In this part of our paper we reflect on the severity of the Spanish Flu in 1919 relative to COVID-19 in 2020 and the efficacy of NPIs in containing infections. Much can be learned about how changing human behaviour can dampen the impact of pandemics (28), despite the current public scepticism in Australia about masks, for example. That discussion is followed by an explanation of why our study of COVID-19 in 2020 is dependable given the reliability of the data that was collected in 2020, relative to 2021-2023.
4.1. The critical role of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) in 1919 and 2020
Our estimates showed that the Spanish Flu death rate in 1919 was more than 30 times the COVID-19 death rate and hospitalisation rates in 2020. This dramatic difference is not unique to Australia: for example, in Switzerland Spanish Flu cases were 40 times greater than confirmed COVID-19 cases in 2020 (29). These estimates are counterintuitive given that relative to the Spanish Flu, COVID-19 appears to have a greater propensity to mutate, resulting in greater infectiveness, and greater longevity because of the ongoing cycle of mutations (30, 31). Of course, without any genomic data for 1918-1919 we can only speculate about the nature of the influenza virus and its various strains at that time. In 2020 the high infectiveness of COVID-19 was identified as being linked to its longer incubation period of between four and 12 days relative to SARS in 2002 (2-7 days) and pandemic influenza in 2009 (2 days) (32). The incubation period of the Spanish Flu virus was very much shorter at a few hours up to one or two days (29, 33), but there is insufficient explanation of the true characteristics of the virus that caused the 1918-1919 pandemic.
The severity of Spanish Flu has never been fully explained despite the research by Tumpey and colleagues on the virulence of the reconstructed Spanish Flu H1N1 virus in 2005 (34). Moreover, the influenza virus appears not to have been the primary driver of mortality: rather it was secondary infections from a range of ‘bacterial pneumopathogens’. These worked in tandem with the H1N1 virus amongst a population that had no experience of or access to antibiotics which did not yet exist (25). Coming on top of the deprivations experienced by all sections of society during the First World War, the immunity of Australians was also very low making them susceptible to viral and bacterial pathogens. The age specific nature of the Spanish Flu may have been another factor driving the severity of the 1919 pandemic. It affected mainly those of working age and many more men than women died. Workforce participation rates (67.7% for men and 22% for women) may have been a factor together with the pub-drinking habits of men that threw them close together after working in crowded blue-collar jobs. Again, there is no certainty about these socioeconomic drivers of the Spanish Flu (6). The many measures that were taken to reduce the spread and severity of Spanish Flu, including the closure of international borders, the lockdown of schools and other public facilities, the wearing of face masks and health measures including public inhalations and inoculations with the Commonwealth Serum Laboratory vaccine and the distribution of aid, were useful but insufficient aids to reducing the high levels of mortality and morbidity that were experienced (35, 36). On the other hand, we suggest in the following section that without NPIs the lethality of Spanish Flu in 1919 would have been even higher.
4.1.1. Protective sequestration as an NPI
Despite the imperfections of NPIs, we should not dismiss the importance of early and timely nonpharmaceutical interventions and realise that without any changes in human behaviour the outcomes of the Spanish Flu in Sydney might have been much worse.
Detailed studies for Australian cities in 1919 do not exist, but we have much to learn from research about the American experience where special attention has been paid to assessing the benefits of quarantine and masks. The US Defence Department wanted to know what could be done to protect America in the event of a sudden pandemic for which pharmaceutical responses such as vaccines or antivirals would take many months to develop. The commissioned study by the University of Michigan Medical School located seven communities that during the second wave of the Spanish Flu pandemic in America (September-December 1918) experienced low rates of infection and no more than one death each (9). The study concluded that the most dramatic example of infection control occurred at the US Navy Yerba Buena Island Training Base (in San Francisco Bay) that was subjected to ‘protective sequestration’ imposed under strict naval command. The base’s island location made that possible. While draconian quarantine of this kind was not workable in most American situations, protective sequestration could be useful in shielding small, contained communities in emergency situations – for example military installations.
The benefits of non-pharmaceutical interventions in more typical situations were demonstrated by two other studies. Research on San Francisco compared with 15 other American cities suggested that a 25% reduction in mortality had occurred thanks to the use of masks and bans on large public gatherings (37). Unfortunately, the city authorities did not persist with their interventions. Had the San Francisco authorities been stricter for longer, the authors suggested that the transmission of flu could have been stopped completely and its mortality rate reduced by about 95%. By extension, had the Sydney metropolitan authorities been more persistent in their interventions instead of engaging in policy flip-flops in their mask mandates, the Spanish Flu might have killed fewer in 1919. The same applies to containing COVID-19 infections in Australia during 2022, the third year of the pandemic; that year was characterised by very high levels of excess mortality from COVID-19 despite the availability of vaccines and antivirals.
A second study of 43 American cities (from 8 September 1918 to 22 February 1919), showed that closing schools and cancelling public gatherings were effective in flattening the impact of the pandemic. About 79% of these 43 cities implemented these two restrictions for a median period of four weeks and this was ‘significantly associated with reductions in weekly EDR’ (Excess Death Rates’) (38). The cities that introduced these NPI strategies earlier experienced statistically significant ‘greater delays in reaching peak mortality’, had ‘lower peak mortality rates’ and ‘lower total mortality’.
