1. Introduction
Various chemical substances have been produced with the advancement of science and technology and the expansion of chemical plants, leading to a transformation of the industrial structure towards the production of essential products using these chemicals. Consequently, the proportion of chemical substances used by humans has increased, increasing human dependence on these substances [
1]. According to the American Chemistry Council, the global production of chemical substances exceeds 400 million tons annually, and the demand for chemical and petrochemical products is increasing annually [
2,
3]. Thus, the careless/unsafe production, use, storage, and transportation of chemical substances may result in accidents such as fires and explosions. In particular, fires and explosions can negatively affect human health, and in extreme cases, lead to large-scale fatal accidents [
4,
5]. Owing to some of the properties of chemical substances, such as flammability, reactivity, and toxicity, they are also considered potential threats to human life and the natural environment [
6,
7]. For example, the nitrocellulose cotton fire leading to an ammonium nitrate explosion at Tianjin Port, China in 2015, and the ammonium nitrate explosion at the Port of Beirut, Lebanon in 2020, resulted in massive casualties and economic damages [
8,
9]. Generally, chemical accidents occur at a larger scale compared to general industrial accidents, and potentially pose a greater risk to public safety; thus, it is imperative to establish and maintain safety rules based on the hazardous nature of chemicals to safely manage and operate processes in the chemical industry [
10,
11]. Additionally, although extensive preventative activities have been applied, such as developing technologies to enhance safety for the prevention of chemical accidents, introducing changes to the role of safety departments within organizations, and setting systematic chemical accident prevention standards by creating chemical accident databases, along with providing incentives, most countries focus their policies on strengthening regulations and systems related to the safe management of chemical substances for the prevention of chemical accidents [
12].
Process safety management (PSM) is a highly representative systemic chemical safety management system and is administered by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) in the United States. PSM includes safety regulations necessary for the operation of chemical plants, such as safe operating procedures; education for employees, including workers; management measures to ensure the mechanical integrity of equipment; process hazard analysis; and process safety management. The PSM system in the U.S. has been criticized for primarily focusing on workplace safety and worker protection; however, additional systems are being implemented by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), including off-site consequence analysis (OCA) related to chemical accident simulation and the risk management plan (RMP) for accident risk analysis and response [
13].
The Korean process safety management (K-PSM) ) system (based on the U.S. system) is composed of 12 elements and was first established and operated in 1996 in accordance with the Industrial Safety and Health Act. The hydrofluoric acid accident that occurred in Gumi in 2015 was a turning point, as it highlighted that accidents caused by chemical substances impact not only the individuals within the factory, but can also significantly contaminate the surrounding environment and negatively affect nearby residents. Consequently, the Ministry of Environment in Korea introduced the OCA and RMP systems from the U.S. and established and operated the Chemical Substance Management Act. Owing to the various chemical accidents that have occurred in Korea, regulations and legal provisions related to chemical substances have been continuously strengthened. However, this has led to criticisms regarding the imposition of excessive administrative regulations [
14]. The reason why accidents are difficult to prevent, despite the strengthening of various regulations and laws, is that most of the causes of safety accidents in factories are associated with human error [
22]. Therefore, accident investigation researchers have recognized human error and accident models as the key factors for the safe operation of the system, and have conducted many related studies [
18].
Dr. Leveson from the Massachusetts institute of technology (MIT) proposed that, as activities within organizations have expanded into more complex relationships than in the past, a comprehensive and integrated systemic analysis is required in addition to sequential analysis methods from various perspectives, including social, technical, and organizational, to prevent accidents within organizations [
15,
16]. There are various systems thinking analyses and investigation techniques (Figure 3), and they are generally categorized into three generations based on their thinking model [
23].
The first-generation accident survey model was based on linear cause-effect models, such as the well-known domino and FTA models. In this model, accidents occur in a linear causal relationship with a root cause of the accident [
24]. Accordingly, the model demonstrates that accidents can be prevented by eliminating only their root causes However, as more accidents occurred later, it became necessary to expand human and organizational factors and identify potential accident factors, thus the second-generation accident investigation model was created in the 1990s.
