As references [1,2,3] show, digital money technology is advanced enough to carry out lending and borrowing at any volume, but the field literature [4,5,6,7,8,9,10] points out to limited practice. Africa takes the lead, driven by necessity. None of the literatures or solutions is practicing loan build up as described here. This technology is patent pending.

The operation is driven by borrowers because, a borrower's request by default should be accepted, or rejected as is, while a lender posting can be partially taken.

Borrowers postings are examined per their start date, the earlier get attention early.

The matchmaker looks for lenders with posting fit into the borrower's start day, at any amount. The borrower's requested loan amount is built from available lenders who wish to lend a lesser amount, or from a lender with proper timing that wishes to lend a larger amount. All the lenders that assembled to service this early borrower are paying the money directly to the borrower. (in practice the money may go from the lender to the match maker (the virtual digital bank) from where it goes to the borrower -- in both cases using the digital cash instant transaction like in BitMint*LeVeL.)

When the entire requested loan is fit with proper lender's postings the first step is complete. The requested loan is digitally paid to the borrower. The borrower can use the BitMint digital money as is, or redeem it against legacy dollars, per their choosing. After the full amount of the load has been paid to the borrower, there are various time points where the matched lenders have finished their offered duration, and before that happens the match maker needs to find a proper lender to take over the lender that expects its money back before the loan is due. A given first lender L₁ is finishing its lending mission at time point t₁. When t₁ comes to pass the match maker must be ready with another lender, L₂ whose proposed loan is at least the amount serviced by L₁. The replacement lender L₂ pays the amount serviced by L₁, X, but not to the borrower, rather to L₁. This concludes the participation of L₁ who made his lending and got his money back after the specified lending time. The earned interest will be paid later by the match maker.

Next the match maker watches for the next time point where any of the active lenders that is part of the group of lenders who support this borrower reaches its end of lending time, while the borrower's time demand is much longer. At that next time point the match maker will have to be ready with a new lender with proper terms. This new lender will pay the previous lender the amount the previous lender lent, and so again the retiring lender gets it money back at the time desired, being unaware that this lender is part of a loan match build up assembled by the match maker.

The complexity of matching hard to predict streams of postings from borrowers and lenders alike, makes the goal of optimal loan matching into a typical AI mission.

To prepare the data for AI, the DLI will keep record of the stream of postings over time. The overall time line will be divided to reference periods. R₁, R₂, ..... The postings that were submitted fully within a reference period will be analyzed "post mortem" to determine the best matching that could have been achieved. This M_best value would be compared to the de facto M values achieved within each reference period. If they are similar then no need for AI boost. If not then the data for the growing number of reference periods will be given as raw material for AI supervised learning in order to find pattern with which to build a matching strategy with high matching score. This AI reference engine will become more effective the more reference periods there are to be analyzed. If the climate of the postings will change then the AI inference will track it by giving more weight to recent reference period relative to older ones.

If a market is serviced by more than one DLI then the various DLI will compete as to how well they use AI to increase the efficacy of the loan matching operation.

Given a situation where the B postings and the L postings are not in good match, it is advisable for the DLI to negotiate some changes in the terms. To check if a different sum will be Ok, to check if the requested or stated duration can be modified a bit, to check if the starting date can be different. And of course to re-negotiate interest rates. Some postings can come with a lot of elasticity as to such changes, and others not.

It is a role suitable for AI to propose a negotiation strategy. The DLI can offer better rate in exchange of terms elasticity.

A borrower Bob wishes to borrow an amount B, borrowing to start at time T_b, and end at date and time T'_b. The borrowering prospective is prepared to pay an annual plain interest of r%.

The DLI is searching for some n lenders L₁, L₂, ..... L_n. These lenders each offered to lend money per the following terms. Amount lended by L_i: l _i; lending starts at t_i date, and ends at t'_i date, requested interest p_i. For i=1,2,3.....n

The DLI manager may negotiate with the borrower on its terms, and also negotiate with each lender on their terms. Eventually an agreement is reached.