As in America, ‘protective sequestration’ or quarantine was highly successful in keeping the Spanish Flu virus at bay in Australia. As an isolated island continent, stringent port regulations made that possible with the result that the most savage influenza strains of 1918 did not enter and Australia escaped the first global waves of the pandemic. By late January 1919 the situation changed with the outbreak of the Spanish Flu in Melbourne and Sydney, the detailed circumstances of which have not yet been fully explained. Once the pandemic burnt itself out, memory of the Spanish Flu dimmed quickly despite the huge number of deaths. The debates about how to control the pandemic, the protests against masks and the policy changes that defined the responses of other countries to influenza became features of the Australian experience in 1919. There has been no study of the Australian experience, comparable to the American research by Markel and others (9, 38) yet there is no reason to think that quarantine in Australia during the Spanish Flu did not make an equally important contribution to dampening the waves of infection.
In 2020 Australia’s quarantine system needed to respond to a much more complex international economy compared to 1919 with frequent arrivals from many global destinations at many entry points. On 1 February 2020 the first ban was introduced preventing all foreign nationals who had left mainland China from landing in Australia until 14 days had passed since they left the People’s Republic of China (39). It was widely assumed that COVID-19 originated in Wuhan, mainland China, as a result of either natural or unnatural causes (40).
Prior to that, arrivals were met at the airport where various degrees of screening for COVID-19 were undertaken. Australians were advised not to travel to Wuhan and then not to travel to China. In early February Australian citizens and permanent residents were evacuated from Wuhan to Christmas Island that had been opened up as a quarantine station. Then on 9 February 2020, the Howard Springs quarantine centre received their first group of many hundreds of evacuees (39). Gradually travel restrictions and then bans were extended to other countries and by mid-March 2020 domestic restrictions were placed on visitors to aged care homes in an effort to protect the vulnerable aged. On the 20 March 2020 Australia closed its international borders to all but Australian citizens, permanent residents and returning family members (39). Two days later, bans were introduced in Melbourne ordering the closure of pubs and bars, entertainment venues, religious gatherings, cafes and restaurants – only a few exceptions were permissible such as takeaway food and drink and very small groups at funerals and some religious events where the ‘1 person per 4 square meters applied’ (39). By the end of March 2020 Australia became one of 12 countries to introduce quarantine hotels as a way of detaining all international arrivals for 14 days surveillance and testing for COVID-19: 14 days was the upper limit of the incubation period for the virus. Arrivals were transported from their arrival points to hotels for 14 days mandatory detention. At first the hotels had ‘red floors’ for only COVID-19 positive arrivals but later these were replaced by dedicated COVID-19 positive hotels or ‘hot hotels’ for arrivals who had tested positive tests for the virus and their close contacts (41).
The system was flawed with 20 known breaches of quarantine, complaints by international arrivals of the poor condition of many of the hotels and how they felt at risk of catching COVID-19 and other infections. Reports were received by authorities about the inadequate protective equipment and procedures in airports, ports, buses and hotels, and the casual attitudes of hotel staff, airline and transport staff, police, defence force personnel, and security personnel (42). The effectiveness of Australia’s quarantine system in 2020 has yet to be systematically assessed but it is reasonable to suggest that despite the inadequacies, the system was a great advance on what was possible in 1919 because testing for the SARS-CoV-2 virus was possible. Given the millions of people affected by the above-mentioned quarantine measures, the breaches were relatively few although, 90% of COVID fatalities in 2020 were linked to quarantine breaches at the Rydges Hotel in Carlton, Melbourne and the other 10% to the Stamford Hotel in Melbourne’s central business district. In other words, the virus escaped from the international arrivals in these two ‘hot hotels’ into the general Melbourne community, mainly via the aged care sector. Paradoxically, our certainty about these transmission routes has been generated by one of our most powerful NPIs against the pandemic in 2020, namely, genomic tracing which was developed to cut the transmission networks.
4.1.2. Contemporary, scientific ‘protective sequestration’ via contact tracing and genomic sequencing
In 2020 ‘protective sequestration’ was placed onto a scientific basis thanks to our capacity to test for the presence of SARS-Cov-2. That led to contact tracing and genomic sequencing of the SARS-CoV-2 virus that enabled governments in Australia to generate detailed maps of outbreaks of infection and the geographical directions in which it had moved. Contact tracing began on the 25 January 2020, the same day that the first Australian case of COVID-19 was confirmed in a patient from Wuhan who had flown to Melbourne via Guangdong six days earlier. Details about outbreaks of infections in public spaces such as shops, cafes and bars appeared daily in Victorian news bulletins, the DHHS website, and social media. The Chief Medical Officer and his staff in Melbourne gave daily press conferences to convey the latest details about the pandemic and provide advice on interventions. Information about the suburb, name of the site, address and the date and time that a COVID-19 positive customer or member of staff was confirmed to have been at that site was widely disseminated. As a consequence, Melbournians had the choice of avoiding specific locations in particular neighbourhoods. Mass communication systems ensured that once the testing results had been released by the laboratories, this information became widely known very quickly. In 1919, by contrast, Sydney residents only knew about the spread of infection in limited areas because the authorities lacked the methods of modern contact tracing or mass communication to generate a wider picture of the emerging trends in the pandemic.