The second-generation model is known as the Swiss cheese model, which is based on an epidemiological model. In the first-generation accident investigation model, when the cause of the accident was identified as human error, no further accident analysis was conducted. However, the second-generation model included the behavioral factors of the accident victims and the management problems in the organization. The second-generation model was more effective than the first in investigating accidents caused by various and complex factors, but the second-generation model also assumed a linear causal relationship, which limited its ability to clearly analyze accidents caused by complex interactions [
23].
The third-generation accident investigation model is a systemic investigation technique based on the systemic model, in which accidents are caused by emergent properties, where various factors in an organization interact in an unexpected and nonlinear manner [
25,
26]. Of these systematic accident investigation techniques, AcciMap was applied in the 1990s, and the system theoretic accident model and processes (STAMP), CREAM, and functional resonance analysis method (FRAM) have been used for accident investigations and research since the 2000s [
27].
The STAMP model is an analysis method released in 2004 to overcome the limitations of the sequential accident analysis of the first- and second-generation accident investigation models [
28]. This model consists of a hierarchy of control structures for each stage, including system development and operation structures. The upper structure of the model determines safety-related policies, internal standards, and procedures, and the lower structure includes procedures or controls that must be operated to realize the policies and procedures [
15,
16]. STAMP is a top-down analysis model, which has the advantage of enabling various analyses of accident-related causes by including software, people, organization, procedures, and safety culture as the main factors for accident occurrence even in complex structures [
29,
30]. Therefore, STAMP can be applied to various types of accident analyses [
20].
The FRAM models the nonlinear interaction of system functions during the accident process under the premise that accidents occur when normal variable factors in the system form unexpected combinations. Although it is a functional model that helps analysts understand the functionality of the entire system, it is also applied to safety models because such models can be used for accident analysis and risk assessment. FRAM is based on the concepts and principles of Safety II and resilience engineering, a new safety paradigm [
25,
31].
Various models can be used for accident investigation depending on their characteristics. Of the 216 accident investigation reports written in the past 20 years, 63 were conducted using accident investigation methods, including STAMP, AcciMap, HFACS, FRAM, and FTA [
33]. STAMP is the most commonly used model for systemic accident investigations, as it is useful for analyzing accidents caused by complex systems and the relationships between stakeholders involved in the decision-making process. FRAM is useful for job analysis, function assignment, accident analysis, hazard/risk assessment, and impact analysis of changes such as design alterations and improvements [
32]. In South Korea, various systematic accident investigation studies have been conducted using the STAMP model. This technique is mainly used to determine organizational and systematic recurrence prevention measures by analyzing the lack of legal obligation measures, incorrect decisions and defects, and policy errors for each function of the government, original contractors, suppliers, production departments, workers, production processes, and facilities involved in accidents related to chemical handling in plants [
34].
In this study, based on the technical analysis results of fire and explosion accidents that occurred during the packaging of organic catalysts in a chemical plant, we further analyzed the causes of accidents from a barrier perspective using the barrier-based systematic cause analysis technique (BSCAT), an accident investigation technique provided by DNV. The BSCAT is based on the systematic cause analysis technique (SCAT), an accident investigation technique introduced by Dr. Bird in 1985. This accident investigation technique focuses on identifying the basic/root cause of accidents and control areas for improvement actions based on the direct cause identified by the accident investigator [
21]. BSCAT analyzes accidents based on the barriers involved in preventing the spread of chemical accidents in factories with complexities among various causes and factors related to their occurrence, and the barrier is the concept of containment of threat factors [
35].
