Version 1
: Received: 6 February 2023 / Approved: 7 February 2023 / Online: 7 February 2023 (11:24:52 CET)
Version 2
: Received: 5 May 2023 / Approved: 5 May 2023 / Online: 5 May 2023 (11:54:13 CEST)
Version 3
: Received: 22 September 2024 / Approved: 23 September 2024 / Online: 24 September 2024 (04:59:48 CEST)
Version 4
: Received: 6 November 2024 / Approved: 7 November 2024 / Online: 7 November 2024 (08:51:26 CET)
How to cite:
Bejarano, T. Primitive vs. Advanced Theory-of-Mind: Defending and Reformulating the Difference. Preprints2023, 2023020131. https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202302.0131.v1
Bejarano, T. Primitive vs. Advanced Theory-of-Mind: Defending and Reformulating the Difference. Preprints 2023, 2023020131. https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202302.0131.v1
Bejarano, T. Primitive vs. Advanced Theory-of-Mind: Defending and Reformulating the Difference. Preprints2023, 2023020131. https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202302.0131.v1
APA Style
Bejarano, T. (2023). Primitive vs. Advanced Theory-of-Mind: Defending and Reformulating the Difference. Preprints. https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202302.0131.v1
Chicago/Turabian Style
Bejarano, T. 2023 "Primitive vs. Advanced Theory-of-Mind: Defending and Reformulating the Difference" Preprints. https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202302.0131.v1
Abstract
Abstract. Can we nowadays keep a qualitative difference between the primitive and advanced Theory-of-Mind? The old criteria have become blurry. In addition, it is clear that in ‘apes’ lifestyle’ it is not necessary to use the communicative-cognitive basic abilities which became indispensable in ‘the new lifestyle’. Thus, it is usual to conclude that apes would have to some degree such abilities. However, this article tries to reformulate and defend that qualitative difference. Thus, after underlining the contrast between two kinds of mental states (‘contents’ and ‘expectations’), I apply it to the detection of foreign mental states as well. Then, three points are proposed: First, ‘vicarious expectations’ sustain the primitive ToM; second, a subject can have no expectation of inner states which are intrinsically impossible for him; third, the state of interacting with ourselves as with a different person –e.g., the thinking what others think of us– cannot be a vicarious expectation of ours, but it requires the estimation of foreign contents. From this hypothesis, I deduce that vicarious expectations are unable to sustain self-conscious emotions or the really effective reception of pointing gestures. These abilities could appear only when ‘the estimation of foreign contents’ –i.e., the origin of the advanced ToM– arose.
Keywords
foreign mental contents; human sclera; reception of pointing gestures; self-conscious emotions; Theory-of-Mind; vicarious expectations
Subject
Social Sciences, Behavior Sciences
Copyright:
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