On the other hand, the benefits of imposing ‘protective sequestration’ in Melbourne through targeted lockdowns were partially compromised by the feeling amongst some communities that they were under attack. For example, when high-rise residential towers in North Melbourne and Flemington were identified as clusters of infection on 29 June 2020, movements into and out of the apartments and buildings were stopped without warning or any community consultations involving residents. At any one time, about 500 police were asked to ‘ring- fence’ all the towers including those that had not had a confirmed case of infection (43, 44). No effort was made to explain to residents why stopping the spread of infections needed to involve towers that had not yet succumbed to COVID-19. Nor did the residents have ready access to media releases about the progression of the pandemic, because these were typically in English and many locals were migrants from non-English backgrounds. They were, therefore, poorly prepared for any state intervention – especially of the draconian type. The residential population included refugees from countries where they had suffered police oppression, and many were unemployed or poorly paid, casual workers. The lockdown was supposed to protect the residents by containing the existing infections but in doing this through culturally insensitive means it further reduced the trust that they had in the authorities. Many of the employed residents in these towers were indeed at higher risk of COVID-19 infection because of their lower socio-economic status and willingness to work as casual labourers juggling numerous poorly paid jobs at the same time. The Victorian Chief Medical Officer’s reason for more rather than less intervention was that given the lack of vaccines and antivirals, ‘an abundance of caution’ was necessary to ensure that the risks of cross-infection be minimised in facilities with high population densities. This rationale was totally logical but the lockdowns could have been implemented in better ways and with communications and ‘outreach to multicultural communities’ (45). Even the police complained about the unplanned manner in which this particular ‘protective sequestration’ was implemented.
Contact tracing was an important tool that allowed the Victorian government to re-reinvent the ancient system of ‘quarantine’. When that information required interventions beyond voluntary avoidance practices by individuals, the state used that data to ensure public compliance with stringent public health measures. The majority of these interventions did not lead to the public outrage that defined the quarantine cordon around the high-rise towers of North Melbourne and Flemington. Metropolitan Melbourne experienced a cascading series of mini-sequestrations that peaked with the introduction of city-wide lockdowns and curfews, the latter being unfamiliar to all who did not live through the Second World War. Six lockdowns were implemented during the first two years of the pandemic- the longest lasted 111 days from 9 July to 27 October 2020 (46). On 2 August 2020 the Victorian government declared a ‘state of disaster’ and also imposed a curfew from 8pm to 5am. Six weeks later, on 14 September, the curfew was eased to 9pm to 5am and then removed on 28 September (47).
Notably, Melbourne became the most locked down city in the world (48), at an estimated weekly cost of about AUD$1 billion. Preceding the metropolitan-wide lockdowns, there were lockdowns of particular facilities where infectious clusters had been identified: for example, as reported on 1 August 2020 there were hundreds of active cases including 823 in aged care homes, 377 in public housing towers, 286 meatworkers, 184 in the Al-Taqwa College and several cases in retail outlets (49). Regular monitoring for infection was introduced for residents and essential visitors in aged care homes and public housing towers and special arrangements were made for the delivery of food and medical supplies. Through these means the Victorian government sought to contain the spread of infection at a time when little was known about the virus and when pharmaceutical solutions were not available. Government intervention did not waiver despite many justifiable complaints about the imperfect implementation of these policies. Mini-sequestrations often gave way to lockdowns of whole suburbs or local government areas where numerous infectious clusters had been identified. Travel into and out of these areas was highly restricted and fines were imposed for breaches of the rules – for example, driving beyond one’s residential suburb to another suburb required a good reason such as medical treatment that could not be provided locally.
Genomic tracing had the capacity to enhance the contact tracing system by providing authorities with information about specific strains of the COVID-19 virus and matching that information with data about the clusters of infection. The corona virus has RNA, a genetic code similar to human DNA. Minute changes in RNA are identified by laboratory analysis and then linked to epidemiological information collected from known sites of infection. In this manner, genomic sequencing can help to identify the origins of infections and the sequence of transmission to other localities. The infectious materials analysed came from individuals who had tested positive for COVID-19 and also their symptomless contacts – the latter, in 2020, represented about 18% of all infections (50). In bringing together epidemiological clusters with genomic clusters, a powerful diagnostic tool was invented for tracing the movement of the virus amongst the population. This tool sought to gather a large volume of systematic information to break the networks of viral transmission (50).
Unfortunately, the analysis of genomic clusters came too late in 2020 to prevent infected workers at the Rydges and Stamford Hotels from carrying the virus into the general community and ultimately into aged care homes that suffered the highest lethality. The preliminary results of genomic analysis were not known until mid-June 2020 and the final reports to the DHHS arrived on 31 July 2020 for the Rydges Hotel and on the 4 August for the Stamford Hotel (41). Nor could specific events of transmission be pinpointed and the mode of transmission also remained open to speculation i.e. whether it was the result of contact with inanimate objects in the hotels, poor environmental conditions such as inadequate ventilation or person to person contact. As the Royal Commission inquiry into hotel quarantine noted, the results of contact tracing and genomic sequencing within the ‘hot hotels’ could only be improved and made more timely by placing into each quarantine facility specialised units to prevent and control infection and undertake hotel specific contact tracing (41). This imperfect tracing system may have contributed to the double- and triple-digit weekly deaths recorded in Stages 3, 4 and 5 (
Table 2).