The DLI assemble n₁ < n lenders who can start lending at the agreed upon T_b. The total amount lent by the n₁ group is. B = Σ l _i. for i=1,2,....n₁.

Every lender i in the n₁ group for which t'_i is earlier than T'_b (t'_i < T'_b) will be getting back his loan l _i at t'_i by activating another lender , j, where l _i ≤ l _j, (where L_j is not in the n₁ group) to pay l _i dollars to L_i. Thereby lender L_i finished his service for this loan. This lender lent l _i dollars from t_i to t'_i, and now is owed by DLI interest .

This 'replacement of lender' sequence is used again and again until the full lending case is accomplished. The borrower receives an amount of B dollars from time T_b to time T'_b, and is billed by the DLI an amount commensurate with interest r%.

The values of r% and p₁, p₂, ..... p_n are such that DLI is left with a gross profit P_g sufficient to cover the operational cost C_o and secure a net profit N = P_g - C_o to make the initiative worthwhile.

Over time a stream of borrowers approach the DLI as well as a stream of lenders. The streams may be in good balance and the operation is smooth.

At times the streams are off balance. There may be more borrowers asking for a loan than lenders willing to extend one. In that case the DLI raises the bar with respect to r%, which is the interest paid by the borrower, which in turn allows DLI to raise the lending rate p_i for every potential lender i, to lure lenders to the operation.

At other times there is an edge of offering lenders over a few borrowers. In this case DLI will negotiate lower lending rate p₁, p₂, ..... p_n and then tempt more borrowers with a lower r%.

The more borrowers and the more lenders the greater the action and the greater the profits for DLI , so DLI will be of interest to advertise the service and reach out far and wide. Since borrowers and lender don't know each other, they can be matched from across town to across ocean, making the DLI a global operation.

The final negotiations with lenders may be private so that lenders cannot compare rates. Advertised rates normally are made public.

The negotiates interest rate p₁, p₂, ..... p_n may be graded: the larger the amount, and the longer the lending time, the larger the interest rate because the DLI will have to use fewer lenders to build up a loan. Also a given extended loan can be extended between two or more built-up loans.

A large lending offering will have to be broken down to serve a variety of small scale, short term borrowers.

Matching will start with looking for borrowers that together will borrow the large amount of lending money to be broken down. Ideally there will be a borrower for every dollar offered to be lent at the time the lending offer is regarded as the start time. The match maker, the DLI, will try to post small borrowers on the larger lending offer. Success is measured by how much money from this lender is lent for how long a time.

Geometrically one can represent a lending offer for sum X and duration T to start at t_start as rectangle marked on a flat surface where T is the horizontal stretch of the rectangle and X is the vertical stretch, while the rectangle itself is placed on the time line at starting point t_start.

The objective of the loan match maker would be cover as much as possible from the area of this rectangle with smaller rectangles representing borrowers. The ratio of the covered area (wtih borrowers) divided by the area of the rectangle, XT, represents the efficiency of the operation, the ratio of rendering the lending offer to an executed loan. The goal of the DLI is to maximize the amount and duration of executed loans because the DLI makes money in proportion of the multiplication of loan amounts times their durations.

Naturally the engaged borrowers and the engaged lenders will have to balance out for the DLI concept to work. The balance of interest refers to the size distribution of the borrowing requests versus the size distribution of the lenders offers. A size S of a loan is measured by the multiplication of the loan amount X times the loan duration, D: S = XD. The price of the loan, p is proportional to its size p = kS. Because p is determined by the amount and the duration.

The following options are all proper:

1. There are few borrowers, but the typical size of their loan is high, while there are many lenders with a typical small size loans.

2. There is a roughly equal number of borrowers and lenders and the loans from both sides are similar.

3. There are many borrowers but their loans is small, while there are few lenders and their loan is large.

Colored DLI: DLI can be implemented over a colored community of borrowers. Say minority small business, or say pharmaceutical startups. Being a special group might incentivize lenders to lend at a lower rate, even perhaps with a negative interest rate.

