1. Introduction

2. Methods

3. Literature Review

3.3. Aftermath of the Critical Juncture

The occurrence of Tazreen Fire closely followed by the Rana Plaza collapse, unmasked the true cost of doing business in Bangladesh to those allured by cheap labour, as facilitated by misuse of power and greed for more profit. A plethora of safety culture concerns came under scrutiny- unstable infrastructure, restricted labour rights, a weak and/or lenient regulatory environment, compromised and/or neglected safety standards, stringent production deadlines, and a permissive supply chain network allowing accumulation of overbearing pressure to meet unrealistic production deadlines from global brands. The RMG industry necessitated the production of fast fashion at low costs, paired with poorly constructed factories comprising risky workplaces for more than four million people [30].

As the death toll of the Rana Plaza disaster was tenfold that of the Tazreen Factory, the reactionary media focus, perhaps disproportionately, shifted their attention to focus structural safety concerns such as those associated with the Rana Plaza over the fire safety issues that had led to the Tazreen Factory disaster. With the public eye shifting from the Tazreen incident to the Rana Plaza disaster, attention diverted from fire vulnerabilities within RMG workplaces to the factory buildings’ structural weaknesses.

Nevertheless, a few easily avoidable human errors were unveiled through investigations in case of both disasters. Safety negligence by management bodies and disregard for warnings received in advance (fire alarm in case of the Tazreen, regulator’s warning in case of the Rana Plaza) were common in both tragedies [31]. Moreover, factory workers had been coerced and intimidated into continuing to serve in workplaces that had already been identified as potentially unsafe alerting to the possibility of disastrous consequences. The role of powerplay within the country’s global supply chain network was hence uncovered through these consecutive factory disasters. These facts point to the absence of a safety culture and practices that are covered under social technology.

The Rana Plaza Incident has been described as a “perfect storm” of inferior conditions and practices where the trajectory of the RMG industry’s progress was hindered by exploitation that primarily impacted the most vulnerable and least equipped [32]. These highlighted the absence of adequate safety regimes and governance mechanisms that involve both physical and social technologies. In the aftermath of the wake-up call by the Rana Plaza tragedy, few companies importing Bangladeshi garments withdrew all production activities from the country, addressing the government’s failure to employ safety regulations [33]. Fortunately, some retailers and global stakeholders, adopted a more constructive approach to improve workplace conditions within Bangladesh. The Bangladesh Government was thus expected to undertake prompt actions to assist the RMG sector recuperate and improve the overall working conditions to repair the industry’s global reputation.

To sustain the industry and the country’s economy, the government agreed to the transfer of technology through the advent of transnational regulatory regimes within months of the Rana Plaza collapse. The government’s attempt to respond to the garment industry’s image repair demands amounted to transplanting foreign regulatory regimes assembled by global buyers primarily based in the global north, into a developing country like Bangladesh. This was perhaps seen as a quicker way to rectify safety issues related to RMG workplaces while satisfying the demands of the global stakeholders. It amounted to a leapfrog approach to transfer the required technology from the north, rather than initiating a gradual modification or strengthening of prevalent institutions to build an effective local governance and regulatory system that would promote safety culture.

A game-changing rapid transfer of technology thus occurred within the regulatory system of Bangladesh’s RMG sector via the entry of two regulatory regimes: the Accord led by European clothing retailers; and the Alliance led by United States and Canadian fashion companies. These agencies were launched to motivate garment manufacturing factories to conduct safety assessments and remediation [34]. The Alliance and Accord can be seen as global actors facilitating transfer of technology in the RMG sector, representing the interests of global stakeholders whose tenure began after the Rana Plaza collapse in 2013 and ended in 2019 after extension of the five-year agreement.