While genomic sequencing arrived too late in 2020, its potential to break networks of transmission was eloquently explained to the inquiry into Melbourne’s hot hotels and their failure to secure the ‘protective sequestration’ that had been expected of them. This new knowledge, including the failures to prevent quarantine breaches, stands ready to be mobilised as a powerful NPI in future pandemics caused by the arrival of exotic pathogens. Nor was the more routine contact tracing system without its flaws, even after it was accompanied by the introduction in late August 2020 of wastewater testing for viral fragments (51, 52). Yet, despite being slow and cumbersome, as an NPI, the contact tracing approach provided essential information at a time when genomic sequencing was not an established practice and Australia lacked a Centre for Diseases Control (CDC) or any other system of surveillance comparable to that which existed in the UK and USA (53). Authorities were able to justify the many mini-sequestrations and lockdowns in a way that ensured a high degree of public compliance with the restrictions. Even breaches of the curfews in Melbourne were rare, as dog owners will testify - late night walks for dogs are essential given the confines of apartment living in modern cities but except for dog owners and their pets the streets in Melbourne were empty. Even homeless people were tested for the virus and moved off the streets into hotel accommodation to ensure that the poorest Australians did not become sick and pass on infections.
The lower lethality of COVID-19 in Melbourne in 2020 relative to the Spanish Flu in Sydney in 1919 was achieved largely because of the persistence of the contact tracing system, the detailed information that it generated and the high public awareness of the risks of infection that it created. Thanks to this NPI, the public’s risk appetite in Melbourne was very low in 2020. Other NPIs such as the wearing of masks and physical distancing were, in our view, less effective because they allowed a wider degree of discretion on the part of the individual user. In the worst-case scenarios, contact tracing allowed the Victorian government to justify requisitioning the use of public and private hospitals for providing the residents of aged care housing priority access to treatment. Driven by media images of the horrors experienced by the citizens of Lombardy (Italy), fears of the possible collapse of Melbourne’s hospital system were palpable by March 2020 (54). On 28 July 2020, the state government announced that all elective surgery (except for emergencies in Categories I and II) in public and private hospitals was suspended to make room for the relocation of aged care residents; provision was also made to ensure that there were extra hospital staff to look after them (55).
4.1.3. Cloth masks as NPIs
Despite the lax use of masks even when authorities mandated their use, masks played an important role in containing infection both in 1919 and 2020. Had they been used more systematically and continuously, the outcomes for the communities would have been even better, given the research that increasingly points to the considerable benefits of even cloth masks as an NPI. New research in China suggests that masks are important not only in crowded indoor settings but also in crowded outdoor markets where the SARS-CoV-2 can survive in the air for more than an hour and a half (56).
Again, given the lack of research about the value of masks in the case of Sydney’s Spanish Flu in 1919 we cite American examples that are compelling. Despite the violent resistance to mask wearing in many quarters, many citizens in San Francisco made masks from all kinds of cloth. Medical professionals, however, preferred gauze masks over others. In 1920 Kellogg imitated human mask wearing by covering laboratory dishes with various layers of gauze and pumping the airtight dishes with B. prodigiosus- a common bacillus, also known as Serratia marcescens. The ‘possible reduction in dosage of infection [was] not more than 50% effective’ and in his view did not justify mandatory mask wearing (57). With hindsight we can now appreciate that the widespread wearing of 50% effective cloth masks could have made a big difference to reducing the rate at which infection spread in any location by lowering the viral load to which people were exposed.
A much later laboratory experiment in 1949 involved tests on rabbits wearing gauze masks. It concluded that between 90% and 95% of ‘virulent bovine tubercle’ could be screened out (58). The scientists measured the thread diameters and interthread spaces in gauze and reported that three to six layers of this material ‘occluded practically all of the spaces’ and this accounted for the effective barrier that the gauze had created to the dissemination of the bacterium. In laboratory conditions, high levels of protection were easier to achieve than amongst active citizens. The masks were tight fitting and the rabbits virtually inert. Despite the problem of how to ensure that a face mask provides a proper seal when worn by humans, a recent literature review by Clase et al. supports the value of using a wide range of cloths (including gauze) as barriers against infection on the basis of their review of 25 articles that summarise ‘a century of evidence on the efficiency of cloth and cloth masks to reduce transmission of droplets and aerosols’ (59). Despite the enormous variety of materials, methods and tests, the cumulative evidence showed ‘that even at low thread counts and layers, and for aerosols, some kinds of cloth block substantial percentages of transmission’. The size of the virions (a virion is a complete infectious particle including its genome) of H1N1 and SARS-CoV-2 are similar: 80nm-120nm (0.08mm-0.12mm) in the former case and 100 nm (0.1mm) in the case of SARS-CoV-2 (60, 61). However, neither the size of the virions nor the thread counts of the cloth appear to be the determining factors in screening out viruses. Additional considerations come into play, for at the microscopic level the thread is thick and deep so that the gaps between the threads take the form of tunnels into which small filaments of broken and irregular threads intrude. This means that when a virus particle impacts on a thread it acts ‘like a ball hitting a wall’. It bounces off and cannot ‘redirect itself to avoid obstacles’ (60). If the cloth mask has numerous layers, these add further obstacles that the virion must pass through before it completely escapes from the mask. In short, ‘the point is not that some particles may penetrate the cloth, but that some are blocked’. At a more basic level, masking greatly reduces the distance travelled by the jet stream of air emanating from a sick person: one study reported that without a mask the average distance travelled by a jet stream was 8 feet compared with less than half of that in the case of a bandana elastic T-shirt material mask and as little as 2.5 inches in the case of a stitched mask made from quilting cotton (62). Personal observations over the last three years of the COVID-19 pandemic in Melbourne also showed that masks promote physical distancing on the street by signalling to passers-by that the mask wearer might be infected and needs to be avoided. The mere sight of a person wearing a mask can also trigger memories of the purposes of masks and the risks of contracting an infection during a pandemic if you do nothing. When distancing is not possible masks are even more important as the barrier between the sick and non-sick.
