This article considers the status of psychoanalytical archetypes as attitudinal bodies. It possesses the initiative to consider the prerogative that they are situated on, and to develop that into discussing the conditions for an archetype-like body that is derived from Jungian pretenses. As this article operates within the boundaries of the conjecture, it serves instead to cover the potentiality for developments outside of the simple basis of the archetype, which therefore means that it covers a form of guidance instead of specific results. Unlike Jung’s study, which serves in a multitude of sections and draws upon evidential factors of, however generally expressed, ancient civilisations, this article seeks to apply that logic to the purpose of explicating the meaning and potential extensions of the “archetypal dogma”.

Technology can mediate the gap between observation methods and scientific experience. Intuition—as a form of unconscious knowledge—is one of the most important elements in the emergence of disruptive technology, since the new ideas do not work only on the technical level, but also on social, psychological, political, and economic ones. Its origin is influenced by the creators’ background, the current scientific and technical possibilities, and also by deep aspirations, illusions, motivations, and human values of researchers.However, there is an epistemological breakthrough between scientific experience and intuition. Owing to the idea that intuitions are not individual, this article explores the relation between intuition and innovation since different perspectives with the aim to provide researchers more pathways for creating collective disruptive innovations in the future.

This article argues for five correctives to the current ethical debate about speciesism, and proposes normative, conceptual, methodological and experimental avenues to move this debate forward. Firstly, it clarifies the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests and points out limitations of its scope. Secondly, it disambiguates between ‘favouritist’ and ‘species-relative’ views about moral treatment. Thirdly, it argues that not all moral intuitions about speciesism should be given equal weight. Fourthly, it emphasizes the importance of empirical research to corroborate statements about ‘folk speciesism’. Fifthly, it disambiguates between the moral significance of species and the moral status of their individual members. For each of these issues, it is shown that they have either been overlooked, or been given inapt treatment, in recent contributions to the debate. Building on the correctives, new directions are proposed for ethical inquiry into the moral relevance of species and species membership.