Version 1
: Received: 26 October 2024 / Approved: 27 October 2024 / Online: 28 October 2024 (13:23:39 CET)
How to cite:
Ziying, Z.; Elvis, N. T.; Gonglin, H.; Yan, K. C.; Yun, S. Y. Asymmetric Roles of Different Punishments under Centralized Sanctions. Preprints2024, 2024102118. https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202410.2118.v1
Ziying, Z.; Elvis, N. T.; Gonglin, H.; Yan, K. C.; Yun, S. Y. Asymmetric Roles of Different Punishments under Centralized Sanctions. Preprints 2024, 2024102118. https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202410.2118.v1
Ziying, Z.; Elvis, N. T.; Gonglin, H.; Yan, K. C.; Yun, S. Y. Asymmetric Roles of Different Punishments under Centralized Sanctions. Preprints2024, 2024102118. https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202410.2118.v1
APA Style
Ziying, Z., Elvis, N. T., Gonglin, H., Yan, K. C., & Yun, S. Y. (2024). Asymmetric Roles of Different Punishments under Centralized Sanctions. Preprints. https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202410.2118.v1
Chicago/Turabian Style
Ziying, Z., Kang Chun Yan and Shen Yun Yun. 2024 "Asymmetric Roles of Different Punishments under Centralized Sanctions" Preprints. https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202410.2118.v1
Abstract
Altruistic punishment has been found to promote cooperation and address social dilemmas in both small and large societies. For many years, peer punishment has been viewed as a decentralized sanction to promote cooperation. Recent studies have found that centralized sanctions and punishments are more effective. In this paper, we incorporate centralized sanctions (third-party sanctions) into the repeating public goods game to investigate how different patterns of third-party punishment impact public cooperation and the organization’s profit, given enough information. Furthermore, the study assesses the influence of various punishments on cooperative behavior and examines the asymmetric roles of punishments in centralized sanctions. As a result: (1) Given enough information, high-intensity and non-random punishment can maintain long-term and high-level cooperation. (2) Punishment successfully deters free riding, regardless of intensity or randomness. (3) Under punishment, people can swiftly establish cooperative social norms to avoid punishment and, eventually, increase profits, regardless of the pattern applied. Therefore, our study sheds light on the heterogeneity of human cooperative behaviors under different centralized sanctions and proves the effectiveness of punishment in promoting human cooperation.
Keywords
punishment; centralized sanctions; cooperation; public goods game
Subject
Social Sciences, Behavior Sciences
Copyright:
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