On balance, the evidence shows that cloth masks have always been and remain a useful non-pharmaceutical intervention for citizens trapped in pandemic conditions: they are effective barriers to spreading infection, though imperfect because of difficulties in firmly sealing the edge of the mask against the human face. By the best standards of air filtration in developed countries today they have been superseded by the use of N95 masks which provide the most reliable protection (63) – provided that they are fitted properly. Surgical masks are also useful but significantly inferior to N95s (64).
Despite these technological advances, the day of the cloth mask is far from over given that in 2020 ‘nearly half the world—over 3 billion people—lived on less than US$ 6.85 per day’ (65) and a single N95 mask in Australia costs about US$ 2.60.
Without vaccines or antivirals, the evidence about NPIs discussed above suggests that in 1919 and 2020 the wearing of masks helped to contain the spread and severity of infection in the general community. Combined with contact tracing in the case of Melbourne, masks probably had a greater impact than was true of 1919. As in China, deploying multiple non-pharmaceutical interventions in Melbourne had the additional benefit of reducing the incidence of seasonal flu (66). ‘Year to Date’ comparisons between 2020 (on 8 August) and the previous three years show that Victoria only had 4,722 flu cases relative to an annual average of 20,286 for 2017-2019, a decline of 77% (67). NPIs not only flattened the curve of infections for SARS-CoV-2 but also for influenza. Once the NPIs were rolled back influenza cases in Victoria began to rise dramatically; Australia’s Department of Health and Aged Care reported 35,136 cases between 1 January and 9 October 2022 (68). The data is unequivocal: ‘Australia hasn’t made the most of the lessons of Covid-19 about masks, ventilation, and optimal vaccination to inform public health strategies to reduce the impact of seasonal flu’ (69).
4.1.4. NPIs in Melbourne in 2020 and 2022
We acknowledge that the warnings by Professor Doherty and other scientists, probably helped to galvanise the community to change its behaviour in dealing with the challenges of 2020. That behavioural change happened despite insufficient knowledge in the community about the spread of infection via aerosols rather than droplets (70). The relatively low lethality of COVID-19 in 2020 suggests that Australians responded appropriately during the first year of the new pathogen’s arrival. Only 909 Australian deaths were registered in 2020 relative to 11,552 for the Spanish Flu in 1919, comparing the two calendar years (
Table 1). In 2021, there was a small increase in mortality to 1,351 but in 2022 annual deaths soared to 10,095 (71). Using these Australian Bureau of Statistics (hereafter ABS) figures, total mortality ‘due’ to COVID-19 in the three years 2020 to 2022 came to 12,352 (71). These ABS figures refer to people who had died because COVID-19 was the ‘underlying cause of death’ (i.e. due to COVID-19). This figure is almost the same as the total mortality from Spanish Flu in 1919 i.e. 11,552. In other words, Professor Doherty’s predictions in 2020 did not apply to the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic in Australia but they became increasingly relevant over time. Total COVID-19 deaths in 2022 accounted for 81.7% of all Australian deaths since the start of the pandemic in early 2020 despite the multiple benefits of both pharmaceutical interventions (vaccines and antivirals) and the NPIs that were available by then.
The ABS also noted that in addition to deaths ‘due’ to COVID-19 more Australians had died than would normally have been the case because COVID-19 contributed to their death from other underlying causes. The number of national deaths registered under this heading were 9, 60 and 2,901 in 2020, 2021 and 2022 respectively (71). Taking these two categories of deaths (12,352+2,970) the total COVID-19 related deaths in Australia from 2020 to 2022 came to 15,322: 85% of these occurred in 2022 compared with only 6% in 2020. The ABS estimates for the second category of deaths ‘related to COVID-19’ are lower than, for example, the figures given by the Actuaries Institute of Australia. According to that source, in 2022 alone, there were 7,000 ‘incidental COVID-19 deaths’ defied as cases where ‘the person was COVID-19 positive at the time of death, but COVID-19 was not recorded on the death certificate’ (72).
Thanks to the worsening COVID-19 pandemic in 2022, in that year COVID-19 emerged as Australia’s ‘third leading cause of death… behind ischaemic heart disease and dementia’ (72). This shocking outcome for 2022 was predicted in late September 2022 by Professor Crabb (the CEO and Director of the Burnet Institute, Melbourne) (73) who responded to the Australian National Cabinet decision of 30 September 2022 by arguing against the idea that Australia needed to move away from ‘COVID exceptionalism’ and treat it like any other disease by ending ‘mandatory isolation requirements for COVID-19 effective 14 October’ (74, 75). Professor Crabb certainly knew what he was talking about: influenza deaths in 2022 demonstrated that COVID-19 was indeed ‘exceptional’: about 300 people died from flu but deaths from COVID-19 were 40 to 50 times higher. Hospitalisations from influenza up to early December 2022 numbered 1,700 about equal to the total number of people in hospital for COVID-19 on the day of the National Cabinet decision of 30 September 2022. In hearing of the latter’s decision, Professor Crabb, ‘collapsed with disbelief’ (73). For the first time since the end of World War Two, excess deaths in Australia increased in 2022, reversing the long term trend of improving longevity in Australia during the last 78 years.