Loans of particular purposes may be treated in a special way. For example loans given to socially important enterprise may be guaranteed by the government so that lenders don't sustain any risk in lending. The character of the loan makes a difference. We focus, for example, on the purposer of the lent money. The first run of the DLI is planned for idle liquid money that normally does not bear any interest. Therefore any interest offered by the DLI will be a net positive to the lender. This is the no-competition zone because banks keep liquid funds in a non-interest bearing accounts. The bank enjoy the resultant profit. One would expect the zero competition zone for DLI to work smoothly and depend only on the level of promotion of the initiative.

DLI will naturally extend itself to compete with legacy banks, aiming at non liquid funds. Legacy banks lure customers to trust them with locked funds for a long range, and be rewarded with high yield. The banks in the US rely on the FDIC to project security, since depositors are most concerned with not losing their money. The DLI will lure its lenders with security through various means.

DLI security offering:

1. screening borrowers 2. DLI guarantee 3. Insured DLI 4. risk matching

screening borrowers: The DLI will choose borrowers projecting trust, qualified in some way, and then assure the lenders that these borrowers are trust worthy.

risk matching: A high risk borrower is ready to pay a high price for their loan. The DLI will tell the lenders that their money will serve high risk borrowers, and therefore their claimed interest will also be high, to compensate for their risk. And the same on the other end, highly secure borrowers are insisting on paying low interest, and the lenders will comply.

Borrowers and Lenders alike will have to use dedicated DLI applications on their electronic communication devices. These applications will have hand shaking protocols with the DLI and will be programmed to pass BitMint digital coin from one to the other using the standard BitMint payment protocol. We note that however short a lending event is, the money, cash-wise is transferred from lender to the DLI and from the DLI to the borrower or to the previous lender. and vice versa from the borrower to the DLI, and from the DLI to the last lender. All the transactions are listed and are clear on the public ledger for this BitMint coin.

The figure shows the digital lending initiative, DLI handling a set of large sum long duration borrower to be matched with a large number of small sum short duration lenders (note that here we use DLI or alternatively virtual digital bank, VDB, or 'loan match maker' all referring to the organization that offers this loan matching option to the public). In this case, which is expected to be common one, the task will be to put together an array of small scale lenders to meet the requirements of a smaller number of large scale borrowers.

This figure shows the case where people with large amount of money to put aside are offering large loans for long duration while on the other side the borrowers are asking for smaller loans for shorter durations. The task of the DLI is to build a puzzle so to speak to match the small loan requests with the large lending offering, the DLI procedure for this matching is symmetrically equivalent to the matching of small lenders to large borrowers. the matching starts with the most close time point and then adjusts the sums.

The figure shows a borrower who accepts a loan at date and time, t1 and is returning the loan at time point t4. The interest payment of the borrower is not shown on the figure. The figure shows that lender 1 transfers BitMint money to the borrower (the amount of the loan) at time point t1. At time point t2 lender 2 comes in and pays the amount of the loan to lender 1. This completes the participation of lender 1 in the loan event. Lender 1 offered the sum of the loan for the period t1 to t2. They received their money and our out of the situation. The borrower is not asked to pay anything so the borrower is blind to the fact that lender 2 paid to lender 1 the amount of the loan. When the clock reaches time/date t3, lender 3 comes in and pays the amount of the loan to lender 2. Again the borrower is blind to this exchange. Lender 2 receives the loan amount after the agreed upon time t3-t2. Now the borrower is served by lender 3. When the clock hits t4 the borrower is expected to pay the amount of the loan back to lender 3 which gets its money when expected. We note that while it is possible that all these transactions are done directly between lenders and borrowers, it is more orderly to have the DLI as an intermediary to whom the BitMint coins are paid and who pays the BitMint coins to the participants. The borrower at some preset time remits to the DLI the calculated amount of interest based on the agreed interest rate. the amount of the loan, and its duration. The DLI collects this payment with all other payments by the various borrowers, uses the money for operation and profits and pays the money due per agreement to the lender3.