3.3.1. The Impact of Transnational Intervention

The launching of foreign regulatory bodies and transfer of physical technology exemplified a “retailers to the rescue” pattern where renowned brands and organisations seemingly participated for reputational benefits [35]. During the introduction of the international regimes, few firms manufacturing in Bangladesh affiliated with the Accord, others joined the Alliance, and several had avoided participation in either. While the signatories trumpeted their cooperation, little was revealed about those who had refused to collaborate [36].

The Accord and Alliance shared many similarities as they were both created for the same purpose by similar sets of stakeholders based in the Global North. They were both meant to significantly enhance Bangladesh’s existing national building and safety codes and their audit systems and follow-up compliance mechanisms. However, the two also had many dissimilarities in their approach towards the task. These dissimilarities largely reflect the variations prevalent in the home bases of the two sets of global players relating to labour laws and management approaches. The similarities and dissimilarities of these two regimes are shown in Table 01. Despite their somewhat different approaches, both regimes operated for roughly the same period between 2013 and 2019 and received similar support and cooperation from the Bangladesh government. After their exit, the RMG Sustainability Council (RSC) was formed to monitor garment factories; it is a collaborate initiative by the Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA) and factory owners.

Table 1. Similarities and Differences between the Accord and the Alliance. Source: Adapted from Donaghey and Reinecke [37].

Table 1. Similarities and Differences between the Accord and the Alliance. Source: Adapted from Donaghey and Reinecke [37].

Similarities	Differences
The Accord & The Alliance -Five-year agreements -Inspection of fire, structural and electrical safety of factories -Common set of safety standards based on the Bangladesh National Building Code (BNBC) -Common reporting template -Mutual recognition of audits in factories covered by brands under both agencies -Remediation plans follow inspections and follow-up inspections are conducted -Factories can be declared ineligible for business for failure to implement recommendations -Issuance of Corrective Action Plan (CAPs) -Aim to establish Occupational Health and Safety Committees within factories -Safety trainings for management and workers -Publication of progress reports on websites -Mechanisms to resolve workers’ complaints -Offer of compensation to workers of terminated factories	The Accord -Started in May 2013, with signatories from all over the world. -Plurarist- resulting in transnational co-determination. -Labour-driven governance -Credible commitment due to legally binding agreement -Exclusion of the Bangladesh Garment Exporters and Manufacturers Association (BGMEA) from Steering Committee -Focus on capacity building of workers -In case of factory closure, employers compensate workers -Installing complaint mechanism through collective action of workers, unions and buyers	The Alliance -Started in July 2013, with North American brands only. -Unitarist- resulting in industry self-regulation -Corporate-driven governance -Flexible commitment due to voluntary agreement -Incorporation of the BGMEA as a partner -Focus on developing rapid solutions -Buyers and employers share compensation -Setting up toll-free helpline for workers to report complaints

3.3.2. Effectiveness of Transfer of Physical Technology against Social Technology

The Accord and the Alliance undoubtedly reduced building safety-related issues and there has been no major incident of structural failure since the implementation of the transnational regulatory agencies. This fact reflects an effective transfer of physical technology. However, problems like low wages, unpaid overtime, abusive supervision, corruption, unethical practices and rejection of unions and collective bargaining have not been resolved and continue within the industry [38]. These issues fall within the ambit of social technology, as they relate to everyday practices and a sense of individual and collective responsibility that define social values that are vital ingredients of a shared workplace safety culture.

The transnational regulatory agencies extensively resolved the apparent structural issues underlying the factory buildings that had resulted in a tragedy like the Rana Plaza. Indeed, the international agencies’ most crucial achievement has been that the RMG sector of Bangladesh has not witnessed another structural collapse since the Rana Plaza [39]. Another achievement noted in recent literature in this regard relates to the establishment of ‘green’ factory buildings in Bangladesh. In less than a decade since the two unprecedented disasters, the country can boast of having the highest number of green RMG factory buildings in the world. There are currently 155 green factories located in Bangladesh that includes 40 of the world’s top 100 garment factories [40]. These green factories certified by LEED have been widely publicised by factory owners and management associations as evidence of improved safety standards in the country’s RMG sector. The successful transfer of physical technology from developed countries into developing nation is, hence, evident.