Another reason for his shock was the growing evidence since 2020 of the extensive, negative impact of long-COVID on the human body. Cabinet’s decision at the end of September cut across a parliamentary inquiry into Long COVID, submitted on 12 November 2022 (76). The report identified between two kinds of ‘long COVID’: firstly, a situation where the symptoms of infection persisted beyond three months after catching the virus and secondly, a situation where the virus ‘caused or triggered’ a chronic or non-communicable disease affecting different organs, the blood and nervous systems. This second circumstance is called Post-acute COVID Sequelae (PACS). In this case a person can recover from the acute phase of COVID-19 but suffer a pre-mature death from these other conditions. The parliamentary inquiry called for more government intervention to curtail deaths and illness – the usual NPIs were named including mandatory masking and the isolation of the sick (76). Their advice was based on not only Australian mortality rates exceeding most of the OECD countries but also the estimated 370,000 Australians with severe long COVID on 31 October 2022. The latter group represented about 6% of people who had ‘symptomatic COVID’ – their seriously compromised health conditions prevented them from resuming their daily routines and jobs (76). Given the rising rates of reinfection and the proliferation of COVID-19 strains, mandatory measures were recommended to ‘manage the unfolding public health-social-economic crisis that will exist for years to come’ (76). The report stressed that to avoid long COVID the best thing was to avoid COVID, yet the estimates suggest that about 11.2% of those infected had had COVID twice and a further 5.4% had had it three times or more (77). The health costs of the COVID-19 pandemic are now contributing to Australia’s fiscal crisis, made evident by questions about the affordability of the National Disability Insurance Scheme (that covers some 500,000 citizens) and the recent purchase of nuclear submarines. More and more international studies have confirmed the devastating impact of Post-acute COVID Sequelae (PACS): if 10% of acute infections lead to persistent symptoms, it could be predicted that about 400 million individuals globally are in need of support for long COVID (78). Altman and colleagues discussed the multiple mechanisms that can lead to such serious long COVID. Another study reported that about a third of 34 patients who died from non-COVID-related causes in 2021 and 2022 had spike protein in their skulls – confirming the view that SARS-CoV-2 contributed to their ill health and possible death in ways that we still do not fully understand (79).
Despite easy access to pharmaceutical and nonpharmaceutical aids, Australia’s appalling death rate from COVID-19 in 2022 (the third year of the pandemic) tells us that we still have much to learn from our experience during the first year of the pandemic. In 2020, the spread of infection was reasonably manageable and contained even with the lack of vaccines or antivirals. The lethality of COVID-19 was relatively low by historical standards and the experience of Australia in 2022. Our public health system did not collapse; nor did we face the serious fiscal crisis that now looms before us. As discussed in the next section, the abandonment of NPIs in 2022, together with the unrelenting propensity of the virus to mutate and assume highly infectious form, make the US Defence Department’s warnings of 2006 relevant today:
“If vaccine and antivirals are not effective, we have to resort to NPIs and we need to know this before the pandemic hits because NPI is costly and socially disruptive; so we need to have a plan and rationale for using them”.
(9)
4.2. Transparency and data reliability were better in 2020 than in 2021-2022
The diagnostic value of documenting the contours of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, the first year of the pandemic, also arises from the better quality of the data we have for that year. This is especially important because the epidemiology and aetiology of pandemics is an indispensable tool for appropriate public health measures in the short term and pandemic planning in the long run. Such documentation, however, is only as good as the reliability of the data and the access that the public has to it. What emerged with growing clarity in 2022, the third year of the pandemic in Australia, is that over the course of the pandemic, Australian data has become less complete, less reliable and less accessible. These developments are counter-intuitive given that by early 2022 the scientific basis of our response to the pandemic had improved greatly thanks to the arrival and widespread use of vaccines and antivirals and better ways of monitoring the spread of infection using contact tracing and genome analysis. At the end of 2022, stringent complaints were voiced by a number of Australian experts about the lack of public and media understandings of the pandemic caused by federal and state governments refusing to share the data that they did have and the special studies that they themselves had commissioned. A good example of the dire state of public information about COVID-19 in Australia has been given by Hyndman, a member of an inter-university research team set up in March 2020 under Professor McCaw to provide weekly assessments of the progress of the pandemic to the Australian Health Protection Principal Committee or AHPPC (that includes all State Chief Health Officers and the national Chief Medical Officer). The committee regularly provided ‘a relatively good data set of case numbers for all states’. Despite this high-quality research, officially appointed teams such as this ‘were explicitly forbidden to make the data publicly available, even though our data was more accurate than what was appearing in the media’ (80). The secrecy of Australian governments compares poorly with the approach to information sharing in the USA where ‘an official repository of data [was] set up early in the pandemic, and anyone could download it and produce forecasts, and submit those forecasts to the Centre for Disease Control for inclusion in their analysis’ (80). Professor McCaw, head of the taskforce that generates the weekly ‘Situational assessment of COVID-19 in Australia’ for the AHPPC, has also expressed his disappointment with the failure of Australian governments to acknowledge to information provided to them. In particular, he has been concerned about how the Australian public has been misinformed about their own, sensible behavioural responses to the risks of infection. His ‘situational awareness’ data showed that the Australian public was ‘highly compliant’ with government restrictions despite ‘bitter argument … through the media that people weren't taking things seriously’ (81).
