This article

Although we can assert today that a diffuseness in the population’s means of education is an important quality for a modern society, and that it provides a set of differences that would otherwise be irrecoverable given a society formed on the same, standardised education, the nature of the individual parts of that diffuseness must be suggested to questioning. This article promulgates a strictly secular mode of education – given that the reasoning of such scholars as Jung has suggested that religious thought offers a more present and permeating status than qualifiers as belief would otherwise suggest; the protection of traditions is therefore an unimportant factor of education – for they retain their status.

In the spirit of Dewey’s description of education, the notion that the only education which we can describe as being proper is confined to the conscious effect of the student suggests that there exists no possibility for the teacher to directly instigate learning (Letseka & Zireva, 2013), but rather only to be suggestive of material that is conducive towards some learning. The teacher is therefore purely and simply an indirect supplicant to the student’s own processional learning – there is nothing that the teacher can supply to the student (where the educational material has been given hitherto) with the exception of a continued encouragement and manifestation for the student’s intellectual character.

Even so, one of the most pronounced affronts to the study of education is the fact alone that the common interpretation of our education – whereby function is observed on the basis of foci (in the form of subjects) rather than in the development of intellectual traits outside of a militarized and inorganic “learning” regime. It is such that this education, in tandem with the pronouncement of a ruling superiority in the part of the teacher as opposed to the Constructivism of the student, should be termed occupational for the reason that, as this text elucidates, the displacement of a student’s matheticism becomes most present in our current education.

The proposition of this subsection is to assert that, culturally, we perceive logic to be derivative on a fickle basis; the child must come to grasp a correct nature of the topic that they should study – supplied only by the teacher – without incurring an assumed false logic of the material that they should study. The Teacher’s role is therefore delicate for children and less so for adolescents.

Simultaneously, it is considered to be a good practice if any teacher should delegate their students into different curricula on account of a disparity in application. Ignoring any prejudice towards students, we can understand that the lessons are predicated on a normativity – a certain lulling into educational material, a transference of knowledge between the teacher and the student (as opposed to the student’s own determination of knowledge) is what this practice defines.

In the classroom, I define there to exist two central modes: the didacticism and the matheticism. The didacticism composes the actions of the teacher in faculty of the transference of knowledge to the students and the matheticism is the Constructivist formation of the student, this latter part relies on a developmental learning that is therefore indelibly attached the student. On account of the fact that the developmental learning is attached to the student rather than to the teacher – such that Dewey has explicated the fact that the student’s own conscience is to be applied to a task at hand if any proper learning is to be achieved.

Of course, we do recognize and understand properties that are absolutely akin to the matheticism that I have previously described in the form of the lifestyle - a perceived reckoning of institutional strength that functions in place of a collective learning and serves as a mimesis of previous generations’ schooling where the perceived success of their own character in their normative setting (where culture et cetera are created) is manifest as an expectation for individual character and in itself is suggestive of that which transcends education and delivers a collectivized personal experience.

The scale of information that a student pertains to is an entirely normative faculty – how much one should learn is predicated on the transference that is shown in the narrative voice if one should read a book, and in the communicative faculty that is established in social circles.

Jesuit Education (Notes on Jesuit Education, n.d.) describes almost perfectly the didacticism that this article seeks to describe. Even following the Enlightenment (and perhaps where such thinkers were far less jaded about meddling with religious causes), the intellectual prerogative of theology was doubted in a manner quite similar to how the Hellenics had in their own politicised philosophy, yet the Church remained to be one of the greatest providers of education in the Catholic, newly Enlightened world.

As is common among provisional models of education a la religious sectarian movements, the transformation of the youth upon a common educational tone (as opposed to their own apprehension of any education) akin to the primitive, ritualistic form that constitutes Religion. Catholicism – although limited by secularity – observes this in its sacramental passages. As such, the didacticism under Jesuit methods is limited to incremental acts that are made exclusively in the classroom, and in following that the teacher accedes to an absolutism where the student’s matheticism is voided.

In initiating a primitive means to education, a primitive being is therefore established. The forthrightness with which sacraments are applied in some retrospective reverence does not serve as an academic acculturation, but, in the context of a society and intelligence that has surpassed primal religious contexts, it forms an immediate disparity between the modern qualification whereby traditions are merely traditional rather than supernatural and the effect of science still pervades.

We can understand the sacramental passages (Kilmartin, 1989) of the first paragraph to relate to a tradition. Where traditions are concerned with respect to their rituals in the context of the passage, we can expect a set of development – akin to education – to be practiced. To assert traditional practices in relation to, but not derived from modern proposals augments the traditionalism, is to create an immediate case for unnecessary struggle where the enemy is the immediate and dialectical superior to the tradition – the reverse is observed in an academic acculturation where the reverent tradition is considered in an intellectual faculty.

The introduction of means that simultaneously include the influence of the lifestyle in tandem with an unsuitable sacramental ordination result in that which (given the assumed educational – and therefore that which relates to learning – content in both studies) should represent learning in itself (of course, it only fulfils primal urges towards adulthood on account of the gradient between the maturity of the teacher and the immaturity of the student).

The benefits of any traditionalism in assumed mode of normative grounding – although my own personal support for cultural normativity is nil, it is understood that a significant degree of the public values cultural significance in such educational practices, and that to remove this advantage is wholly undemocratic.

Matheticism suggests that only one mode (of matheticism) can be applied at one time on account of the fact that the human will is exclusively singular: for instance, we may assume that someone should be simultaneously engaged in two assumedly distinct activities, yet for this reason we can assume that this person is unified by the will to maximize engagement, making that their prerogative. The will that is central to the matheticism is relevant within the confines of one mode of belief - where, of course, we assume that one possesses a significantly more sophisticated basis and can therefore possess a superior character. What we have instead is an immediate contradiction between forms – not one that is rectified, but one that is treated as education.

This article determines a view of education that provides an appellation of practices that are present within the frame of current education, and it suggests an isolating character for that current education where one has not been described before.

Disjunctive elements that have been found in the logical treatment of didacticism and matheticism, particularly in the inclusion of religious elements to education, suggest a misplacement (and false continuation that is made in the case for an expected, normative educational response of the student) in the matheticism for the student – it therefore initiates a direct observation of the manner of education that the student is applied to.