In this paper, mean-field type games between two players with backward stochastic dynamics are defined and studied. They make up a class of non-zero-sum differential games where the players' state dynamics solve backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs) that depend on the marginal distributions of player states. Players try to minimize their individual cost functionals, also depending on the marginal state distributions. Under some regularity conditions, we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of Nash equilibria. Player behavior is illustrated by numerical examples, and is compared to a centrally planned solution where the social cost, the sum of player costs, is minimized. The inefficiency of a Nash equilibrium, compared to socially optimal behavior, is quantified by the so-called price of anarchy. Numerical simulations of the price of anarchy indicate how the improvement in social cost achievable by a central planner depends on problem parameters.

This article discusses the outcomes of a quantitative analysis of the competitiveness of grain and its recycling in the countries-members of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) through econometric panel data models. The analysis is based on the data of public authorities’ statistics of the countries-members of the EEU, as well as the United Nations Comtrade Database which is a repository of official international trade statistics. The results of the analysis allow to assess the level of competitiveness of produced agro-food products in the countries-members of the EEU and determine the extent to which various factors affect it. The research conclusions can be used to develop and adjust the agreed with the agro-food policy in the EEU.