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Detection of Fake Replay Attack Signals on Remote Keyless Controlled Vehicles Using Pre-Trained Deep Neural Network

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Submitted:

04 October 2022

Posted:

06 October 2022

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Abstract
The keyless systems have replaced the old fashion methods of inserting physical keys in the keyhole to, i.e., unlock the door, because they are inconvenient and easy to be exploited by the threat actors. Keyless systems use the technology of radio frequency (RF) as an interface to transmit signals from the key fob to the vehicle. However, Keyless systems are susceptible to being compromised by a thread actor who intercepts the transmitted signal and performs a reply attack. In this paper, we propose a transfer learning-based model to identify the replay attacks launched against remote keyless controlled vehicles. Specifically, the system makes use of a pre-trained ResNet50 deep neural network to predict the wireless remote signals used to lock or unlock doors of a remote-controlled vehicle system remotely. The signals are finally classified into three classes: real signal, fake signal high gain, and fake signal low gain. We have trained our model with 100 epochs (3800 iterations) on a KeFRA 2022 dataset, a modern dataset. The model has recorded a final validation accuracy of 99.71% and a final validation loss of 0.29% at a low inferencing time of 50 ms for the model-based SGD solver. The experimental evaluation revealed the supremacy of the proposed model.
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Subject: Engineering  -   Control and Systems Engineering
Copyright: This open access article is published under a Creative Commons CC BY 4.0 license, which permit the free download, distribution, and reuse, provided that the author and preprint are cited in any reuse.
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