. increase in financial performance, ceteris paribus. Through these results, both hypothesis 6 and 9, which argued for a negative relationship of social and environmental practices with ROE, are accepted.
As it was possible to see from the results presented above, obtaining high scores on the environment dimension hurts the operational and financial performance of Western European companies. In congruence with the results of this research, Alareeni & Hamdan (2020), Elouidani & Zoubir (2015), Faria (2018), Makni et al. (2009), Riyadh et al. (2019) and Sameer (2021) also identified an inverse relationship between environmental practices and operational and financial performance. In fact, it can be seen that this is a very recurrent conclusion in the literature, being justified by the high costs associated with these practices, whose benefits in business performance are only reflected in the long term and from a certain level of investment (Arsić et al., 2017; Elouidani & Zoubir, 2015; Madueño et al., 2016; Nollet et al., 2016). On the other hand, it should be noted that the positive relationship between the Environmental dimension of SR and business performance is also advocated in the literature (Alareeni & Hamdan, 2020; Buallay, 2019; Kamatra & Kartikaningdyah; 2015; Pham et al., 2022). To highlight the study by Alareeni & Hamdan (2020) that verified both interactions, that is, first, like in this research, the authors observed an inverse relationship between environmental practices and operational and financial performance. However, these authors also found a positive relationship between these practices and market performance, thus contradicting the absence of a relationship identified in this research between these variables.
With regard to the social dimension, through the results of model V, it was possible to verify the existence of two relationships, i.e., a negative relationship between social practices and operational and financial performance, as well as a positive relationship with these same practices and market performance. In fact, both Makni et al. (2009) and Li et al. (2018) had previously verified in their studies quite identical results. In short, in the literature, there are several authors who defend the view that social practices harm the performance of companies, claiming the high costs associated with these activities, which ultimately outweigh their economic benefits (Elouidani & Zoubir, 2015; Nejati et al., 2017; Riyadh et al., 2019; Sameer, 2021). Importantly, the positive relationship between social practices and business performance has also been argued in some studies (Kamatra & Kartikaningdyah, 2015; Li et al., 2018). In fact, Kamatra & Kartikaningdyah (2015) and Li et al. (2018), recorded findings close to this research, in the sense that the Social dimension is positively related to market performance. The reason for this relationship is associated with access to substantial investment from the market when companies perform well in terms of social practices. This is because investors increasingly look for socially responsible companies in order to build their investment portfolios that meet their fiduciary responsibility (Okafor et al., 2021).
At the level of the Governance dimension, it was possible to see that high scores cause a decrease in the asset efficiency (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) of Western European companies. This is an interesting finding, since this dimension is associated with corporate and management policies implemented in the firm. In fact, this observation conveys evidence that the management of European companies has been geared towards satisfying the interests of board members, therefore creating agency problems between board members and shareholders, and consequently a decrease in company value (Pham et al., 2022). However, this study is not the first to observe this relationship between these variables, as Pham et al. (2022) and Buallay (2019) identified the same relationship in North American, Chinese, and European companies. In contrast, it was also observed in the results of model V that a high score on the Government dimension results in better market performance. This is an already expected result, since investors are paying attention to quality management policies by companies, so the deliberations of managers, may influence shareholders’ investment decisions (Li et al., 2018; Okafor et al., 2021).
About the GC Score, because it has higher scores in the quartiles of its categories, it would not make sense to make a division between the worst and best scores, since most of the worst scores are significantly above the neutral point. In sum, in tests performed, it was found that the distinction between good and bad scores was not beneficial for the GC Score categories, since thus the estimated models did not show variables with statistical significance. Therefore, given these facts, it was preferable to understand what direct relationship each variable has with financial, market and operational performance, the results of which are presented in
Table 7.
From the results of model VI, it is possible to ascertain which GC Score dimensions affect ROA, Tobin’s Q, and ROE. Thus, we can observe that only the practices associated with Human Rights (HR) affect more than one dependent variable. More precisely, the HR variable is statistically significant at the 1% level when the dependent variable is ROA and ROE. The remaining independent variables uniquely influence each of the business performance variables. That is, the Anti-Corruption (AC) and Labor Rights (LR) variables are statistically significant at the 10% level when analyzing market performance for the AC variable and financial performance for the LR variable. The Environment variable (ENV) is statistically significant at the 5% level when the dependent variable is ROA. Regarding the additional control variables, it can be seen that only the variables Log(Size), age and the energy, health, technology and utilities sectors are shown to be relevant in the estimated regression equations. More precisely:
The variable Log(Size), in the first two regression equations, is statistically significant at least at 0.1%, and in the last equation at 1%;
The age variable is statistically significant at least at the 1% level when the dependent variable is ROA and 0.1% when the dependent variable is Tobin’s Q.
When the dependent variable is ROA and Tobin’s Q, the utilities sector is statistically significant at least at the 5% and 10% level, respectively.
The health care and technology sectors are statistically significant at the 5% level when the dependent variable is Tobin’s Q. When the dependent variable is ROA, the energy sector is statistically significant at least at the 10% level.
In terms of interpreting the results, we verify that anti-corruption related activities slightly decrease market performance. That is, an increase of 1 p.p. in the AC variable implies a decrease of 0.77 p.p. in the Tobin’s Q. Human Rights related activities show an inverse relationship with operational and financial performance, which means that an increase of 1 p.p. in the HR variable leads to a decrease of about 0.34 p.p. in ROA and 0.97 p.p. in ROE. Regarding environmental practices, these negatively affect financial performance, i.e., an increase of 1 p.p. in the Environment dimension of the GC Score, leads to a decrease of 0.64 p.p. As for the last variable (labor rights), this is the only one that shows a positive relationship with business performance, since an increase of 1 p.p. in the independent variable LR implies an increase of about 0.56 p.p. in ROE. Finally, all additional control variables, with the exception of Log(Size), show a positive relationship with the business performance variables.