However, it has been revealed through several studies that despite rigorous efforts made by the private compliance strategies, both the Accord and Alliance have been relatively ineffective in implementing enhanced fire safety standards. Before discussing the range of justifications for the unsatisfactory outcomes, it needs to be clarified that LEED certification of ‘green’ buildings does not verify adequacy of fire protection measures but rather focuses on the environmental performance of buildings [41].

4. Revelations through Study

4.1. A Scan of Media and Literature Covering Post Rana Plaza Period

A media scan was carried out particularly after the Rana Plaza disaster in 2013 to determine the state of affairs relating to workplace safety in Bangladesh. While it is noted that not all industrial fire accidents occur within the RMG sector, this sector employing over 4 million people in around 6,000 garment manufacturing factories within and around Dhaka has been identified as the most vulnerable section of the city’s built environment [4]. Factory fire remains a recurring nightmare which mostly appears to be a consequence of negligence rather than a structural or building design flaw. As reported by The Daily Star [42], in the year 2022 alone, there had been a total number of 24,102 fire incidents claiming nearly a hundred lives, 13 of them being firefighters.

The issues that had culminated into a tragedy like the Tazreen Fire in 2012 were overshadowed and sidelined by those of the Rana Plaza. Perhaps this fact contributed towards allowing fire risks, primarily caused by reckless and unprincipled behaviour by the factory owners and management bodies, to prevail within the RMG industry. In a developing nation like Bangladesh, where workers have limited knowledge and awareness regarding their rights to safe working conditions, incorporation of foreign social technology to enhance safety practices could be challenging. Moreover, corruption, greed, and the allure of more profit, often influence employers to compromise with fire related precautions through procedural shortcuts and deliberate negligence which can more conveniently be swept under the carpet.

Since the debatable exit of the Accord and the Alliance in 2019, regulatory responsibility of the RMG industry of Bangladesh has been taken over by the RMG Sustainability Council (RSC)- an agency that comprises members from the BGMEA (Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association), government officials and, ironically, a considerable number of garment factory owners themselves. Hence, this “self-regulatory” monitoring system has once again put the garment industry’s ethical operation and safety in question.

In this scenario, the media scan reveals a dire situation regarding workplace safety within factories in Bangladesh due to frequent fire incidents. According to a 2022 media report [43], there had been more than 16,000 fire incidents around the country in a decade, 80% of which were related to export-related factories. As reported in the New Age Bangladesh [44], there has been 285,000 fire incidents in the country over the past two decades. Notably, in 2019, the year of exit of the transnational regulatory agencies, Bangladesh witnessed the highest number of fire hazards in a year, with 24,040 reported fire incidents [43]. It was followed by the second highest number in 2020 with a total of 21,073 fire occurrences. On the contrary, no major incident of structural failure has been reported since the intervention by international regulators to date. Most factories observe safety culture in response to pressure faced by factory owners and management from buyers.

According to an article in The Diplomat, there prevails an overt lack of remediation in numerous RMG factories that had been under the Accord, 118 manufacturing factories serving for the brand H&M were found to lack safe fire exits, 159 factories did not have fire alarms, 163 factories did not have sprinklers installed and 44 required immediate attention for remediation [45]. Such shortcomings within factories catering to renowned international brands, ascertain negligence and unethical practice corroborating with factory owners, regulators, and foreign buyers. The prevalence of such shortcomings again points to discounting elements of social technology that seeks to install a safety culture that would discourage such disregard for regulations and promote compliant behaviour.