The organic catalysts involved in this accident investigation are classified as Class 3 dangerous goods (spontaneously combustible and water- reactive chemicals) under Korea's Dangerous Goods Act, and there have been numerous fires involving these materials in South Korea and Japan. In Korea, there were a total of 104 fires caused by water reactive chemical between 2013 and 2017 [
36]. In Japan, a numerous accidents caused by alkyl aluminum, a water-reactive chemical, occurred between 2000 and 2016, and more than a dozen of these accidents are well known, thus the National Fire Research Institute of Japan established technical standards for extinguishing alkyl aluminum-induced fires. Most of the alkyl aluminum-induced fire accidents in Japan were the result of a leakage inside the facilities related to the handling of the substance, internal explosions due to abnormal reactions during processing, or leakage during packaging [
37]. Because prevention and response are important for incidents involving spontaneous combustion and water-reactive chemicals, identifying the barriers involved in blocking and responding to accident threats that can cause such accidents is important [
35]. Based on technical analysis of accidents and results of a BSCAT analysis, this study aimed to conduct a systematic analysis of the relationship between various factors such as safety policies, internal standards, procedures, workers, and organizational structure related to organic catalyst explosion accidents using the STAMP model [
19]. In addition, the relationship and role complementarities between various departments involved from the research stage to the process establishment, risk assessment, and work procedure establishment stages through the step-by-step application of various analysis models was demonstrated, and comprehensive appropriate recurrence prevention measures are proposed.
Figure 1.
Diagram illustrating the accident.
Figure 1.
Diagram illustrating the accident.
Figure 2.
Flow chart showing the accident analysis procedure.
Figure 2.
Flow chart showing the accident analysis procedure.
Figure 3.
A timeline of the development of methods for sociotechnical systems and safety [
21].
Figure 3.
A timeline of the development of methods for sociotechnical systems and safety [
21].
Figure 4.
Typical socio-technical control model of the system theoretical accident model and processes (STAMP) method.
Figure 4.
Typical socio-technical control model of the system theoretical accident model and processes (STAMP) method.
Figure 5.
Flow chart illustrating the accident root cause analysis model of barrier-based systematic cause analysis technique (BSCAT). (DNV SCAT 8.2 ver.).
Figure 5.
Flow chart illustrating the accident root cause analysis model of barrier-based systematic cause analysis technique (BSCAT). (DNV SCAT 8.2 ver.).
Figure 6.
Structure of supported catalyst.
Figure 6.
Structure of supported catalyst.
Figure 7.
Airborne exposure testing of MAO+metallocene supported catalyst (heat is generated 20 s after reacting with air). (a) Start of the experiment; (b) 20 s elapsed; (c) 33 s elapsed.
Figure 7.
Airborne exposure testing of MAO+metallocene supported catalyst (heat is generated 20 s after reacting with air). (a) Start of the experiment; (b) 20 s elapsed; (c) 33 s elapsed.
Figure 8.
Illustration of Bernoulli's equation (P1 > P2).
Figure 8.
Illustration of Bernoulli's equation (P1 > P2).
Figure 9.
A schematic drawing of the packaging container (PSV, connection point, and vent line are outlined).
Figure 9.
A schematic drawing of the packaging container (PSV, connection point, and vent line are outlined).
Figure 10.
Outside air entering the leak point when valve is open. (a) Start of the experiment; (b) N2 line valve open (red arrow indicates the smoke endpoint).
Figure 10.
Outside air entering the leak point when valve is open. (a) Start of the experiment; (b) N2 line valve open (red arrow indicates the smoke endpoint).
Figure 11.
Pressure changes in a packaging filling line (valve is 30% open and leak gap is 5 mm).
Figure 11.
Pressure changes in a packaging filling line (valve is 30% open and leak gap is 5 mm).
Figure 13.
Action required to improve risk management.
Figure 13.
Action required to improve risk management.
Figure 14.
Flow chart showing the procedures and related departments from the research and development (R&D) stage to commissioning organic catalytic processes.
Figure 14.
Flow chart showing the procedures and related departments from the research and development (R&D) stage to commissioning organic catalytic processes.
Table 1.
History of accidents involving hazardous materials in process safety management (PSM) plants in South Korea (2016–2021).
Table 1.
History of accidents involving hazardous materials in process safety management (PSM) plants in South Korea (2016–2021).
