Version 1
: Received: 25 September 2024 / Approved: 25 September 2024 / Online: 26 September 2024 (09:53:29 CEST)
How to cite:
Zhang, C.; Wang, D.; Wu, J. Two-Dimensional Directions Determination for GNSS Spoofing Source Based on MEMS-Based Dual-GNSS/INS Integration. Preprints2024, 2024092048. https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202409.2048.v1
Zhang, C.; Wang, D.; Wu, J. Two-Dimensional Directions Determination for GNSS Spoofing Source Based on MEMS-Based Dual-GNSS/INS Integration. Preprints 2024, 2024092048. https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202409.2048.v1
Zhang, C.; Wang, D.; Wu, J. Two-Dimensional Directions Determination for GNSS Spoofing Source Based on MEMS-Based Dual-GNSS/INS Integration. Preprints2024, 2024092048. https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202409.2048.v1
APA Style
Zhang, C., Wang, D., & Wu, J. (2024). Two-Dimensional Directions Determination for GNSS Spoofing Source Based on MEMS-Based Dual-GNSS/INS Integration. Preprints. https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202409.2048.v1
Chicago/Turabian Style
Zhang, C., Dingjie Wang and Jie Wu. 2024 "Two-Dimensional Directions Determination for GNSS Spoofing Source Based on MEMS-Based Dual-GNSS/INS Integration" Preprints. https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202409.2048.v1
Abstract
Satellite navigation spoofing is a major challenge in the field of satellite/inertial integrated navigation security. To effectively enhance the anti-spoofing capability of low-cost GNSS/MEMS-SINS integrated navigation system, this paper proposes a method integrating a dual-antenna global navigation satellite system (GNSS) and a micro-inertial measurement unit (MIMU) to determine the two-dimensional (2D) directions of spoofing signal sources. The proposed method evaluates whether the single-difference carrier-phase measurements conform to the corresponding directions given in ephemeris files, and employs the micro-inertial navigation technology to determine the 2D directions of the signal source. Based on a set of short-baseline dual-station measurements, the accuracy of the proposed method in determining the 2D azimuths of satellites in synchronous orbits is verified, and the deviation from the real value is evaluated. The experimental results show that the proposed method can effectively identify the spoofed satellite signals while providing high-precision direction information at three different distances: 100m, 10km, and 36000km.The two-dimensional angles errors do not exceed 0.2 rad, 0.05 rad, and 0.01 rad, respectively.
Copyright:
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