Literature shows that there is a greater dependence on fire escapes and firefighting measures than on precautionary measures related to maintenance and operation. Matters relating to physical technology that could, for example, lead to structural issues can be clearly and instantly identified during design and construction approval of factory establishments. Moreover, they can also be detected during building inspections. Implementing physical technology through installation of fire safety equipment such as fire extinguishers and structural elements including fire-retardant doors and fire escapes are easy to enforce and monitor. However, implementing social technology relates to more complex aspects requiring incorporation of values, behaviours, and practices, such as conducting fire safety drills effectively and regularly.

The adoption of physical technology requires knowledge and expertise about employing material technology and incorporating technical processes and techniques. These normally relate to design of structures, selection of appropriate building materials and adopting the processes of certification of safety standards to improve safety performance of factory buildings. However, fire safety performance could be drastically compromised by lack of social technology that could allow irresponsible management practices such as blocking exits with storage of combustible raw material or locking fire doors to go unnoticed. Such practices whereby noncompliance to safety standards can be kept hidden or temporarily forged to pass safety inspections result from prevalent human behaviour and contextual norms, i.e., aspects covered by social technology. Additionally, the overall context within which physical technology is meant to operate is influenced by its political, social and cultural environments that define the safety culture that could be shaped by adoption of appropriate social technology.

Figure 1 reveals that fire is the most common cause of workplace safety hazards, contributing to 94% of work-related deaths. However, the death toll of a single incidence of structural failure resulting in the collapse of a factory building, the Rana Plaza, can make a much larger impact on public perception (Figure 2). In 2013, Rana Plaza tragedy caused ten times more fatalities than the factory fire at Tazreen Factory in 2012, eclipsing the urgency to resolve fire issues and instead commanding immediate attention to resolving structural failure concerns. Also, while the magnitude of death toll caused by fire over the years is much greater than that by structural collapse of RMG factory buildings in Bangladesh, the fact is lost unless the Rana Plaza disaster occurring in 2013 is discounted from the statistics (Figure 2).

Figure 1. Causes of Deadly Incidents in RMG Industry in Bangladesh till 2017. Source: Solidarity Center [46].

Figure 1. Causes of Deadly Incidents in RMG Industry in Bangladesh till 2017. Source: Solidarity Center [46].

Figure 2. Death Toll in RMG Industry Disasters in Bangladesh until 2017 Source: Adapted from Islam et al [47].

Figure 2. Death Toll in RMG Industry Disasters in Bangladesh until 2017 Source: Adapted from Islam et al [47].

Although the number and frequency of building collapses that are life threatening have reduced, resulting in a lower death toll, fire incidents continue to occur registering a much higher death toll. In this milieu, it is observed that the country is yet to perpetually resolve the prevalent threats of hazards within RMG workplaces and incorporate comprehensive safety culture related to sustainability [19].

4.2. Interviews and Survey of Key Players in the RMG Sector

To assess the impact made by the intervention on the workplace safety situation within RMG factories in Dhaka, we interviewed and/or surveyed key actors in 2022, around three years after the exit of the transnational regulatory agencies, as part of a larger study. As mentioned earlier, the data and findings represent a part of a larger PhD study. Around 50 professionals playing various key roles within the RMG industry of Bangladesh were interviewed to get an insight into their assessment of the workplace safety situation on the ground. The interviewees included architects, engineers, educators, RMG factory owners and stakeholders. Their responses exposed several underlying concerns that prevail even after the exit of the external regulatory agencies.

When asked whether, after the exit of the external regulatory regimes, Dhaka’s overall built environment including the RMG workplaces was less prone to disasters, only a little over a quarter (27%) of the interviewees responded in the affirmative. Meanwhile, almost two-thirds (64%) either disagreed (38%) or strongly disagreed (26%) with the assertion. This puts a serious question mark on how the achievements of the transnational intervention are perceived among those who play a key role in the design and maintenance of RMG factories, even though no structural failures resulted in RMG factories following the intervention.

Figure 3. Key Actors’ Response to Statement: “Dhaka’s built environment is now less prone to disasters”.