No. |
Industries |
Accident Date |
Process categorization |
Disaster |
1 |
Pharmaceutical raw materials, petroleum products manufacturing |
January. 2016 |
Fire in a cleaning process of a raw material concentrator |
Death |
2 |
Pharmaceutical raw materials, petroleum products manufacturing |
January. 2016 |
Fire in the process of feeding raw materials into a reactor |
Death |
3 |
Chemical and rubber products manufacturing |
July. 2016 |
Fire from a chemical leak in a reactor |
Death |
4 |
Chemical and rubber products manufacturing |
October. 2017 |
Dust explosion in a facility during pre-operational inspection |
Death |
5 |
Chemical and rubber products manufacturing |
November. 2018 |
Fire in the process of adding filler to the mixer |
Death |
6 |
Chemical and rubber products manufacturing |
August. 2018 |
Fire caused by oil vapor in the process of feeding raw materials into an agitator |
Serious injury |
7 |
Chemical and rubber products manufacturing |
November. 2019 |
Fire during a chemical splay operation |
Serious injury |
8 |
Chemical and rubber products manufacturing |
December. 2019 |
Explosion during a reactor internal cleaning |
Death |
9 |
Pharmaceutical raw materials, petroleum products manufacturing |
May. 2019 |
Fire during filtration of chemicals |
Serious injury |
10 |
Pharmaceutical raw materials, petroleum products manufacturing |
February. 2020 |
Explosion during a reactor internal cleaning |
Serious injury |
11 |
Chemical and rubber products manufacturing |
March. 2020 |
Explosion during welding on top of reactor |
Death |
12 |
Chemical and rubber products manufacturing |
March. 2020 |
Fire while cutting piping connected to a storage tank |
Death |
13 |
Pharmaceutical raw materials, petroleum products manufacturing |
April. 2020 |
Fire during powder feeding operation |
Serious injury |
14 |
Chemical and rubber products manufacturing |
May. 2020 |
Fire during flange bolt cutting operation |
Serious injury |
15 |
Chemical and rubber products manufacturing |
May. 2020 |
Fires and explosions in organocatalyst product packaging operations |
Death |
16 |
Chemical and rubber products manufacturing |
June. 2021 |
Fire during powdered chemical feed operation |
Serious injury |
Table 2.
Accident overview.
Table 2.
Accident overview.
Table 3.
Estimated cause and result of the accident by the Korean Occupational Safety and Health Agency (KOSHA).
Table 3.
Estimated cause and result of the accident by the Korean Occupational Safety and Health Agency (KOSHA).
Sequence of events |
Accident cause |
Reason for accident |
Result |
First Event |
Improper connection between container and flange |
Air enters between improperly connected flanges and reacts with the catalyst inside the container |
Pressure builds up inside the vessel, causing the internal pressure to blow out through the process safety valve (PSV). |
Second Event |
safety valve outlet is not connected to a safety location |
Catalyst dust is blowing into the room because the PSV outlet is not connected to a safety location |
“Dust explosion” caused by dust released into the packing room |
Table 4.
Possible scenarios that could lead to an accident.
Table 4.
Possible scenarios that could lead to an accident.
Classification |
Possible scenario |
Investigation result |
Packaging containers |
Moisture residue due to poor container cleaning |
Internal analysis of identically handled containers shows no moisture residue |
Moisture ingress due to improper container storage |
Nitrogen Inlet Line |
Moisture content in nitrogen |
The issue did not occur with other products packaged under the same conditions. |
Moisture in the nitrogen supply line |
Catalyst Filling Line |
Entry of air or moisture during the catalyst packaging line connection process |
Nitrogen purging for 5 minutes after packaging line connection removes internal residue |
Entry of air or moisture during catalyst packaging operations |
Need technical analysis |
Vent Line |
Debris blocks the vent pipe releasing pressure from the packaging container |
The pressure inside the packaging container (5 barg) is expelled through the vent pipe during the packing operation |
Oil inside the pressure gauge installed at the end of the container discharge line enters the packaging container. |
Even if oil leaks, it is structured in a way that prevents oil from entering inside the packaging container. |
Foreign matter present in the raw material |
Foreign matter (such as moisture) in the raw material was mixed in during manufacturing. |
The issue did not occur with other products packaged under the same conditions. |
Table 5.
Information on methylaluminoxane (MAO).
Table 5.
Information on methylaluminoxane (MAO).
Table 6.
the measurement of enthalpy change (∆E) in MAO reactions with air and water.
Table 6.
the measurement of enthalpy change (∆E) in MAO reactions with air and water.
