The managers’ strategic behavior of commercial real estate in a competitive environment is discussed. The means of this research are methods of mathematical and experimental game theory. Illustrates an example of a decision-theoretic game problem with two players engaged in the management of competing shopping centers. The strategies of these players are determined by the costs of the development. Since the number of visitors is constantly and changing the quality of shopping centers, managers actually pull visitors from each other, the game-theoretical formulation of the problem of management of shopping centers corresponds to the zero-sum game. The model example shows that with the help of mathematical modeling it is possible to determine the theoretical expected behavior of agents. The model of the software module created specifically for experimental research is described. The experiments are designed to compare the theoretically predicted behavior with the real actions of people. The novelty is that at significant costs of the Manager for the development and promotion of shopping and entertainment centers, the strategies of managers are resistant to each other's actions, in contrast to changes in the external environment is shown.