MacIntrye, an epidemiologist and one of the world’s foremost experts on biosecurity and bioterrorism, has gone beyond these critiques and documented a much wider practice of government censorship and its impact on medical practitioners who have been silenced from expressing opinions that diverge from the official authorities, including the Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA), the Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency and state based medical councils (82).
On 16 August 2021 she and two colleagues set up ‘OzSAGE’ which is an independent research/advisory association to widen the debate about how best to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic and include a broader range of experts (
https://ozsage.org/). However, this was ‘perceived with hostility’ and she was asked to choose between serving on a government committee or working with OzSAGE (83). She and her two colleagues left the health policy committee to devote their energies to OzSAGE. Despite this the government remained unconcerned about their shrinking access to scientists specialising on infections.
Complaints about the lack of transparency in Australia’s pandemic response began well before the complaints described above. In early 2021 widespread criticisms emerged about the delays and confusion surrounding Australia’s vaccine rollout, with the Commonwealth Government hiding behind the screen of saying that full public disclosure was not possible owing to ‘commercial in confidence’ agreements with vaccine suppliers. Official secrecy and its corrosive effect on public trust were contrasted with the New Zealand government’s openness about their vaccine rollout and warnings about possible adverse side-effects (84). A year later in January 2022, Professor McLaws, one of Australia’s leading epidemiologists, was still calling for the release of timely data to show whether the c. 300% increase in hospitalisations in NSW were caused mainly by the Delta or Omicron strain of COVID-19 (85). Such details mattered because they affected public health policies at a time when the Omicron strain was overtaking Delta: the former was milder than Delta but 36% more transmissible than Delta which was 60% more transmissible than the earlier Alpha strain. Professor McLaws’ sense of urgency was driven by the Commonwealth Government’s decision on 30 December 2021 to restrict testing to ‘close contacts’ redefined as ‘a person who spent four hours or more with a confirmed case in a household or ‘household-like’ setting’ (86). Given the growing transmissibility of successive strains of SARS-CoV-2, hardly any time was needed to risk exposure, let alone four hours. McLaws called for more rather than less testing and other ways of containing the costs of running public testing hubs that were groaning under the burden of meeting public demand for tests (85).
Another reason for the reliability of data for 2020 is that self-testing for infection was not yet an option. The Therapeutic Goods Administration (the TGA is the Australian government regulator) only approved the home use of Rapid Antigen Tests (RATs) in mid-October 2021 and made them available from 1 November 2021 onwards (87). In 2020 all testing was carried using RTPCR tests administered by health professionals at government approved centres and clinics. This testing method remains the ‘gold standard’ against which RATs are less accurate, but in a rapidly escalating health crisis RATs play a range of important functions (88). Despite this, the new RATs based reporting system is full of loopholes that did not exist in 2020 (89). In the newly introduced RATS system after 1 November 2021, many people lacked the motivation to test, or thought that they had the flu or if they tested themselves they could not be bothered to report their test results. The roll out of RAT kits to the public was also insufficient and unreliable (90), and acted as a further disincentive to their use by the public if and when supplies became more accessible. As RATs took over and the government data collection system began to crumble, data about the cases of infection and their geographical locus became less and less comprehensive and dependable.
The data limitations for the Spanish Flu pandemic were of a completely different order and could never have been fully rectified by government intervention because the very existence of viruses was yet to be discovered. That did not happen until 1933. As a result, although the sick and their contacts were quarantined in 1919, no assessment could be made of how effective the system of isolation was or the direction in which sickness was moving (6). This meant that quarantine arrangements were working within a knowledge void. The very idea that something called ‘viruses’ was creating sickness was unimaginable, let alone that these viruses could change their genetic features and generate accelerated risks of continuous infection from mutations. It follows that locking down specific high-risk localities beyond large venues where the public gathered (schools for example) remained inconceivable.
Comparative historical studies always suffer from data problems and the Spanish Flu epidemic generated many of these. Information about deaths from flu in 1919 are hampered by the widely reported phenomenon of the large number of people who died in their own homes where ‘whole families had been ill at once’ (91). Reliable figures on those domestic deaths do not exist but anecdotal and other information speaks to the importance of this aspect of the pandemic. In Sydney the Metropolitan Citizen’s Influenza Administrative Committee ran about 100 relief centres to distribute aid to needy households but these provisions were difficult to access. Families wanting food aid, for example, had to request help and send a family member to a depot to fill in an application which was then scrutinised on Saturdays to ensure compliance with the rules that prevented fraud (92). Meat, bread, milk, groceries and vegetables were named in the committee’s report, but not fruit- and it was fruit which the sick preferred to eat (93). Moreover, given the prevailing economic philosophy of the times that treated inequality as a ‘natural’ state of the social order, it is likely that Sydney’s working poor received less than their fair share of domestic assistance despite mortality amongst male labourers being three times higher than amongst middle class professionals (6).
Over time, self-isolation at home became more common given the limited capacity of Sydney hospitals to take everyone. Shortages of doctors, nurses and other staff also emerged as medical professionals caught the virus. On 23 June 1919, it was reported that Sydney hospitals would now only take the most serious cases (94). Of course, even less serious cases on one day might suddenly turn lethal on the next. Temporary ‘influenza hospitals’ were opened in every accessible public facility including ‘schools, showground buildings, churches, gaols, bowling clubs, tearooms, drill halls and courthouses’ (6). The general chaos that characterised life in 1919 was exacerbated by the speed with which the Spanish Flu claimed lives even within a 24- hour window- although the modal time from onset of the flu to death was 7 days (95).
