Version 1
: Received: 18 September 2024 / Approved: 19 September 2024 / Online: 19 September 2024 (11:27:09 CEST)
How to cite:
Siemers, T.; Basu, A.; Hentz, J. Political Competition, Resource Availability, and Conflict: A Simulation. Preprints2024, 2024091504. https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202409.1504.v1
Siemers, T.; Basu, A.; Hentz, J. Political Competition, Resource Availability, and Conflict: A Simulation. Preprints 2024, 2024091504. https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202409.1504.v1
Siemers, T.; Basu, A.; Hentz, J. Political Competition, Resource Availability, and Conflict: A Simulation. Preprints2024, 2024091504. https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202409.1504.v1
APA Style
Siemers, T., Basu, A., & Hentz, J. (2024). Political Competition, Resource Availability, and Conflict: A Simulation. Preprints. https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202409.1504.v1
Chicago/Turabian Style
Siemers, T., Atin Basu and James Hentz. 2024 "Political Competition, Resource Availability, and Conflict: A Simulation" Preprints. https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202409.1504.v1
Abstract
This paper explores the dynamics of political competition, resource availability, and conflict through a simulation-based approach. Utilizing agent-based models (ABMs) within an evolutionary game theoretical framework, we investigate how individual behaviors and motivations influence collective outcomes in civil conflicts. Our study builds on the theoretical model developed by Basuchoudhary et al. (2023), which integrates factors such as resource availability, state capacity, and political entrepreneurship to explain the evolution of civil conflict. By simulating boundedly rational agents, we demonstrate how changes in resource availability and state capacity can alter the nature of civil conflict, leading to different equilibrium outcomes. The findings highlight the importance of understanding individual motivations and adaptive behaviors in predicting the stability and resolution of conflicts. This research contributes to the growing body of literature on the use of agent-based models in evolutionary game theory and provides valuable insights into the complex interactions that drive civil violence.
Keywords
evolutionary game theory; civil war; state capacity; resource availability
Subject
Business, Economics and Management, Economics
Copyright:
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
