Of all proclivities that have been present in psychoanalysis thus far, what has received little attention is the potentiality for the diverging construction of archetypes1 and therefore the parochial state that they have hitherto been conceived in. The study has been dominated by a normative exercise that conceives some semblance of a natural social proclivity towards these archetypes. The issue with using a limited number of archetypes is that, while they are suggestive of a world (or environment) that they are causal from, they do not suffice for a description of their own, whole, theoretical character. This therefore creates the first prerogative of this text: that the theoretical character in which archetypes are manifested is not limited exclusively to the world that they are initiated into.

Jung details the archetypes as being related to the psychic symbolism (manifest in the collective unconsciousness) – to suggest that the world that they are placed in provides a very clear set of “archetypal dogmas”. It is assumed that the contingency placed on the world from which they are derived allows for a different manifestation of “archetypal dogmas” to become apparent – and that therefore the archetype itself is not absolute, and instead focus must be paid for a separate intuition. That intuition extends beyond the scope of this article, but this helps to form the basis for what the pure personality does intend to be and why it must be so – for the archetypal dogma is established by a qualitative world akin, in nature, to our own which is able to pertain to different experiences according to whom it should be rendered for; with a single set of psychic existence comes a plurality of theoretical manifestations of those psychic existences.

Still, this normative exercise is not believed to yield a false or incorrect set of archetypes – those falsities (whereby the archetypes should fail to describe minds divergent from themselves) cannot exist in a set of archetypes so long as they are conceived correctly. The mistake that is made by the idea of the archetypes is the disparity between how they do restrict deviation within their own form, and that they are limited by the subconscious prerogative that controls them.

As an office of interpretation for the nature of the archetypes, the pure personality – one that is defined as, like the archetypes, to mark itself as distinct from, as our current assumption stands, the monadic idea of the psyche, yet functions in the context of a different environment that is divergent from where the current archetypes are manifest from. Importantly, the necessity for divergent archetypes is two-fold: that mental processes cannot be limited to traditionalist statures, therefore that this “divergence” is a necessary quality, and that any such divergence which is to be used must be absolute rather than within the bounds of negligible changes.

As it will be re-stated further, the allocation of the “pure” distinction as the divergent archetype is no accident, for all other ordinations of the most carnal objects of the mind: emotion, is still qualitatively equivalent if it cannot be produced in its own singular (“pure”) manner, although other modes of deriving “impossible” constructions have not been explored, they are not denied.

This article has been composed with an explanation of the Intuition in 1.2 and a further consideration, or “extension” in the direction of missing pieces in archetypal knowledge.

The pure state is manifested, for the sake of its argument, in a pure environment that is divergent from the same, universal social state that the traditionally Jungian archetypes are predicated upon. To the objects of our own environments – minds of people – the pure environment is entirely a theoretical body, but its perception can be suggested. Its existence makes it a contingency upon constructing the pure mind.

The pure state is therefore reliant on its pure environment for its realisation, but that, like the Jungian archetypes, its characteristics are not a simulacrum of the environment (in the form of the collective subconsciousness, for that necessitates still its environment) it is founded upon. The following explanation explicitly covers the emotion in which the environment is manifested from – in a vacuum bounded only by the psychical symbolism, respect paid towards emotion should appear to be unnecessary, but, with relevance paid to the symbolism discussed by Jung (most particularly, as is considered in §27, §374, the latter of which induces suggestive elements of water as representative of the unconsciousness), it becomes foundational to establishing the symbols and that an altered character of the emotion will therefore alter the presentation of the symbols. However, importantly, one must note that the emotional change itself is exclusively considered instead of the prerogative of the psychic symbolism.

The pure environment is defined as such: emotions, which do contribute most specifically to psychic, and of which to our understanding can be maximised or minimised, are taken as void with respect to their scalar quantity. For an example, if we should take anger as one such emotion, it is observed that it can be quantitatively altered as it conforms to the archetypes that it exists in or it can act void of any such archetype and be a simple, expressive anger. Importantly, we assume the emotion to be directly invoked by the environment such that its qualitative understanding can be flexible and changing as such. The qualitative change in any emotion when it is present in a pure environment, although anger is used for its tangibility, is entirely transcendental, and, for the sake of a descriptive argument (although this understanding will not be explicated), it is enacted to the quality of being formless (whereby it is without a properly connective reciprocals like other minds) and akin to such examples as mathematical singularities.

In this respect, and if a conjecture should be made on an already highly conjectural approach, the pure personality is suggestive of a hierarchy that the Jungian archetypes are not acceded to – that the status of the Monarch, with respect to morality and otherwise, is absolutist about the subjects5. One can suggest further that a determined change in the archetypal dogma is reflective of a hierarchical existence and the relative unknown of an entirely different course of life with an equally different environment.

Therefore, we do understand that for the manner of the qualitative production of an emotion (explicitly, where it should not be causal to a change in the emotion itself), it firstly cannot be comparable to the quantitative scale, and it must also cover all divergent emotions, not exclusively the utilised “anger”.

This article attempts to qualify the nature of archetypes and the collective subconsciousness as being subject to a misplacement of the sentiment of the archetype in an attitude that confers only to the real world. Jung’s ideals are not challenged, however, the attitude that they are placed in is shown to misrepresent the potentiality of such a construction.

The greatest object of its significance is two-fold: it realises the theoretical placement of the archetypes as a factor of their intuition. It uses the expected equivalence of the archetypal dogma among divergent collectives of archetypes to instead illustrate the theoretical intuition of the “archetypal dogma”.