Reaction Case |
Chemical equation |
∆E (kcal/mol) |
비고 |
MAO+O2
|
2(CH3AlO) + 3O2 → Al2O3 + 2CO + 3H2O |
-55.2 |
O2 1 mol |
MAO+H2O |
2(CH3AlO) + H2O → Al2O3 + 2CH4
|
-30.5 |
H2O 1 mol |
<Calculation Tool> ① Software Operations Center : lg chem R&D Center ② Method : Density Functional Theory (DFT) , Becke Exchange Functional & Perdew-Wang 91 Correlation Functional ③ Basis Set : DND(Double-numerical + d Polarization Basis Set) ④ Calculation formula : ΔE°_rxn = [Sum of products for ΔH°_f] – [Sum of reactants for ΔH°_f] |
Table 7.
Status of different barriers that could have prevented the accident.
Table 7.
Status of different barriers that could have prevented the accident.
No. |
Barrier |
Status |
Confidence |
Challenge |
Performance |
1 |
Safety Mgmt. Sys. |
|
Low |
Contains regulations on procedures and work permits for safe process management |
Not working properly |
2 |
Safety valve discharge line connected to combustion/ absorption/capture/recovery facilities. |
|
Missing |
Dangerous substances discharged from safety valves must be treated by combustion, absorption, capture, and recovery. |
Not operational |
3 |
Supplementation of SOP |
|
Missing |
1) In case the piping is not connected properly, the operator should reconfirm the piping connection on his own or have another operator reconfirm the piping connection Establish a procedure for waiting a certain amount of time after packaging to work on a product because adverse events may occur during packaging |
Not operational |
4 |
Education on standard of procedure (SOP) |
|
Missing |
Prevent similar accidents from occurring by training workers on work procedures |
Not operational |
5 |
Packaging process organized as an outside work |
|
Missing |
Operate catalyst packaging outside to ensure that catalyst dust does not reach explosive dust concentrations even if it is blown outside |
Not operational |
6 |
Properly configured fire protection facilities |
|
Missing |
Prevent secondary accidents such as fires and explosions by eliminating flammable materials near the workplace or establishing facilities indoors to prevent or respond to dust explosions |
Not operational |
Table 8.
Management requirements for each department to prevent accidents during chemical processes.
Table 8.
Management requirements for each department to prevent accidents during chemical processes.
Group |
Safety requirements |
Improper decision |
Defect in organization |
MEL/ KOSHA |
1) Enforcement of the safety & health Act 2) Thoroughly review a PSM document |
- |
- |
R&D Center |
1) Establishing safety standards & risk assessment criteria in R&D 2) Establish a safety training program for researchers 3) Establish procedures to identify the risks involved before transferring R&D products to production. |
Underestimating the risk of chemicals and failing to consider the safeguards that should be in place during the scale-up phase. |
Enhance the ability to list risks identified in the research phase and clearly communicate them to production and design teams. |
Production team |
1) Establish procedures to identify key risks before transferring R&D products to production 2) Establish procedures for training workers on key points related to manufacturing new products |
1) Performing piping connections in unsafe locations and conditions without a worker-centric risk assessment. 2) Lack of understanding of what happens when foreign objects are introduced during the packaging process |
Lack of procedure regarding what needs to be reviewed when introducing new products and the ability to worker-centric risk assessments and manage incident cases. |
EHS Team |
1) Clear cross-functional R&R by PSM element 2) Inventory legal requirements about PSM |
Determined that indoor emissions from PSV lines are not in violation of the law |
It is necessary to supplement the function that lists relevant laws and regulations when introducing new products and periodically check them during the construction process. |
D/G safety manager |
Perform safety management tasks to meet legal requirements when handling hazardous materials |
Determining the risk of the pack aging step as low and not participating in the packaging process. |
Establish a system to ensure that safety managers are involved in all hazardous materials work |
Process design team |
1) Establish procedures to incorporate risk factors identified in the research phase into the design. 2) Establish procedures to incorporate accident cases into design |
1) Failure to clearly review legislation during process design 2) Failure to account for human error in process design |
Internal criteria for safe design guidelines (KOSHA Guidelines) must be clarified |