The available evidence suggests that the collection of data was hardly uppermost in the minds of citizens or medical professionals and their volunteer helpers. Moreover, many victims of the Spanish Flu, just like the government officials who reported on sickness and mortality, had no way of separating the symptoms of the pandemic virus from other kinds of influenza or respiratory diseases. ‘Flu-like’ symptoms continue to confuse medical practitioners and researchers to this day (96). The government statistician’s report of 1920 sought to distinguish between pneumonial influenza, influenza with pneumonia and influenza ‘for what they were worth’ and despite ‘differences of opinion between medical men’ about the appropriateness of these distinctions (12). Most dramatically, Cumpston, Australia’s Director of Quarantine, insisted that Australia’s 1919 epidemic was unrelated to the Spanish Flu that had devastated the rest of the world: ‘it is legitimate to say that the evidence available points more directly to a slow evolution of an established local infection than to the introduction of fresh sources of infection from outside’ (97). Perhaps Cumpston was too eager to claim that his control over Australian ports and the arrival of ships with returning soldiers, passengers and cargo had secured Australia against any migration of the disease from the quarantine stations to the domestic population? More realistically, The Medical Journal of Australia noted that ‘Confidence [about the specific nature of the flu] can only be attained if the medical profession admits frankly and without reserve the extent of its ignorance of the causation of influenza and the limitations of its powers to gain a mastery of the disease’ (36). As noted under ‘Materials and Methods’, we have used conservative estimates for the total deaths during the Spanish Flu and data that was presented in its original weekly summary form for Sydney.
During the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic, Melbourne’s victims of infection also largely dealt with their own sickness in home isolation. At the end of our in-depth study period, 30 September 2020, this ‘hidden health crisis’ meant that of the 305 active cases in Victoria only 44 (about 15%) were in hospital including six in intensive care (98). The remaining 85% of active COVID-19 cases were nursing themselves at home or via telehealth with health professionals. Thousands more of symptomatic and asymptomatic Australians also suffered the physical and psychological effects of COVID-19 alone. Throughout the year, health professionals were being called upon to become directly involved in home-based or clinic based primary health care of COVID-19 patients (99), despite official policies that placed the management of the pandemic in the hands of hospitals and clinics.
The difference between home nursing in 1919 and 2020 is that Melbourne’s ‘hidden health crisis’ in 2020 did not distort the data we have about COVID-19 deaths or hospitalisations. This is because mortality from COVID-19 was concentrated in aged care homes where many of the oldest and most vulnerable Australians lived. On 19 September 2020, about 74% of deaths from SARS-CoV-2 had occurred amongst those ‘living in aged care homes at the time of their deaths, although many died in hospital’ (100). Cases of infection in the ten worst affected aged care homes in Victoria on 31 July 2020 came to 49% of residents and 38% of staff (101, 102). The concentration of deaths in older persons and particular facilities, means that the data on hospitalisations and deaths is relatively complete and accurate. Moreover, the newly introduced telehealth system placed high risk patients into regular contact with their GPs who, in turn, would arrange for the evacuation of their clients to hospitals in emergency cases.
At another level of analysis, we learn from investigations into the aged care sector about the inadequacy of NPIs – not because appropriate technology was lacking but because there were insufficient supplies of protective masks and gloves provided to aged care homes (41). Other evidence pointed to the casualisation of labour with some 70% of part time aged care workers struggling to manage COVID-19 with six weeks training as part of their Certificate 3 courses (103). Many casual staff also worked at numerous aged care facilities in order to earn decent incomes and this allowed corridors of infection to develop between aged care homes, family residences and the workplaces of other family members. By the end of July, the Australian government banned aged care staff from working at more than one site in Victoria (104) and paid ‘pandemic leave’ for casual workers was introduced in the hope of encouraging staff with symptoms to stay away from their workplaces. Yet the system was not applied universally and only staff who had been employed on a ‘regular and systemic basis’ were eligible (105). Many casual workers did not qualify and continued to work at numerous part-time jobs. As happened during the Spanish Flu in 1919, Melbourne’s working poor in 2020 were compelled to take greater health risks than the general workforce because they needed multiple income sources to make up for low wages (106, 107).
It is salutary to remind ourselves that inequality in developed countries today, including Australia, has reached the old levels of the pre-Keynesian revolution of the 1940s (108). This is reflected in the studies about the COVID-19 pandemic showing a correlation between a higher incidence of COVID-19 infection in metropolitan Melbourne in 2020 and ‘larger proportions of people who were unemployed, without paid leave benefits, or experiencing mortgage or rent stress, and in areas with higher population and housing density or larger proportions of people who speak languages other than English at home’ (109). The report of the Parliamentary Inquiry of 2021 confirmed this: in metropolitan Melbourne ‘The five councils that had the most active COVID-19 cases as at 1 December 2020 are amongst the 10 most disadvantaged councils in Victoria’ (107).
The data limitations associated with the Spanish Flu in Australia cannot be fixed – we are stuck with the sources that we have used in this analysis. Yet the benefits of comparative studies overwhelm these constraints, especially when the data for COVID-19 in 2020, the first year of the ongoing pandemic, are relatively complete and reliable. Our confidence in this statement is based on recognising the data limitations which emerged in Australia towards the end of 2021, the second year of the pandemic, and how by 2022 serious concerns about these data problems were being expressed by many of Australia’s leading scientists.