As it was possible to ascertain, anti-corruption practices negatively influence market performance, and this may be justified by the question that by presenting a transparent image of their companies to the market, managers can no longer enjoy illicit benefits that could even promote business performance.
Regarding the results of the ENV (environment) variable of the GC Score, it is clear that environmental practices negatively influence corporate performance. This conclusion is consistent with the results of model V, since an inverse relationship was also identified between the Environment dimension of the ESG index and the performance of European companies.
Previously, it has been found that SR practices that take employees’ interests into consideration, affect their loyalty, motivation, productivity, and satisfaction in the workplace, so this may have positive consequences on firm performance (European Commission, 2008, referenced by Adda et al., 2016; Duarte & Neves, 2011; Sameer, 2021). In short, with an SR policy, companies save resources that were intended to increase employee satisfaction and retention (Tiep et al., 2021). In this research, the variable LR was used to represent employees, as this dimension is associated with several factors that influence this group of stakeholders, such as workplace health and safety, diversity, compensation, training and development, and job quality. The results of the relationship between ROE and the variable LR, are in line with what is defined by the authors referenced above, since the assumption that European companies increase financial performance when they define a SR policy that takes into account the interests of employees is confirmed. Therefore, it is possible to accept the hypothesis 10 referenced above.
On the other hand, an inverse relationship was also found between human rights practices and business performance. This means that the investments made by companies in a human rights-oriented CSR policy may be higher than the economic benefits provided by this policy, and, consequently, harm business performance. It should be noted that this dimension was not used to represent employees, since it also focuses on other stakeholders. That is, although the Human Rights dimension considers factors that may influence employees (human rights, labor law, job quality, among others), it also includes practices that affect the community and consumers (such as product quality and safety, access to the product, and the relationships established with the community).
In the literature review, it was possible to see that SR can indirectly affect the performance of companies, being mediated by other factors. Therefore, the next estimated models will aim to verify how size and age can influence the impact of SR on firm performance. Other variables, such as sector, were not considered, since only these variables present interesting results in mediating between social responsibility and firm performance. In short, not all performance variables present interesting results, so in the results only the impact on ROA and ROE is presented.
Table 8 presents the results of the models that use age as a mediator between corporate performance and ESG/GC Score.
By analyzing model VII it can be seen that the ESG:Age variable is statistically significant at the 0.1% level, either when the dependent variable is ROA or ROE. In both regression equations of this model, the additional control variables Log(Size) and age are statistically significant but at different levels. That is, when the dependent variable is ROA, Log(Size) and age are statistically significant at least at the 0.1% level. On the other hand, when the dependent variable is ROE, these variables increase their significance level to 5%. However, it should be noted that only when the dependent variable is ROA, the energy and utilities sector variables assume a reasonable significance level (10%).
Similarly, in model VIII, the GC:Age variable is also statistically significant at the 0.1% level, which means that the interaction between the GC Score index and age influences the operational and financial performance of Western European companies. At the level of significance of the additional control variables Log(Size) and age, these assume exactly the same behavior as that observed in model VII. It should be noted that in the first equation of this model, the financial and utilities sector is also statistically significant at least at the 10% level.
The results of models VII and VIII contradict Sun’s (2021) view, since as the sample companies age, the impact of SR on operational and financial performance degrades. This is a consequence of the fact that firms fail to keep up with SR trends as the years go by, and therefore fail to take the necessary actions, which has negative implications on their performance. In the literature, Han & Kim (2020) also identified a negative relationship between SR and business performance when it is mediated by age. It should also be noted that the statistically significant additional control variables show a positive relationship with ROA and ROE, with the exception of Log(Size).
Finally,
Table 9 presents the last two estimated models, each with two regression equations, which assess the impact of GC Score on firms’ performance through size.
In Model IX, the variable ESG: Log(size), has a positive estimated impact on ROA and ROE and is statistically significant in both regression equations at the 0.1% significance level. At the level of additional control variables, in the first regression equation we find that, with the exception of the industry, materials and health sectors, the remaining variables are statistically significant (age and Log(Size) are at least at the 0.1% level, the utilities sector is at least at the 5% level and the remaining sectors are statistically significant at least at 10%). To highlight that only the Log(Size) variable shows a negative relationship with ROA and ROE, while the remaining additional control variables are positively related to the dependent variables. In the second regression equation only some additional control variables are no longer statistically significant, such as the communications, energy, real estate, technology and utilities sectors.
In model X, the results are very close to the previous model, with the GC: Log(Size) variable also showing a positive relationship with operational and financial performance, and at the same significance level (0.1%). It is worth noting that, compared to the previous model, in both regression equations, the additional control variables assume the same statistical significance, except for the financial sector which is no longer statistically significant at the reasonable level. The relationship that the statistically significant additional control variables establish with ROA and ROE is the same as in model IX, that is, a positive relationship, with the exception of the variable Log(Size), which establishes a negative relationship.
Overall, we can conclude that regardless of the variable used to measure SR (ESG or GC Score), the size of European companies, measured by the total number of assets, positively influences the impact of SR on operational and financial performance. This means that companies with more assets have more resources available to be used in the development of socially responsible practices. The results of model IX and X are in line with what has been argued by Kamatra & Kartikaningdyah (2015) and Minutolo et al. (2019), in the sense that the size of firms positively influences the relationship between their performance and SR, and therefore contradicts the view of Rossi et al. (2021), who argued for an inverse relationship.