This figure shows a borrowing request for an amount x$ asked for duration t as it is being gradually built up from smaller scale lenders. (1). There was no lender offering the full sum of $x, so the DLI had to break down x to smaller parts to fits the sums the lender specified in their postings. The sum x was broken down in this case to sums y, z, and w that together amount to x:

Lender A was matched with the borrower to pay to them the amount y. Lender B was matched with the same borrower to take care of a partial sum z and lender C who offered to lend an amount W was also matched up. So on the date and time that loan event is scheduled to start, lender A, B and C together are paying y, z, and w sums (summing up to x) to the borrower and the loan event starts its life cycle. The borrower has no clue that three lenders had to be assembled to service their loan, and the borrower does not care. (2)

When the clock ticks time Tc (later of course then the start time), the involved lender C is expected to get its loan back. (3). The DLI was busy all the time until Tc to find a suitable lender to replace lender C. Fortunately the DLI found lender M that offered to lend an amount w ( or higher) and agrees for the loan to start at time point Tc. Lender M then pays the mount w to lender C, and lender C leaves the scene having accomplished his plan to lend an amount w for the period of time to start at 'start' time and end on Tc.

Then the clock runs forward and Tb becomes the time of the present. (4). At Tb lender B is expecting to be paid his loan in the amount of z. The DLI before that moment was able to locate lender N who is ready to lend the amount z, and indeed is paying that sum to lender B (again the payment is in all convenience done from lender N to the DLI which right away passes it to lender B -- but direct transfer of money N to B is also possible, if so desired.

Next critical time comes when the clock runs its course to time point Tm (5). At this point lender M who at time point Tc paid w$ to lender C is expecting to be paid back the same amount now at time point Tm. This happens because the DLI found lender R who offered to pay the amount w or higher and do so beginning at time point Tm. So lender R is paying lender M, and lender M leaves the scene, fully satisfied.

Next the clock arrives to time point Ta (6). Lender A was the longest duration lender from the first set (lender A, B, and C). Lender A was prepared to lend to time point Ta which is still short of the full loan duration, so the DLI had to find lender S to pay the amount y$ to lender A, and again the borrower is clueless. When the clock comes to the end of the loan duration, t, then the borrower is returning the amount of the loan x to DLI (as said the interest payment is handled separately), and DLI breaks down x to y, z and w, and pays lender S the amount y, pays lender N the amount z and pays lender R the amount w.

This finishes off the loan event. A good match was achieved. The borrower got the money they requested at the amount and duration they requested and was agreed upon between them and the DLI, and when the loan time concluded the borrower returned the same amount x to DLI which was then able to satisfy lender N, S, and R.

This figure shows breakdown of a large lending offer to assorted smaller borrowing requests. Borrowers, A, B, C, D, E, and F are all fitted into the block of the lender offer. Each for a certain amount of money and a certain stretch of time. The white area represent lending capacity for which no match was found.

Five lender are shown to replace each other at time T1, T2, T3, T4 as together they match the borrower's request.

This figure depicts a use of the DLI for businesses or individuals who wish to keep their liquid assets spend-ready when they are active and awake, but are prepared to lend that money off during after hours, over night, or say when they are sleeping. After all a sleeping person is not spending any money. So the "bag of money" is shown at ready mode when its owner is awake and in a lent state when the owner is asleep. This figure highlights the fact that this described method is applicable to extremely short term lending events. In fact, if the DLI operation is extended globally then "while-you-sleep-lending" over the globe all by itself could support large long term loans since when one of us sleeps the other is awake, and vice versa.

This figure shows a loan that is being satisfied by a succession of lenders L1, L2, L3 -- after which the DLI was unable to locate a matching lender, so with no other choice the DLI used its own money (from a reserve fund kept specifically for that purpose) to support the loan, while looking for a fitting lender. Soon enough lender L4 is found and pays the loan amount. This payment goes to DLI which beforehand paid the same amount to L3. L4 is followed by L5 and the loan is completed without incident. The emergency intervention of the DLI kept the case smooth and without any incident.