Figure 3. Key Actors’ Response to Statement: “Dhaka’s built environment is now less prone to disasters”.

The interviewees were then asked to choose from a list of human behavioural traits those traits that they believe lead to the creation of workplace hazards. The most cited traits interviewees collectively identified were greed, unethical practices, and negligence (Figure 4). In follow-up questions, interviewees revealed that these traits were most commonly found among practitioners, regulators, factory owners as well as international buyers. This response provides an insight into the contextual reality within which RMG factories operated and were managed in Dhaka after the technology transfer by external transnational regulatory agencies. It suggests that aspects of reform attributable to transfer of social technology had not materialised.

Figure 4. Distribution of Key Actors’ views on Major Human Traits Leading to Workplace Hazards.

Figure 4. Distribution of Key Actors’ views on Major Human Traits Leading to Workplace Hazards.

A survey of factory 50 workers who are the primary users of RMG factory buildings and also those most affected by workplace incidents was carried out. They were randomly chosen from nine different RMG factories. The workers were asked whether they felt the factory they worked in was safe. The majority (62%) of the workers reported they did not consider their factory to be safe while only 28% felt it was safe (Figure 5). It is notable that a significant proportion (12%) of respondents chose not to comment on this question. This could perhaps have been the case of fear of being reprimanded by their employers. In any case, the majority response again points to a rather negative image about the perceived safety of operation and management of RMG factories.

Figure 5. Workers’ Perception of Safety in their Workplaces.

Figure 5. Workers’ Perception of Safety in their Workplaces.

Interestingly, when the same question was put to the owners of those nine factories that were interviewed, it derived an almost unanimous positive response confirming the perceived safety of the factories (Figure 6). The only one respondent responding differently, maintaining that despite adopting the most stringent precautions, destiny could play a role in jeopardising workplace safety.

Figure 6. Factory Owners’ Perception of Safety in their Factory.

Figure 6. Factory Owners’ Perception of Safety in their Factory.

Another question in the factory workers survey sought to confirm workers’ perception of negligence and reluctance on part of the management bodies to undertake action to safeguard workers and eliminate potential workplace injuries. The workers were asked about the frequency of safety drills which the factory management bodies are committed to conduct to improve their safety and wellbeing in the event of a fire incident. More than half (58%) of the workers reported that in their opinion, the drills were not conducted regularly, while one-third (33%) found them to be regular and 9% workers chose not to respond (Figure 7). Interestingly, when the same question was put up to factory owners who were interviewed, the results were strikingly different. An overwhelming majority (97%) of factory owners believed the fire drills were conducted regularly, while an insignificant minority (3%) reported otherwise (Figure 8).

Figure 7. Factory Workers’ Perception of Regularity of Fire Drills.

Figure 7. Factory Workers’ Perception of Regularity of Fire Drills.

Figure 8. Factory Owners’ Perception of Regularity of Fire Drills.

Figure 8. Factory Owners’ Perception of Regularity of Fire Drills.

Summary of Findings

The dissimilarity in the responses of workers and owners is cause for skepticism. This may be seen as a case where the fire drills are actually not being conducted regularly as the workers perceive. The response from factory owners would then suggest as cover up by them at worst, or lack of awareness of ground conditions in the factories at best. In case the fire drills are being held regularly but perceived as being irregular by factory workers, the situation may be different, but equally alarming. This would suggest that perhaps the fact that fire drills are not be pre-scheduled pre-announced events but occur without notice are seen as irregularity of their implementation. If this were the case, it indicates that there is a lack of communication and awareness among the factory workers about the purpose of the drills. This indicates there is a need to apply social technology to create general awareness among all stakeholders about their rights and responsibilities in guaranteeing the safety of the workplace. While the fire extinguishers and other fire safety equipment may be present, they may not be employed appropriately by factory workers exposed to a fire hazard.

5. Discussion of Findings

5. Conclusion

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